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Master's Thesis

**The Inevitable Stalemate:
A Two-Level Game Analysis of the Futenma Base
Relocation in Okinawa**

**불가피한 교착상태:
오키나와현 후텐마 기지 이전에 대한 투 레벨 게임 분석**

August 2017

**Graduate School of Seoul National University
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Abstract

The Inevitable Stalemate: A Two-Level Game Analysis of the Futenma Base Relocation in Okinawa

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Ever since the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, the relationship between Okinawa and Japan and the United States has soured. Hoping to amend local discontent, in 1996, both governments agreed on relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Camp Schwab, Henoko bay within five to seven years. Interestingly, the two-decade old agreement to establish the Futenma Relocation Facility on Henoko bay has not occurred. Although the societal, environmental and security concerns regarding the Okinawa base problem are not completely ignored, existing literature fails to analyze and circumvent the reasons behind delay.

This thesis contributes to debate by addressing why the Henoko relocation has stalled for the past twenty years. Loosely applying Putnam's Two-Level Game Analysis, this thesis will present the argument that the United States of America and Japan, believing that security takes precedence over Okinawa interest, knowingly engaged in negotiations given the poor prospects in Okinawan consent. Negotiations were determined to be time consuming and difficult from the beginning due to the low win-set as revealed by initial Okinawan resistance.

Keyword: Okinawa, U.S.-Japan Alliance, Futenma, Henoko, Two-Level Game Analysis

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

DOS	Department of State, The United States of America
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
FRF	Futenma Relocation Facility
GAO	Government Accountability Office
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
MAFF	The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MCIPAC	Marine Corps Installations Pacific
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MLIT	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
MOB	Mobile Offshore base
NHK	Japan Broadcasting Corporation [Nihon Hodou Kyoukai]
QIP	Quick Installation Platform
SACO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SBF	Sea-based Facility
SCC	Security Consultative Committee, U.S. and Japan
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

I. Introduction

1. The Futenma Relocation Problem

When referring to the United States of America's position in Asia, the alliance with Japan is indispensable for America. For Japan, the alliance with America symbolizes Japan's commitment to the post-WWII system and therefore remains its strongest alliance to this day. According to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the alliance between the two countries is an "alliance of hope."¹ While the relationship between the two countries is strong and coherent, there remains a thorn that prickles both parties: the Okinawa base problem.

The problem originates from the 1995 Okinawa rape incident.² Unlike previous military related crimes, the inhumane brutality imposed on a twelve-year old girl by three Marine soldiers caused uproar in Okinawa Prefecture. This particular case permeated both Japanese and Western mainstream media. In hopes to amend local contestation, both governments agreed on relocating Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma out of Ginowan City within five to seven years in 1996. After agreement, both governments announced that the Futenma Relocation Facility (FRF) would be relocated to Henoko, the bay adjacent to Camp Schwab located in Nago City, Okinawa. This proposal received immediate backlash from the oppositions, claiming

¹ Abe Shinzo, " 'Towards an Alliance of Hope' – Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress

² Andrew Pollack, "Marines Seek Peace With Okinawa in Rape Case," *The New York Times*, last modified on October 8, 1995, accessed on December 3, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/08/world/marines-seek-peace-with-okinawa-in-rape-case.html?pagewanted=all>.

that relocation within the prefecture betrays the promise of “reduc[ing] the burden of the people of Okinawa.”³ With opposition stemming from Okinawa, the status of relocation has since inched forward slowly yet steadily, at times shelved due to lack of options.

Immediately after the American and Japanese government initiated discussions on the future of the Futenma base, the LDP successfully concluded a compromised facility with Okinawa governor Keiichi Inamine. Unfortunately, resistance by the locals forced the central government to reconsider the 2002 blueprint. This led to the creation of the 2006 blueprint, which Inamine refused to accept as an alternative. Inamine’s successor accepted the new blueprint in principle but desired modifications. The alliance rejected the new mayor’s proposals. As a result, Okinawan governor Hirokazu Nakaima resisted relocation. Ultimately, the LDP failed to use these opportunities to their advantage.

The base problem took a significant swing with the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) electoral victory in 2009. A month before the elections, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared to relocate the FRF out of the prefecture and announced his will to reevaluate the 2006 roadway plan. Despite his promise, within a year of leadership, the new Prime Minister reneged his plan of relocation while citing security concerns. The politically liberal party failed to change the situation.

³ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan*, last modified on 2014, accessed on December 5, 2016, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html>.

Relocation gained momentum under the second Abe administration. Surprisingly, Nakaima accepted relocation in 2013, which led to his defeat in the 2014 Okinawa gubernatorial elections. The new governor, Takeshi Onaga, resists against the FRF. Legal permission to proceed with the relocation did not urge the Abe administration to take immediate action. After series of political conflict, the Abe administration began the procedure of inserting concrete block on sea ground in February 2017 and completed the bedrock of the FRF within a month.⁴ The logistics of the relocation problem may come to an end sooner or later. The Supreme Court has recently strengthened the LDP's justification for constructing the Henoko base with Okinawa Prefecture's defeat at court.⁵ It is likely that the Japanese government would successfully create the FRF in Henoko bay amidst of Okinawan opposition.

2. Puzzle and Importance of the Issue

Okinawa's location is strategically crucial for the American military. The island is located 350 nautical miles from Taiwan, 670 nautical miles from South Korea, 830 nautical miles from Tokyo and 990 nautical miles from Beijing.⁶ As stated in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the military's presence on the island allows the United States to defend and maintain the security of the Asia-Pacific. Home

⁴ "Finishing Inserting Blocks, The Aim to Avoid Criticism of Henoko Base Construction's as 'Illegal' [Buroku no touka kanryou Henoko shin kichi kouji 'ihou' shiteki sakeru neraika]," *Okinawa Times*, last modified on April 1, 2017, accessed on July 3, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/91249>.

⁵ Yutaka Chiba, "Henoko, Okinawa's Defeat Confirmed Supreme Court Decision Government leaning towards restarting construction [Henoko, Okinawaken no haisokakutei, saikousaiban hanketsu seifu, kouji saikai houshin]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 21, 2017.

⁶ Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," *Congressional Research Services*, last modified on January 20, 2016, accessed on July 2, 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, 4-5.

to roughly 70 percent of American bases in Japan, the strategic importance of Okinawa is undeniable.

Yet local residents have questioned the presence of the American military. Antagonism and skepticism towards American presence continue since Okinawa's reversion back to Japanese jurisdiction on 15 May 1972. Both American and Japanese governments have reduced military presence since reversion. The decision to return Futenma base with 11 other facilities back to Okinawan jurisdiction has been the greatest endeavor towards burden reduction. However, reversion of Futenma base has stalled for the past twenty years. What has hindered the construction of a facility that was proposed over twenty years ago? This puzzle continues to be dismissed and observers have instead discussed the implications of the new base. If the significance of the stalemate between the central governments and local government is not understood, antagonism will continue to accumulate. International security may also be negatively affected if the problem remains unaddressed. Even if relocation occurs against the local government's opposition, remorse will remain for at least a generation. This will result as continued attention towards American and Japanese mishandling of the problem. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the base relocation debate by delving into the reasons why relocation has been postponed for the past twenty years.

3. Structure of Thesis

This thesis is divided into three sections. The first part of the thesis introduces the theoretical overview for the Okinawa base problem. Six main arguments relating to the reasons behind delay in relocation is introduced and critiqued. As most literature related to Okinawa lacks a theoretical framework, the author presents and defends the usage of Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game Analysis for analyzing stagnation. The section will conclude with the methodology of the thesis.

The second part of the thesis theoretically scrutinizes the historical development of the twenty-year statement in three different stages: (1) 1996-2006, (2) 2009-2010, and (3) 2013 and beyond. The first stage (1996-2006) provides readers with background information on the origins and evolutions of both the base problem and the FRF construction plans. The second period (2009-2010) delves into former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his challenge against the United States of America. Although his tenure lasted for only nine months, he was the first Prime Minister to attempt the Futenma base relocation from the prefecture but failed. The third period (2013 to 2017) analyzes the current administration's initiatives in relation to the problem. Unlike previous administrations, relocation has most advanced under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. This period also sees greater mobilization of anti-base sentiment under current Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga. Each historical narrative will be explained using Putnam's theory.

The third part of the thesis conducts a comparative analysis of all three periods. This section clarifies Okinawa's position on the Futenma base relocation. American

and Japanese actions that negatively affects Okinawa's win-set are introduced. After clarifying the positions of the alliance and the local government, the paper answers why relocation has stagnated since 1996. This section concludes with suggestions that America, Japan and Okinawa should consider in order to practically implement a suitable FRF.

II. Theoretical Overview

1. Literature Review

While literature on the Okinawa base problem exists, most focus on the effects and implications of the problem rather than analyzing the essence of the base problem per se. For example, leading American security academics such as Michael Green and Mike Mochizuki argues over the strategic importance of the new base and the presence of the Marines.⁷ Professor at Okinawa International University Hiromori Maedori et al. argue how the US-Japan SOFA Agreement is the fundamental reason why bases continue to be located in Okinawa.⁸ Envall and Ng question whether the Okinawa problem could affect US-Japan relations.⁹ Robert D. Eldridge, recipients of the Suntory Prize for Social Sciences and Humanities and Yasuhiro Nakasone Award, wrote how the Okinawa base problem has been exacerbated by exaggerations made by Okinawan media, thus perpetuating resistance.¹⁰ Unfortunately, most available literature questions other aspects of the Okinawa base problem rather than questioning the issue of

⁷ Michael J. Green et al., “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, last modified on January 19, 2016, accessed on November 22, 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf; Kyoji Yanagisawa, et al., *The Virtual Image of Deterrence* [Kyoizou no yokushiyoku] (Tokyo: Kyouji Yanagisawa, 2015).

⁸ Hiromori Maedori, Toru Aketagawa, Eiichiro Iwayama, and Kouji Yabe, *The U.S.-Japan Status of Force Agreement that is more Important than the Constitution: Introduction* [Hontowa kenpo yori taisetsuna nichibei kyoutei nyumon] (Tokyo: Sogensha, 2013).

⁹ David Envall and Kerri Ng, “The Okinawa ‘Effect’ in US-Japan Alliance Politics,” *Asian Security* 11.3 (2015): 225-241.

¹⁰ Robert D. Eldridge, *Who Kills Okinawa* [Darega Okinawao Korosunoka] (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2016), 164.

stagnation. Therefore, the author accumulated the following six commonly shared arguments scattered within existing literature.

The first argument presents that Okinawa deliberately prolongs negotiation for greater financial gains. As evidence, conservative Okubo and Shinohara (2015) argue that the local construction company lobbied towards the Japanese government for greater financial gains, resulting in modifications of the 2006 blueprint.¹¹ Eldridge (2016a) argues that prolonged opposition would naturally force the government to continue financial aid.¹² Unfortunately, this argument emphasizes the role of few stakeholders (e.g. landowners) rather than the Okinawa as a whole. As the paper will reveal, opinion polls conducted by the central government, prefectural government and NHK reveal a general consensus against the FRF, suggesting that financial income is not an important reason behind delay.¹³ Despite the threat to decrease financial assistance, Okinawa, under Onaga, continues to fight against relocation. Therefore, while there may be entities that seek greater benefits, financial income alone cannot explain delay in relocation.

The second argument asserts that internal division within Okinawa explains the slow process of relocation. Envall and Ng (2015) argue that political pluralization, defined as “increasing competition between political groups over the values or objectives that the state should be pursuing”, hampers speedy relocation.¹⁴ This

¹¹ Jun Okubo and Akira Shinohara, *The Inconvenient Truth of Okinawa* [Okinawa no futsugouno shinjitsu] (Tokyo: Shinchosa, 2016), 17-18, 33.

¹² Robert D. Eldridge, *Okinawa Theory* [Okinawa Ron] (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2016), 165-166.

¹³ Refer to Chapter IV 1.3.

¹⁴ Envall and Kerri, 227.

argument solely places blame on the local Okinawan government and in result dismisses the role of the United States and Japan. In addition, the paper fails to explain why relocation has not occurred when Okinawa was united under the Hatoyama and second Abe administration. The current situation reveals that political pluralization is not sufficient reason for stabilization

While Yoo (2014) agrees with Envial and Ng, she presents the third argument that the flippancy position of governors contributes to delay.¹⁵ She argues that both Inamine and Nakaima have contradicted with their initial intentions to compromise with the central government. However, with closer observation, Inamine was consistent with his stance of relocation.¹⁶ Once his relocation conditions were abandoned by the central government, he declined to cooperate. On the other hand, the relocation lenient governor Nakaima desired modification to the 2006 blueprint. The alliance rejected his proposal. He turned into an anti-base advocate and only changed his mind during his last year of governorship. Therefore, he was consistently hesitant towards the government's proposal for seven years.

The fourth argument attributes blame to the Hatoyama administration's action for disrupting the long procedure of negotiation and allowing skepticism to erupt towards the government. Moritomo (2010), former aid to the Japanese Minister of Defense under the Aso administration, wrote an insider view to the Okinawa base relocation problem. Although his stated purpose was to analyze why Futenma has not

¹⁵ Hyon Joo Yoo, "When Domestic Factors Matter: The Relocation of US Bases in Okinawa," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 12.2 (2014): 404.

¹⁶ Refer to Chapter III 1.3 and 1.4.

been relocated, he merely provided a historical account and failed to explain why relocation has not occurred during the first ten years of the LDP government.¹⁷ The trends of voting preferences in Okinawa's gubernatorial election prove that anti-base preferences did not have a significant change during the DPJ government.¹⁸

Miyagi and Watanabe (2016) represent the fifth argument that the governments' initiative was insufficient to address the burdens of Okinawa and contradict the spirit of the 1996 agreement. They quote Gerald Curtis' comment that "the Okinawa base problem is like a time bomb" to describe the unaddressed burden of the Okinawans.¹⁹ They effectively presented Okinawa's burden but failed to connect it to reasons behind the deadlock.

The sixth argument is the Marine Corps' agenda to protect their own interests. Looking at the Futenma relocation problem from a critical perspective of the United States, Wright (2010) argues, "Crucial to understanding the impasse at Futenma is the infighting and favoritism that occurs among the various branches of the U.S. military."²⁰ He claims that favoritism towards the Marines explains the lack of consideration towards base consolidation with Kadena Air Base and that "[s]imple as it may be, I believe that Okinawa's ideal location, climate, and recreation facilities also pay a role in ensuring that MCAS Futenma will continue to haunt the people of

¹⁷ Satoshi Morimoto, *The Mysterious Twists in the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma Relocation Plan* [Futenma no Nazo] (Tokyo: Kairyusha, 2010), 7.

¹⁸ Refer to Chapter IV 1.4.

¹⁹ Gerald Curtis quoted in Taizo Miyagi and Tsuyoshi Watanabe, *Futenma Henoko The Distorted 20 Years* [Futenma Henoko yugamerareta 20 nen] (Tokyo: Shueisha Shinsho, 2016), 216.

²⁰ Dustin Wright, "Impasse at MCAS Futenma," *Critical Asian Studies* 42.3 (2010): 465.

Ginowan for a long time.”²¹ While Wright’s presentation of internal military politics is interesting, it distracts from addressing the issue of reducing Okinawan burden by the American and Japanese governments.

The previous six arguments are important facets of the relocation problem. Unfortunately, the arguments fail to explain the fundamental issue. Loosely applying Putnam’s Two-Level Game Analysis, the author will argue that America and Japan (Level I), believing that security takes precedence over Okinawa interest (i.e. overall reduction of base presence), knowingly engaged in negotiations given the poor prospects in Okinawan consent (Level II). Negotiations were determined to be time consuming and difficult from the beginning due to the low win-set as revealed by initial Okinawan resistance.

2. Theoretical Framework

Recognizing the intricate relation between diplomacy and domestic actors, Robert Putnam (1988) developed the Two-Level Game Analysis to explain how international and domestic actors affect the other. According to Putnam, both domestic and international constituents are driven by self-interest and seek to maximize gains through negotiation.²² In his original theory, domestic actors pressure the national government to act accordingly to their will. The national government is expected to confront and appease domestic interest through negotiation with other governments. Putnam categorizes negotiation between governments on the international stage as

²¹ Ibid..

²² Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42.3 (1988): 434.

Level I and negotiations within a country as Level II.²³ Putnam labels the range of internal consent as win-sets; the larger the win-sets in both countries in negotiation, the likelihood of agreement increases. Therefore, “By definition, any successful agreement must fall within the Level II win-sets of each of the parties to accord.”²⁴

Ratification of negotiations can fail due to voluntary and involuntary defection. Voluntary defection refers to the rational choice of the government to renege from negotiations.²⁵ Involuntary defection refers to the government’s failure to execute agreements due to domestic contestation. In order to avoid either defection, it is important to understand how win-sets can be modified.

Putnam introduces three factors that affect win-sets. First, the preferences and coalitions among Level II constituents affect the size of win-sets. If Level II actors are internally divided, Level I actors need only to appease the majority of Level II actors.²⁶ Homogeneity among Level II actors can negatively affect the possibility of international consensus due to a constricted Level II conditions. Interest among Level II constituents could also involve many areas, ranging from financial gains to environmental protection. Because preferences cannot be easily changed, incentives agreed upon Level I that provide favorable benefits to domestic actors may positively affect negotiation. This issue linkage is labeled as synergistic linkage.²⁷ The second

²³ Ibid., 436.

²⁴ Ibid., 437-438.

²⁵ Ibid., 438-439.

²⁶ Ibid., 444.

²⁷ Ibid., 447.

factor is Level II institutions, which refers to the type of governance.²⁸ The difference of political institutions and power distribution among different domestic constituents can also affect win-sets, such as the power difference between states, territories, and prefectures. The third factor is the Level I negotiators' choice of strategy, which includes media utilization and language choice.²⁹

Two out of three additional factors that affect negotiations are important for this thesis. If Level I negotiators are placed in a similar position, negotiators must convince a proposal that is slightly in advantage or disadvantage for one party to strike a negotiation.³⁰ Governments can also pressure the opponents to accept certain negotiations, resulting in reverberation within their counterpart's domestic politics.³¹ While Putnam asserts that international pressure can theoretically expand win-sets, he also agrees that domestic backlash may occur.

The Futenma relocation problem consists of three actors: the American government, Japanese government, and the local Okinawan government. The clear division of interest between the central governments and the local government proves that Putnam's theory is appropriate. The case of Okinawa proves interesting as the two central governments (Level I) are united without question and are working towards convincing Okinawa in accepting the relocation (Level II). The domestic political institution limits Japanese leverage because any form of forcible construction without the Okinawa governor's consent will be interpreted as a rejection of democracy. As

²⁸ Ibid., 448-449.

²⁹ Ibid., 450-452.

³⁰ Ibid., 453.

³¹ Ibid., 454-456.

mentioned in the previous section, the thesis argues that the win-sets of the alliance and Okinawa were limited and never overlapped. Therefore, even before negotiations began, the schism between the two parties predetermined consensus as unlikely to occur in the near future.

3. Methodology

In order to analyze the history of the Okinawa base problem, the paper refers to existing literature and news articles to properly address crucial events that occurred in the past twenty years. Works conducted by Okinawan historian Moriteru Aragaki and Satoshi Moritomo is utilized for understanding events that occurred from 1996 until the end of the Hatoyama administration. The Asahi Shimbun is the main source of reference for events from 2013 and to present American, Japanese and Okinawan perspectives.

Both American and Japanese incentives are scrutinized through an analysis of governmental documents and official comments made by both governments. Okinawan incentives are examined through Okinawan related literature, current Okinawa governor Onaga's speeches and book, and public opinion polls. For the sake of clarity, the positions of America and Japan are combined and analyzed as one entity. The evolving conditions or win-sets are observed throughout the thesis.

III. Disrupted Promises and Delayed Implementation

1. Disguised Compromises: From the 1995 Rape to the 2006

Roadmap

1.1 Background to Agreement of Futenma Base's Relocation

Problems between American soldiers and locals were a problem both under American control and after Okinawa's reversion on 15 May 1972. According to the Okinawa Prefecture Police Department, crimes committed by American soldiers from 1972 up to 1995 amounted to 4790 different incidents, significant crimes including 12 murders, 355 cases of theft, and 31 cases of rape.³² Regardless of previous criminal offenses on multiple occasions, the rape of the middle school girl conducted by three American soldiers on 4 September 1995 changed the situation of base politics.³³ In response, the Okinawa Prefecture Civilian Demonstration (*Okinawa Kenmin Soukekki Taikai*) occurred on 21 October 1995, which amounted to 85,000 participants. Both Japanese and Western media reported the incident, and mass demonstrations manifested Okinawan discontent.

Hoping to ease tensions as soon as possible, the Japanese and American government established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) during November 2015. After multiple debates and discussions, both governments jointly

³² Aragaki, 158.

³³ Pollack, "Marines Seek Peace With Okinawa in Rape Case."

published the SACO Final Report on 2 December 1996.³⁴ The American government promised to return 11 facilities, one of them being MCAS Futenma.³⁵ While 11 facilities will be returned, both governments agreed to relocate Futenma base during the next five to seven years within the prefecture rather than moving it out of Okinawa. As an alternative for Futenma, in January 1997, both governments proposed Henoko, Nago city as the host of the new FRF. The decision to return Futenma base was surprising. While burden reduction has been on both U.S. and Japanese agenda since Okinawa's reversion, most of the reversions focused on smaller bases rather than large facilities such as Futenma. It is also important to realize that in 1993, the local government announced three important factors they deemed most necessary: the return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield and the halt of parachute practices, and the halt of Artillery live-fire training over Okinawa Prefecture Highway 104.³⁶ It can be concluded that the Americans and Japanese were ambitious in efforts to reduce burden by addressing both two out of the three demands and simultaneously including the reversion of Futenma.

³⁴ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The SACO Final Report."

³⁵ The 11 facilities are of the following: Futenma, 4000 hectares of Camp Gonsalves (Northern Training Area), Aha Training Area, Gimbaru Training Area, Sobe Communications Site, Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Senaha Communications Station, Camp Kuwae (also known as Camp Lester), Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and housing consolidations on Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran (also known as Camp Foster). "Okinawa Beigun Kichi Henkan Keikaku," *Nippon.com*, last modified on April 25, 2013, accessed on December 31, 2015, <http://www.nippon.com/ja/features/h00028/>.

³⁶ Morimoto, 42.

1.2 The Level I Agreement Between the United States and Japan

Following the announcement of relocating the Futenma base, both American and Japanese government looked at different bases and debated over the preferred destination. The Japanese government understood that relocating the base out of the prefecture was strategically implausible given its geographic location.³⁷ Out of all speculated host destinations, in July 1996, the Japanese government proposed merging Futenma to Kadena Air Base would be preferable as one executive member of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) explained, “Residents of Okinawa would most likely accept relocating the base to an already existing facility rather than creating a new runway.”³⁸ The United States rejected the proposal. According to the American militray, the consolidation of different Marine and the Air Force’s aircrafts could increase the likelihood of aviation navigation accidents.³⁹ In response to America’s explanation, one of the executive members of the JDA retaliated, “It is not possible to simply accept [this explanation] without any data presented. [The Japanese government] will continue pressing for the Kadena proposal until the end.”⁴⁰ This development is extremely interesting, as another executive member of the JDA further

³⁷ Ibid., 106-107.

³⁸ Anonymous executive member of the JDA quoted in “Government to Negotiate with America with Considerations for Okinawa: Proposal of Consolidating Futenma’s Heliport to Kadena [Futenma helipoto no Kadena heno kyushuteian Okinawagawa ni hairyō seifu to bei kōshō],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 27, 1996. Translated by author.

³⁹ “Stalemate on Negotiations for U.S. MCAS Futenma’s Relocation: The Government Stalled against the United States [Taibei Okinawa meguri, seifu tachi oujyou Beigun Futenma kichi iten, susumanu hanashiai],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 28, 1996.

⁴⁰ Anonymous executive member of the JDA quoted in “Continued Stalemate between the United States and Japan on Relocation of the Heliport: Okinawa MCAS Futenma Relocation [Kouchaku tsuzuku nichibei kyōgi heipoto isetsu meguri Okinawa Futenma hikoujyou henkan],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 26, 1996.

claimed, “The United States doesn’t fully understand the difficulty of the Okinawa Problem. Rejecting consolidation with Kadena Air Base could possibly lead to rejection of the American military and result as expulsion from the whole island.”⁴¹

With plans to finish concrete planning by November, the Japanese and American continued negotiations. Staying true to their concerns, the Japanese bureaucrats readdressed the importance of considering creating a facility within Kadena base.⁴² As previously mentioned, the Japanese government presented their proposal as “an option that has possibility of Okinawan consent.”⁴³ As expected, the United States repeated their concern of aviation navigation. American negotiators also raised concerns of further burden on Kadena Air Base and the possibility of growing noise pollution. However, unlike their attitude in the summer of 1996, the American negotiators accepted the Kadena alternative as an alternative to the Futenma base. With America proposing a new alternative of creating a sea-based facility (SBF), both governments came to an agreement to consider creating a new facility within the Kadena Air Base, a facility at Camp Schwab, or a SBF.⁴⁴ Although the parties agreed to come to a conclusion on the destination of the facility, as seen in the SACO Final Report released on 2 December, all alternatives were listed as options to be further examined.⁴⁵ This was soon reversed on 16 January 1997 when Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku

⁴¹ Anonymous executive member of the JDA quoted in Ibid.

⁴² “Delayed to the U.S.-Japan Summit, The SACO Team and the MCAS Futenma Kadena Consolidation Proposal [Shunou kaidan he sakiokurimo SACO sagyou buhai Futenma hikoujyou Kadena kyushuan],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 14, 1996.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ “SACO to Agree on Three Alternatives including a Sea-Based Facility: MCAS Futenma Relocation [Kaijyouan fukume 3 an ni shiboru nichibei tokubetsu koudouin de goui beigun Futenma hikoujyou iten],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 18, 1996.

⁴⁵ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996.”

Kajiyama announced that both governments agreed to uphold Henoko bay as the alternative claiming, “There is no other alternative.”⁴⁶ Given the lower population in Nago City and possible increase of noise pollution in Kadena, the alliance concluded Henoko as the better option.⁴⁷

As seen in the development of deciding the location for the FRF, the Japanese government fought for creating the facility within the already existing Kadena Air Base. Although critics may like to believe that Japanese politicians simply succumbed to American pressure, the government’s endeavor cannot be simply ignored. The Japanese government correctly understood that any alternative other than the Kadena proposal would engender further contestation.

On the Level I platform, the Japanese government failed to convince the American government in accepting their Kadena proposal. Negotiations between the United States and Japan reveal three conditions that the Americans deemed as important: to relocate Futenma within Okinawa, to not consolidate the FRF to an existing facility, and to maintain the equal level of security. Although Japan knew Okinawa’s low win-set and warned their counterpart of resistance, Japan failed in persuading America to expand their win-set. Mutually understood necessity of security and America’s intransigent position on relocation led to a Level I agreement. The alliance engaged Okinawa amidst acknowledging their low win-set.

⁴⁶ Seiroku Kajiyama quoted in “Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama to announce that Schwab Bay is also a candidate: Report to the American Military [Shuwabuoki, Kajiyama kanbouchoukan mo kouho to meigen beigun he ripoto],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 17, 1997.

⁴⁷ Morimoto, 127.

1.3. The 2002 Blueprint: Taking Okinawa's Demands into

Consideration

Demonstrations occurred throughout the year of discussion, as it soon became apparent that the Futenma reversion required creating another facility within the prefecture.⁴⁸ American military facilities that could serve as hosts for relocation were all over Okinawa. Therefore, it is not surprising that those living in the Nago City, the proposed relocation destination, protested against the suggestion. As protest gained momentum, the Nago City Mayor decided to conduct a referendum about Henoko on 6 June 1997. This particular incident experienced a voter turnout of 82.45 percent.⁴⁹ Those who approved the construction amounted to roughly 45 percent, while those who opposed amounted to roughly 52 percent. Unfortunately, the referendum was meaningless. To everyone's surprise, during December, the Nago mayor suddenly decided to accept the relocation and left office the following day.⁵⁰ Tateo Kishimoto, the new mayor, announced that he would follow the decision of the Okinawan governor. After the Nago City referendum, Governor Masahide Ota resisted further development of relocation. However, Keiichi Inamine, candidate who was more flexible on relocation, won the 1998 Okinawa gubernatorial election against Ota, former governor against Henoko. It seemed as if things were going in favor of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

⁴⁸ "Okinawa to Anger against FRF Once Again Against All Potential Candidates [Okinawa, Daitaikichi ni Ikari Futatabi Dono Kouhochimo Ukeire Hantai]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 17, 1996.

⁴⁹ Aragaki, 186.

⁵⁰ "Mayor Higashicho to Resign [Higashicho ga Jiyuu Teishutsu]," *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on December 26, 1997, accessed on December 3, 2016, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-90396.html>.

As an alternative to Futenma, the alliance initially agreed to create a sea-based facility. When discussing the nature of the new base, the U.S. military proposed the Mobile Offshore Base (MOB), a floating platform that can freely move in bodies of water.⁵¹ The mobile facility could be placed at a respectful distance from local residents. In addition, the facility could be easily dismantled if further usage was deemed unnecessary. However, this model is technologically advanced and demanding, and remains technologically implausible to this day. The Japanese researched the possibility of creating a mega-float base by using the Quick Installation Platform (QIP).⁵² Like the MOB, a mega-float base created with the QIP methodology was attractive because it can support the infrastructure with several piles, and thus is easier to dismantle when the base is deemed as unnecessary. The usage of piles also allows water to flow under these floating bases and is less environmentally hazardous when compared to a landfill.

With different outlooks of base creation, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced on 11 November 1998 that the government would reconsider the agreed-upon MOB alternative as the FRF.⁵³ With discussions of what an alternative could look like, a year later on 23 November 1999, Okinawan governor Inamine accepted Henoko as the location for the relocation facility with the conditions of a fifteen-year lease and

⁵¹ Morimoto, 159.

⁵² Ibid., 165.

⁵³ “Okinawa On-Sea Base Under Unavoidable Review Government Leaders’ Outlook [Okinawano kaijyou kichian wa mitoushi fukahi Seifushuno ga mitoushi],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 11, 1998.

usage of the new facility as a joint military-civilian airport.⁵⁴ While the fifteen-year lease was not fully embraced by the alliance, the Obuchi Administration agreed with the cabinet decision “Government Policies Regarding the Relocation of the MCAS Futenma” on 28 December 1999.⁵⁵

This cabinet decision resulted in the development of the Futenma Relocation Facility Conference, which allowed Okinawan and affiliated Japanese government cabinet ministers to engage in negotiation regarding the construction methodology and location of the FRF. Starting from 28 December 1999, the conference concluded negotiation by 29 July 2002 over a span of nine meetings.⁵⁶ With both U.S. government and Japanese government showing less interest in the American-proposed MOB and Okinawan negotiators believing that the new facility would be a joint military-civilian airport on a fifteen-year lease, the Japanese and Okinawan politicians came to the conclusion of landfilling the FRF.

Unlike the current plan, Japan and Okinawa agreed to landfill the seabed 2.2 kilometers away from Henoko, Nago and 0.6 kilometers from Hirajima.⁵⁷ With a base far from the city, noise pollution and contact with the Okinawans would significantly decrease, and a landfill would prove economically beneficial for local companies. After 15 years, Okinawa expected full usage of the runway. Contrary to Okinawan

⁵⁴ “‘American Military Usage for 15 Years’ Governor Inamine Continuing Request regarding the Futenma Air Base Relocation Site [Beigunshiyō wa 15 nen Inamine chiji, yōsei keizokuhe Futenma hikoujyō isetsusaki],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 23, 1999; Morimoto, 146.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 150-151.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 184-189.

⁵⁷ Japanese Cabinet Office, “Consideration documents based on ‘Main Points of the Direction in Handling the Relocation Facility Plan’ [‘Daitai isetsu kihon keikaku shuyō jikō ni kakawaru toriatsukai hoshin’ ni motodoku kentō shiryō],” *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, last modified on 2002, accessed on April 17, 2017, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hutenma/dai9/9siryō1.pdf>, 2.

belief, the American military never accepted restriction on usage. As a result, on 28 November 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his cabinet passed the cabinet decision “Government Policies Regarding the Relocation of the Futenma Air Base.”⁵⁸ The Koizumi administration announced that they would discuss the duration of usage with the United States while heavily considering Okinawa’s conditions. This was purposely left vague in order to avoid conflict with the Okinawan stakeholders.

1.4 The 2006 Blueprint: Pushing for a Speedy Relocation

With the original deadline of five to seven years already passed, the process of inspection and boring survey began from 19 April 2004. This process of halted and ultimately failed due to demonstrations.⁵⁹ The next critical accident relating American bases occurred during August 2004 when an American military helicopter crashed into Okinawa International University, located within a kilometer from MCAS Futenma.⁶⁰ Fortunately, school was out of session. This incident rekindled fear among the Okinawans and ignited further frustration, which manifested as the “U.S. Helicopter Crash 9.12 Ginowan-City Civilian Demonstration” (*Beigun Heri Tsuiraku 9.12 Ginowan Shimin Taikai*) with 30,000 participants, which amounts roughly to a third of

⁵⁸ Japanese Cabinet Office, “Main Points of ‘The Government’s Position on the Relocation of the Futenma Air Base’ [‘Futenma hikoujyou no isetsu ni kakaru seifuhoushin’ no gaiyou],” *Cabinet Office, Government of Japan*, last modified on May 30, 2006, accessed on April 17, 2017, <http://www8.cao.go.jp/okinawa/7/7211.html>.

⁵⁹ Aragaki, 220-221; Takemasa Moriya, *The Futenma Chronicle the negotiations behind the scenes* [‘Futenma’ koushou hiroku] (Tokyo: Shinchosa, 2010), 52.

⁶⁰ James Brooke, “A Crash, and the Scent of Pizzatocracy, Anger Okinawa,” *The New York Times*, last modified on September 13, 2004, accessed on December 4, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/13/world/asia/a-crash-and-the-scent-of-pizzatocracy-anger-okinawa.html>.

the city's population.⁶¹ The uncertain situation of base-lease and infamous 2004 Helicopter Crash Accident gave momentum for the anti-base movement.

With friction between Okinawa and the central governments increasing whether related to the recent accident or misunderstandings on the nature of the new base, the alliance started to hint at reconsidering the already decided FRF. On 23 February 2005, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of Defense Richard P. Lawless revealed the necessity of finding a viable location for the FRF, implying that other options may be reconsidered.⁶² This suggestion was further bolstered on 27 February when Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura, through a Fuji Television news program, mentioned, "Whether options other than the Henoko [plan] exist or not. I will not reject any possibilities."⁶³ Morimoto notes that intensified reanalysis of all options occurred within the LDP during September 2005.⁶⁴ While the original plan cleared all objectives and concerns held by all three actors, the extensive period of construction and finance made both the United States and Japan to reconsider the 2002 agreement.

Given that demonstration against environmental assessment of Henoko was hindering the procedure, the Japanese government under former Prime Minister

⁶¹ Population data of Ginowan residents (89,316 at August 2004) retrieved from Okinawa Prefectural Government, "Okinawa Prefecture Estimated Population Data Table [Okinawaken suikei jinko data ichiran]," *Okinawa Prefecture Statistical Document Website*, accessed on April 17, 2017, <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/toukeika/estimates/estidata.html#2004>; Morimoto, 236.

⁶² "America to consider alternative if proposed A Breakthrough Alternative Approaching Japan The Futenma Transfer Problem [Bei, daitaian dereba kentou Nihon ni daikai-saku semaru Futenma iten mondai]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 24, 2005.

⁶³ "Foreign Minister Machimura on the Futenam Relocation, Not to reject proposals other than Henoko [Henoko igai 'haijyo shinai' Beigun Futenma isetsu de Machimura Gaishou]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 28, 2005.

⁶⁴ Morimoto, 242.

Junichiro Koizumi believed that creating the base entirely on land would shorten the process.⁶⁵ The United States government proposed to create a landfilled extension near Henoko City than the original 2.2 kilometers. Taking America's proposal into consideration, the Japanese government argued that construction should occur partly on land, hoping that this would fasten the process of the already late relocation. In the midst of U.S.-Japan negotiations, Nago Mayor Kishimoto and Okinawa Governor Inamine opposed changes. Kishimoto suggested that Nago would consider the American proposal, However, he argued against the Japanese proposal citing potential danger due to proximity and noise pollution, and therefore "[the Japanese proposal is] 100 percent no."⁶⁶ On the other hand, Inamine argued against both alternatives and called out to respect the initial agreement.⁶⁷ Regardless of these leaders' opposition, on 29 October 2005, both governments put an end to the long discussion on the location of the new facility with an agreement to create the FRF on Henoko Bay.⁶⁸ In response to the decision, Inamine argued, "[The 2002 agreement was decided] within the difficult context of relocation within the prefecture.... If not the original agreement, the prefecture will continue to hold firm on out of prefecture relocation."⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Ibid., 250; Moriya, 82-83.

⁶⁶ "Futenma Relocation, Okinawa Henoko Reduction Plan Appears Nago City Mayor Showing Hints of Admitting Proposal [Futenmaishetsu, Henoko Okinawa shukushoan ga fujyou Nago shicho, younin no shisei]," *The Asahi Shinbun*, September 21, 2005.

⁶⁷ "Not Satisfied with the Innter-Prefecture Relocation Okinawa Governor Comments on the Futenma Relocation [Kennaian ni nattokusezu Okinawa chiji, hatsugen fumikomu Futenma isetsu]," *The Asahi Shinbun*, October 5, 2005.

⁶⁸ Morimoto, 259.

⁶⁹ Keiichi Inamine quoted in "Nago City Mayor Officially Denouncing Futenma's Relocation Plan to Henoko [Futenma no Henokosaki isetsuan, Nago shicho mo hitei seishiki hyoumei]," *The Asahi Shinbun*, November 1, 2005.

Both Kishimoto and Inamine's disapproval did not stop the governments. Negotiations of the blueprint occurred between the Japanese government and the new Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro in March 2006, and both parties came to an agreement of a V-way roadmap rather than the original L-way on 7 April 2006.⁷⁰ The alliance officially announced the new blueprint through the U.S.-Japan joint publication of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation on 1 May 2006.⁷¹ Okinawa Governor Inamine responded that he would "respect the decision of Nago city. But the prefecture will remain to its view."⁷² Starting out from mutual negotiation and ending in contradictory stances, decision on the location and blueprint were now set. Pro-relocation candidate Hirokazu Nakaima won the 2006 Okinawa gubernatorial elections, providing confidence in speedy relocation.⁷³ As originally decided in the 1996 SACO Final Report, relocation was not achieved within the five to seven years as promised. The new deadline was placed at 2014.

⁷⁰ Moriya, 177-186; "Agreement between the Central Government and Nago City on the Futenma Relocation with a V-way Structure with Two Runways [Kassoro 2 honka de goui V jigata, richakuriku wo bunri Futenma isetsude Kuni to Nagoshi]." *The Asahi Shimbun*. April 8, 2006.

⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation," *U.S. Department of State*, last modified on May 1, 2006, accessed on December 10, 2016, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/65517.htm>.

⁷² "Inamine Okinawa Governor's Difficulty and Decision to Hold Steadfast to the Prefecture's Position of Opposing the New Futenma Relocation Proposal [Inamine Okinawa chiji, kujyu Futenma isetsu mondai no sai shusei an ni hantai ken no tachiba kenji kyoudi wa keizoku]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 9, 2006.

⁷³ "Nakaima Elected and Defeats Itokazu with 37,318 Vote Difference [Nakaimashi ga hatsutousen Itokazushi ni 3 man 7318 hyousa]," *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on November 20, 2006, accessed on April 10, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/photo/preentry-19026.html>.

Contrary to expectations, Nakaima demanded that the new runway had to be located further out in Henoko bay and less partially on land.⁷⁴ Lengthy negotiations with both the United States and the new Nago mayor resulted in the central government's rejection of Nakaima's proposal. However, resistant and obdurate as the previous governor, Nakaima refused to accept the new proposal if his conditions were not met.

1.5 Expanding Win-sets?

As expected, Okinawa resisted inner-prefecture relocation. The 1997 Nago City Referendum and Ota's position were hurdles to the alliance's plan. Inamine was determined to limit the use of the new facility by proposing two conditions. Despite America being hesitant, Japan believed that negotiations on Inamine's terms were necessary in order to reach a consensus. While it may seem as if the alliance was able to change the preferences of the Okinawan government, the conditions that limited American use of the new base suggest that Okinawa never changed their position on relocation. If a new facility was necessary, Okinawa desired a facility that limits usage and remain under Okinawan jurisdiction. Therefore, a proper Level I and Level II consensus was never reached. As seen with the Koizumi administration's cabinet decision, the Japanese government was intentionally vague on the term of usage in order to strike a deal with both America and Okinawa.

⁷⁴ Shougo Nishie, "What about the Economy, the Base? Nakaima's Seven Years of Governorship [Keizaiwa? Kichiwa? Nakaima kensei 7 nen]," *Okinawa Times*, last modified on December 9, 2013, accessed on July 5, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/34872>.

Failure to conduct boring surveys for the 2002 blueprint discouraged the Koizumi administration to continue with construction. While respecting America's win-sets, Japan reexamined other alternatives that could shorten the process and confront less resistance. Rekindled negotiation with the United States resulted in the 2006 blueprint. The central government decided not to discuss the specifics with the Okinawa governor, which resulted in Okinawa to reaffirm their win-sets. The rise of Nakaima was expected to be advantageous for the alliance. However, the new governor demanded readjustment to the blueprint, which would result in another round of lengthy negotiations with the Americans and Okinawans. For the first time, Japan and America cemented their position on the blueprint and resisted Okinawan demands. This resulted in a continued standoff between the Level I and Level II constituents.

2. Great Expectations: The DPJ and Hatoyama's Failed Attempt

2.1 Hatoyama's Challenge Against the Initial Level I Agreement

All of Japanese politics took a significant swing with the DPJ's electoral victory on 30 August 2009. For the first time in history, one ruling party defeated the LDP. An advocate against the Futenma relocation, a month before elections, Yukio Hatoyama declared to create the FRF out of the prefecture and announced his will to reevaluate the 2006 roadway plan.⁷⁵ In response, a day after the DPJ's historic victory, the Americans made it clear that they have no intention to renegotiate the already decided

⁷⁵ "Representative of the Democratic Party of Japan Hatoyama to 'Act' on Outer-Prefecture Futenma Relocation [Futenma kengai setsu 'koudou suru' Minshutou Hatoyama daihyou]," *The Ryukyu Shimpo*, last modified on July 20, 2009, accessed on December 10, 2016, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-147365.html>.

plans.⁷⁶ Regardless, during the second U.S.-Japan Meeting held on 13 November 2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama told President Barack Obama to trust him on the Okinawa base problem and claimed to provide an alternative to Henoko.⁷⁷ A month later on 17 December at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference held at Copenhagen, Hatoyama reiterated Japan's direction on the base problem to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.⁷⁸ Few days later, Clinton warned Japanese Ambassador to the United States of America Ichiro Fujisaki that a delayed relocation of the FRF "may affect the future of U.S.-Japan relations."⁷⁹ Frustration growing in the United States prompted Hatoyama to announce May 2010 as the deadline of decision, and thus led to the creation of the Okinawa Base Problem Investigation Committee on 28 December.⁸⁰

Growing expectations and pressure from Washington intensified discussion at the Okinawa Base Problem Investigation Committee. A joint committee compromised with politicians from the DPJ, the Social Democratic Party and the People's New Party. The latter two parties presented alternatives to the existing plan for the DPJ to consider. While the Social Democrats' proposals were all pointed towards other locations within Japan other than Okinawa, the People's New Party proposed creating

⁷⁶ "'Will not Renegotiate' Futenma, Kerry U.S. Press Secretary Checks on the DPJ's Rule [Futenma 'saikoushou shinai' Kerry bei hodoukan, 'Minshu seiken' kensei]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 31, 2009.

⁷⁷ "Prime Minister Hatoyama Revealing President Obama's 'I will trust you' at the Summit Conference [Obama bei daitouryou kara 'shinjimasuyo' Shunou kaidan de hentou, Hatoyama Shushou akasu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 19, 2009.

⁷⁸ Keiichi Kaneko, "Prime Minister Hatoyama explaining he 'received understanding' on Delaying Futenma Relocation, Secretary Clinton Denying Claims by Notifying Japan's Ambassador to United States [Futenma sakiokuri 'rikai eta' Hatoyama shushou no setsumei, Clinton beichoukan hitei zai bei taishi ni dentatsu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 23, 2009.

⁷⁹ Hillary Clinton quoted in Ibid.

⁸⁰ Morimoto, 400-401.

the runway and helipad within Camp Schwab or merging with Kadena Air Base.⁸¹ Although the DPJ saw Tokunoshima, Kagoshima Prefecture as the single out of Okinawa alternative, they understood the difficult reality creating a FRF out of Okinawa. On 23 March 2010 the Cabinet decided to push for creating a runway or helipad within Camp Schwab.⁸² As expected, both Governor Nakaima and the American government rejected the proposal. With two more months until the deadline, the Hatoyama administration scrambled to figure whether the feasibility of the Tokunoshima alternative. This too failed, as media coverage on DPJ's tentative Tokunoshima proposal resulted in an island-wide demonstration.

Immense pressure from both the Okinawans and Americans led to Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's demise. Rescinding his promise, Hatoyama eventually revoked his plan on May 4, 2010, announcing that Henoko was necessary for deterrence.⁸³ The Prime Minister's failed attempt encouraged Nakaima to run on an anti-Futema platform for the 2010 Okinawa gubernatorial elections.⁸⁴ Hatoyama's failure resulted in a skeptical Washington. While the two following DPJ Prime Ministers after Hatoyama tried to revive relations, the first administration's failure led to former LDP Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to advocate strengthening U.S.-Japan

⁸¹ Ibid., 446.

⁸² Ibid., 475-478.

⁸³ "Prime Minister Reneging Out of Prefecture Platform [Shushou, 'kengai isetsu' wo tekkai]," *Nihon Nikkei Shimbun*, last modified on May 4, 2010, accessed on December 10, 2016, http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS04016_U0A500C1PE8001/.

⁸⁴ "Re-election of Nakaima and Questioning the Negotiation Ability with the government on Realizing the Platform of 'Outer-Prefecture Relocation' [Nakaimashi saisen / 'Kengai isetsu' kouyaku no jitsugen wo towareru tai seifu koushouryoku]," *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on November 29, 2010, accessed on April 9, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/editorial/preentry-170703.html>.

relations.⁸⁵ The relocation problem would once again experience stalemate until the LDP's return to power.

2.2 Okinawa's Position that Remained Resilient

The Hatoyama administration's endeavor to challenge the initial Level I agreement provided political momentum for the Okinawan politicians. On 24 January 2010, anti-base candidate Susumu Inamine defeated sitting mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro at the Nago City Mayor Election.⁸⁶ Changes in Okinawa also affected the Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima's position. Two days after Inamine's victory, Nakaima revealed anti-Henoko sentiment. With these two developments, both the Nago City Assembly and Okinawa Prefecture Assembly unanimously agreed on opposing relocating Futenma base within the prefecture.⁸⁷ For Okinawa, the central government finally confronted the United States on behalf of Okinawa's demands.

2.3 Reconfirming the Level I Agreement

According to Putnam, the national government on behalf of domestic interest. The Okinawa base relocation problem presents a different situation, where two governments believe in the superiority of their agreement. Unlike the LDP that agreed upon America's three conditions, the DPJ was the first and only party that strived to challenge America's small win-set. Unfortunately, failure in proposing a suitable alternative resulted in a damaged alliance. Failure resulted in reconfirming the

⁸⁵ "Party Leader Debate with Abe and Prime Minister Noda's Desire [Abeshi tonou touhou touron, Noda shushou ga iyoku]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 24, 2012.

⁸⁶ Morimoto, 434.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 436

necessity of abiding by the Level I agreement, revealing that the alliance's win-set will not be compromised.

Yukio Hatoyama and the DPJ were not able to change the situation in Okinawa. In attempt to alleviate pain, the Hatoyama administration unintentionally and ironically worsened relations with both Okinawa and the United States. If the new administration knew the depths and developments of the first decade, treatment may have been different. No one can deny Hatoyama's endeavor and heart for Okinawa. He should be recognized as the only prime minister who fought for Okinawans against the initial Level I agreement. Unfortunately, his sympathy overtook practicality and knowledge, which led to his baseless promises without realistic policies in mind prior to argumentation. The grand promise of the DPJ thus ended as an expectation, and prolonged the stalemate between the constituents.

3. For the Brighter Future of Okinawa: The Second Abe Administration's Initiatives

3.1 Unraveling Events under Two Governors

3.1.1 Nakaima: An Unexpected Approval

With increasing distrust in the DPJ, in December 2012, the LDP regained power to governance.⁸⁸ Shinzo Abe, who has previously served as Prime Minister in 2006,

⁸⁸ Martin Fackler, "Japan Election Returns Power to Old Guard," *The New York Times*, last modified on December 16, 2012, accessed on March 23, 2017,

was chosen to serve once again as Prime Minister of Japan. Unlike the inertia felt during his first administration, Abe did not wait to work towards relocation. A month after assuming office, Abe worked towards shortening the construction period of the second airway of the Naha airport, hoping to use this initiative as a means to negotiate relocation. The original construction period, which was planned for seven years, was shortened by 14 months.⁸⁹

On 2 February 2013, Abe made his first visit to Okinawa since assuming office and held a meeting with then Governor Nakaima. Hoping not to alienate Okinawa, Abe heavily focused on economic development in Okinawa. Regarding Henoko, he only remained mentioning, “Futenma’s *koteika* [stabilization] must not occur” rather than proposing alternatives to halt such *koteika*.⁹⁰ While accepting the second airway and economic aid, Nakaima’s position remained resolute on Futenma’s immediate removal and relocation out of the prefecture. This same sentiment was articulated towards the Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida on 16 February, with Nakaima claiming, “My agenda is to relocate the base out of the prefecture.”⁹¹ Nakaima demanded the government to review the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation, the agreement to deploy

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/world/asia/conservative-liberal-democratic-party-nearing-a-return-to-power-in-japan.html>.

⁸⁹ “Government to Act on Okinawa’s Request of Construction of Naha’s Second Runway, Reducing Construction by 14 months [Naha dai 2 kassourou, kouji 14 kagetsu tanshuku seiken, Okinawa no youbou uke],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 29, 2013.

⁹⁰ Shinzo Abe quoted in “Difficulty of the Okinawa Problem to Continue Prime Minister Abe, Refusing to Mention Henoko to Avoid Conflict while looking for Progress on Futenma [Okinawa mondai, tsuzuku nankyoku Abe shushou, Futenma shinten saguru shigeki sake ‘Henoko’ fuuin],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 3, 2013.

⁹¹ “Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Request Understanding on Inner-Prefecture Relocation of Futenma to Okinawa Governor Nakaima [Futenma kennai isetsu de rikai motomeru Kishida gaishou, Nakaima Okinawa ken chijini],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 16, 2013.

Ospreys to Okinawa, the criminal offenses caused by and preemption of such actions by US soldiers and the US-Japan SACO Agreement. In response, Kishida agreed that he would “seriously take these worries into consideration” and “become a Minister that can be trusted by the Okinawan electorates.”⁹²

On 21 February, both Abe and Kishida visited the United States and announced the government’s will to submit a landfill request to the local government of Okinawa.⁹³ Both Abe and Obama agreed to accelerate the process of relocating Futenma and return the facilities south of Kadena. At the press conference held right after their bilateral meeting, Abe articulated his will to “revive trust [between the local and central government] that was lost during the past three years.”⁹⁴ With both leaders articulating their will to proceed with relocation, the Ministry of Defense submitted a landfill request to the Nago Fishery Association on 26 February.⁹⁵ The following day, the head of the Association told the press that they could “99% agree” with the landfill.⁹⁶ Although the central government is not legally required to receive permission from the local fishery association, the government decided that contacting

⁹² Fumio Kishida quoted in Ibid.

⁹³ “Government’s Plan to Request Landfill of Henoko Next Month [Henoko umetate, raigetsu nimo shinsei he Futenma isetsu de seiken],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 23, 2013.

⁹⁴ Shinzo Abe quoted in “Prioritizing on Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance by Requesting a Landfill of Henoko Bay Next Month [Henoko oki, raigetsu nimo umetate shinsei Nichi-bei doumei kyouka wo yuusen],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 24, 2013.

⁹⁵ “Ministry of Defense to Submit Request of Landfill to the Fishery Association, Procedure in Progress [Boueishou, Gyokyou ni doui shinsei Henoko umetate, tetsuzuki chakushu],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 26, 2013.

⁹⁶ “Henoko Procedure Gaining Momentum, President of Nago Fishery Association to ‘99% Agree’ with the Futenma Relocation [Henoko, ugokidashita tetsuzuki Nago gyokyou kumiai cho ‘99% doui’ Futenma isetsu],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 27, 2013.

the locals would diversify Level II interest. The local fishery association officially agreed to landfill on 11 March with the condition of proper compensation.⁹⁷

Given the association's agreement, the central government officially submitted the request to conduct a landfill in Henoko bay on 22 March 2013.⁹⁸ Legally, the central government must obtain permission from the local governor to start landfill and construction. Amidst of criticism from Okinawan residents, Abe reiterated that "Futenma's *koteika* must absolutely not occur" and his will to "fully engage in reducing the burden on Okinawa."⁹⁹ Nakaima responded that he would review the government's request in light of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface regardless of his discomfort with the problem. When asked about the request, Nakaima responded that it was "unrealistic and impossible" to relocate the base within the Prefecture, and expressed his belief that out of Prefecture relocation is the best. Nago City Mayor Susumi Inamine criticized the government to forcibly shove Henoko onto the Okinawans.¹⁰⁰ On 24 March NHK broadcast, Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera spoke that "the actualization of the relocation will allow bases south of Kadena to be returned [to Okinawan jurisdiction]," thus hinting that the Futenma

⁹⁷ "Agreement with the Nago Fishery Association to strengthen Government's Position to Request Landfill of Henoko within the Month [Nago gyokyou doui uke, Henoko umetate shinsei he getsunai nimo seiken]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 12, 2013.

⁹⁸ "Okinawa to Oppose the Abe Administration's Henoko Landfill Request [Abe seiken, Henoko umetate shinsei Okinawa, tsuyoku hanpatsu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 23, 2013.

⁹⁹ Shinzo Abe quoted in Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ "Nago City Mayor and Others to hold Conference with Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Yamamoto Henoko Landfill Request is 'Forcible' [Henoko umetate shinsei 'kyouken-teki' Nago shichoura, Yamamoto Okinawasou to kaidan]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 24, 2013.

relocation is intertwined with other base returns.¹⁰¹ As positions on the base started to polarize, on 29 March, the local government of Okinawa officially began review the central government's submission.¹⁰²

Talks about base land reversion such as the southern facilities of Kadena started to regain momentum during April 2013. On 3 April 2013, Suga visited Okinawa for the first time since the LDP's return to power. As Chief Cabinet Secretary, he articulated, "Futenma's *koteika* [stabilization] must not occur."¹⁰³ With Suga repeating Abe's concern by verbatim, the government revealed the relocation plans on 5 April. The deadline for Futenma base was changed from Japanese financial year 2022 to "Japanese financial year 2022 or later", making the return dates range from 2013 to 2028 or later.¹⁰⁴ With the changes in the deadlines, Abe claimed that this plan made burden reduction on Okinawa palpable. Defense Minister Onodera claimed that the first return could occur as soon as August 2013. In response to the changes, Nakaima lamented that the new deadlines were vague. He even criticized the government for being brash in explanation and "viewing Okinawa lightly."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Itsunori Onodera quoted in "Minister of Defense Onodera to claim that if Futenma Relocation Talks Proceed, Bases South of Kadena to be Returned [Futenma isetsu susumeba, Kadena inan 'henkan' Onodera boueisou]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 25, 2013.

¹⁰² "Okinawa Prefecture to Officially Accept Landfill Request of Henoko [Henoko umetate shinsei wo seishiki juri]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 29, 2013.

¹⁰³ Yoshihide Suga quoted in "Okinawa Governor to hold Conference with Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga and to reiterate request to relocate Futenma out of the Prefecture [Futenma kengai isetsu, aratamete yobou Okinawa chiji, Suga kanbouhoukan to kaidan]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 3, 2013.

¹⁰⁴ "Reversion Remains Equivocal with 'or later' Addition and U.S.-Japan Agreement on Bases South of Kadena [Itsu henkan, tamamushi iro 'matawa sono ato' kuwae kecchaku Kadena inan, Nichibei goui]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 6, 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Hirokazu Nakaima quoted in "Widening Gap between the Government and Okinawa 'Recovery of Rights' and 'Humiliation' Strengthening of Abe's Policy of Prioritizing Foreign Relations [Seiken Okinawa hirogawu mizo 'shuken kaifuku' to 'kutsujoku' tsuyomaru Abe iro, gaikou yuusen]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 29, 2013.

Despite fluctuating deadlines, land reversion picked up momentum. On 31 August 2013, the northern roadway to Camp Kiser, roughly 1 hectares of land, was returned.¹⁰⁶ On 20 September 2013, the Abe administration requested permission to start landfill for the second runway for Naha Airport and decided to start construction from January 2014, fastening the procedure by two months.¹⁰⁷ The following month, on 3 October 2013, the United States and Japan jointly announced that Henoko was the only solution and agreed to relocate part of the Marine force to Guam in the beginning of 2020s.¹⁰⁸ The latter announcement was the first time both governments provided a clear date for Marine relocation. Following this announcement, the U.S.-Japan SOFA was revised and now allowed victims of US crimes to directly receive the results of lawsuits and punishments against the aggressor.¹⁰⁹ Up to October 2013, the Japanese government received the results of trials from their American counterpart, hindering the right of the individual from notifications of proper punishment. This was the first time to revise the SOFA regarding the system of announcement. On 9 December 2013, the government announced that fifteen KC-130 Aerial refueling aircrafts would be

¹⁰⁶ “Northern Roadway to Camp Kiser to be the first Base South of Kadena to be Returned [Beigun Maki minato hokuyu chiku no ichibu henkan ‘Kadena inan’ keikaku no dai 1 go],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 1, 2013.

¹⁰⁷ “Government to Request Landfill of Naha Airport Second Runway without Prospect of Financial Resources [Naha dai 2 kassourou umetate shinseihe seifu, zaigen medo nashi],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 20, 2013.

¹⁰⁸ “Date of the Marine Relocation to Guam Announced at the U.S.-Japan 2+2 Meeting, Burden Reduction of the Futenma Relocation [Kaiheitai Guam iten no jiki meiji nichibei 2 purasu 2],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 4, 2013.

¹⁰⁹ “Revising the U.S.-Japan SOFA to allow Victims to be Notified of Military Criminal Punishment [Hanzai beihei no shobun higaisha ni tsuchihe chiikyoutei no unyou minaoshi],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 8, 2013.

relocated from Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni during the summer of 2014.¹¹⁰ As seen in these examples, albeit comparatively minimal to his later achievements, the Abe administration made tangible progress and achievements previous administrations struggled to accomplish.

The government endeavored to use rapid progress as means to pressure Henoko's acceptance. Increasing progress did not change Nakaima's position, as he reiterated that he "honestly does not understand [the necessity of relocation]."¹¹¹ Amidst Abe's accomplishments, deployments of twelve Ospreys increased in Okinawa and American helicopter HH60 had crashed within Camp Hansen, Uruma, on 6 August 2013, both concerns for the Okinawan governor.¹¹² Responding to the central government's position of repeating the phrase "Futenma's *koteika* [stabilization] must not occur", Nakaima claimed that such repetition "reveals ignorance [of the base issue]."¹¹³ Despite Nakaima usage of strong language against the central government, out of everyone's surprise, he suddenly changed his position in December 2013. Probably two factors affected his position: change of position within the Liberal

¹¹⁰ Shotaro Watanabe, "Iwakuni Governor to Announce Acceptance of 15 American Military Aircrafts from Futenma Planned Next Summer [Beigunki no raika ijyu, Iwakuni shichou ga younin hyoumei Futenma no 15ki]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 10, 2013.

¹¹¹ Kazuo Yamagishi and Kouji Sonoda. "Despite Praising Base Burden Reduction, Okinawa Governor Nakaima 'Cannot Understand Inner-Prefecture Relocation', Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense's Visit to Okinawa [Nakaima chiji 'kennai isetsu, rikai dekinu' kichi futan keigen wa hyouka gaisou boueisou, Okinawa houmon]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 9, 2013.

¹¹² "Inner-Base American Military Helicopter Accident in Okinawa During Military Practice [Okinawa de beigun heri tsuiraku kichinai no yamanaka kunrenchu to setsume]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 6, 2013.

¹¹³ Hirokazu Nakaima quoted in "*Koteika* of Futenma Comment 'Manifests Incompetence' [Futenma koteika no hatsugen, 'munou no araware'," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 2, 2013.

Democratic Party of Okinawa (LDP Okinawa Kenren) and central government's grand promises.

Unlike the Liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa (LDP Okinawa Kenren) disagreed with the FRF's location. When Abe visited Okinawa back in February 2013, he also visited the Prefectural LDP branch. In addition to the Osprey deployment tensions between the local and central government, the Kenren told Abe, "[The Prefectural LDP] won Upper House seats based on outer-Prefectural relocation and desire to have their electorates' concerns to be delivered."¹¹⁴ The chairman of the LDP Okinawa Kenren Masatoshi Onaga declared that the local LDP would maintain their opposition against relocation within the same prefecture and even claimed, "It would be a pity if the government submits a request for landfill while ignoring Okinawan sentiment."¹¹⁵

The polarization between the Kenren and the Abe administration forced Suga to discuss relocation with chairman Masatoshi Onaga on 17 March 2013.¹¹⁶ However, Suga failed to convince the Kenren. When meeting the Kenren on 6 April 2013, Secretary General of the LDP Shigeru Ishiba admitted the schism between the main

¹¹⁴ LDP Okinawa Kenren quoted in "LDP Okinawa Kenren requesting Prime Minister to Relocate Futenma out of the Prefecture [Shusou ni Futenma kengai isetsu wo youbou Jimin Okinawa Kenren]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 3, 2013.

¹¹⁵ Masatoshi Onaga quoted in "Prioritizing on Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance by Requesting a Landfill of Henoko Bay Next Month."

¹¹⁶ "Chief Cabinet Secretary to Tell LDP Okinawa Kenren on the Henoko Landfill Policy [Henoko umetate shinsei houshin tsutaeru Kanbochoukan, Okinawa Kenren ni]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 18, 2013.

LDP platform and local LDP promise and articulated the importance of being united.¹¹⁷ Although resistant for roughly nine months, after multiple discussions with Ishiba and Suga, the sitting five Okinawan LDP Kenren members agreed to accept the Henoko relocation in November 2013.¹¹⁸ This change resulted in the LDP Okinawa Kenren's official announcement on 27 November 2013 to accept the Henoko facility as the alternative.¹¹⁹ The sudden reversal of position made Onaga to step down as the chairman of Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa.¹²⁰ This episode reveals that Okinawans, regardless of their political affiliation, can take different positions when it comes to the base problem.

The Liberal Democracy Party of Okinawa shift on Futenma surprised Nakaima. When asked by press what his thoughts on the sudden change of the Kenren's stance, Nakaima responded back blankly, admitting that he was not aware.¹²¹ On 4 December 2013, Nakaima officially announced to reveal the prefecture's decision on the central government's request for landfill by the end of the year.¹²² At the Okinawa Policy Council held at the Prime Minister's Residence on 17 December, Nakaima demanded

¹¹⁷ "LDP Painful Effort to Convince the LDP Okinawa Kenren and its Platform of 'Out of Prefecture Relocation' [Jimin, Okinawa Kenren no settoku kuryo 'Futenma wa kengai isetsu' kouyaku de]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 7, 2013.

¹¹⁸ "Five Elected Okinawan LDP Members to Accept Henoko, Conference with Secretary General Ishiba [Okinawa senshutsu no Jimin 5 giin, Henoko wo younin Ishiba kanjichou to kaidan]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 25 2013.

¹¹⁹ "LDP Okinawa Kenren to Accept the Henoko Relocation [Jimin Okinawa, Henoko isetsu wo younin]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 27, 2013.

¹²⁰ "LDP Okinawa Kenren President to Resign after Accepting Henoko Relocation [Henoko isetsu younin, Kenren kaichou ga jii Jimin Okinawa]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 2, 2013.

¹²¹ "Local Okinawan Mayors to Criticize Okinawan LDP Member's Acceptance of Henoko [Okinawa, jimoto shuchouga ga hihan Jimin giin no Henoko younin]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 25, 2013.

¹²² "Decision on Henoko's Landfill 'After the End of the Month' [Henoko umetate hihan 'getsumatsu ikou']," *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 4, 2013.

that operations at Futenma must be closed within three years and operations must halt within the next five years.¹²³ He also demanded for the full reversion of Camp Kinser within seven years, amendment of the US-Japan SOFA, and relocation the twelve deployed Ospreys out of Okinawa. In response, Abe assured Nakaima that he would “take the governor’s word with gravity and would try to endeavor [towards realization of the requests].”¹²⁴ Other officials followed up Abe’s promises. On the 20th, Ishiba told the LDP of Okinawa that the government was working on practical measures and Suga claimed “the Japanese lack knowledge on Okinawan suffering.”¹²⁵

On 24 December, Abe provided further economic incentives to Okinawa by announcing an annual 300 billion yen in economic aid until fiscal year 2021.¹²⁶ In addition to economic incentives, the Prime Minister announced that he would establish a team within the Ministry of Defense to proceed with halting the use of Futenma within five years.¹²⁷ Furthering commitment, on 25 December, Abe promised Nakaima that he would negotiate additional amendments to the U.S.-Japan SOFA, relocate half of American Ospreys on Okinawa out of the Prefecture and shorten the procedure of returning Camp Kinser. With increasing assistance and assurance from the central government, Nakaima praised the Prime Minister stating, “If Futenma can stop

¹²³ “Okinawa Governor Nakaima to Demand the ‘Closure of Futenma within 5 Years’ as the Deadline of the Henoko Landfill Decision Approaches [Henoko umetate handan hika, kensei Nakaima Okinawa chiji ‘Futenma 5 nen inai teishi wo’],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 18, 2013.

¹²⁴ Shinzo Abe quoted in Ibid.

¹²⁵ Yoshihide Suga quoted in “Henoko Landfill Decision Approaching [Henoko handan he ootsume],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 21 2013.

¹²⁶ “Securing 300 Billion Yen for Okinawa Economic Aid Until Fiscal Year 2021 [Okinawa fukkou ni 3000 oku en dai 21 nen do made kakuho shiji],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 24, 2013.

¹²⁷ “Okinawa Governor to Approve Henoko Landfill Tomorrow, Praising Base Burden Mitigation Policy [Henoko umetate shounin he Okinawa chiji, asu hyoumei kichi futan keigensaku wo hyouka],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 26, 2013.

operating within five years, the proposal fulfills the promise of ‘removing of danger as soon as possible.’ Then there is no problem.”¹²⁸ As Nakaima’s changed tone suggested, on 27 December 2013, the governor accepted the central government’s request to conduct a landfill in Henoko bay.¹²⁹ When asked to defend his decision, Nakaima responded that he accepted relocation accordingly to the environment law and standards. Despite accepting relocation, he claimed that he still believes in outer-prefecture relocation is the best and most efficient alternative to Futenma. Within a year from inauguration, Abe made a significant step in the stagnating relocation debatable.

With Nakaima accepting the relocation, the following year saw a mixture of resistance by the Okinawans and action by the central government. During January 2014, residents of Nago City reelected Susumi Inamine, an opponent against the Henoko relocation, as their mayor.¹³⁰ On April 19, the “Suwarikomi” demonstration held at Nago bay reached their tenth anniversary, which started in face of the Ministry of Defense’s boring survey of the region.¹³¹ More Okinawans resisted when actual construction began in the summer. In face of restarting the boring survey, Inamine criticized the government for the lack of information sharing despite working on the

¹²⁸ Nakaima quoted in “Over-issued Bill Path Towards Relocation [Tegata ranpatsu isetsu he michisuji],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 26, 2013.

¹²⁹ “Turmoil for 17 Years to Move Towards Relocation [Meisou 17 nen isetsu he ugoku],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 28, 2013.

¹³⁰ “Re-election of Anti-Base Mayor [Henoko hantai no genshoku saisen],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 20, 2014.

¹³¹ “Anti-Henoko Sit-In Protest’s Tenth Anniversary [Henoko ‘hantai’ suwarikomi 10 nen],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 20, 2014.

relocation process.¹³² The dissatisfaction and frustration engendered by Nakaima and Abe's agreement led to the manifestation of Okinawan discontent in the Okinawa gubernatorial elections held in November 2014.

Abe kept his promises such as implementing a research team within the Ministry of Defense for Okinawan burden reduction, relocating fifteen KC-130 Aerial refueling aircrafts to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, and attempting to relocate Ospreys from Okinawa to Saga Prefecture.¹³³ The Abe administration also announced to close Futenma base by February 2019.¹³⁴ Despite Abe addressing issues raised by Inamine back in December 2013, resistance grew as the government started to take concrete actions towards constructing the new base. Beginning from July, demolition within Camp Schwab, expansion of the restricted area of water, settlement of buoys, boring survey and seabed drilling occurred all within 40 days.¹³⁵ These measures, although controversial for the Okinawans, were important steps to revitalize the decade-long dormant construction. Unlike the previous Prime Ministers, Abe was able to revive the boring survey, which was cancelled since 2004. In addition, the restriction zone was expanded to 2 kilometers, given that demonstrators frequently disrupted the previous

¹³² "Boring Survey for the Seabed of Henoko to Begin [Henoko kaitei chousa ni chakushu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 14, 2014.

¹³³ "Establishing an Okinawan Burden Mitigation Research Team within the Ministry of Defense [Okinawa no futan keigen boueishou ni iinkai]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 23, 2014; "American Military's Aerial Refueling Aircraft to be relocated to Iwakuni Next Month [Beigun kuchu kyuuyuki raigetsu kara Iwakuni he]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 25, 2014; "Emphasizing the Necessity of Transferring American Military's Osprey Prime Minister 'Mitigation of Okinawa's Burden' [Beigun osupurei iten no hitsuyousei kyouchou shusou 'Okinawa no futan keigen']," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 24, 2014.

¹³⁴ "Prospect of Halting Futenma by 2019 [Futenma teishi 19 nen medo]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 16, 2014.

¹³⁵ "Construction to Begin in Henoko [Henoko yoteichi de kouji hajimeru]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 2, 2014; "Expanding the Restrictive Area Around Henoko [Henoko shuuhun no kinshi kuiki kakudai]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 3, 2014; "America Welcomes the buoy in Henoko [Henoko ni bui, bei kangei]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 15, 2014.

zone of 50 meters a decade ago.¹³⁶ Government rhetoric did not shift, with both Suga and Abe articulating the necessity of speedily relocating the base in order to minimize burden on Okinawa. While things were moving smoothly for the central government, the 2014 Okinawa gubernatorial election turned into another hurdle for the relocation process.

Growing dissatisfaction, frustration and disapproval against Nakaima and Abe led to the rise of Takeshi Onaga, mayor of Naha city, as the symbol of Okinawan resistance. While speculation for his bid began around June, he officially announced the decision to run for the gubernatorial election in September 2014.¹³⁷ A staunch supporter of Nago City mayor Susumu Inamine, Onaga popularized the terminology “All Okinawa,” claiming that everyone in Okinawa is against creating a FRF in Henoko bay.

The government did not consider Onaga as a threat. When asked by Asahi Shinbun’s interview on Okinawa gubernatorial elections, one of the LDP executive members replied that Onaga is merely trying to garner votes and will not try to halt the Henoko construction.¹³⁸ In response to the rise of Onaga, on a commercial broadcasting program on 12 September, Suga claimed that the relocation problem was solved and the revitalization of Okinawa’s economy was the new challenge. Suga also

¹³⁶ Kazuo Yamagishi and Shinobu Konno, “Government’s Haste of Henoko Relocation [Henoko isetsu isogu seiken],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 15, 2014.

¹³⁷ Kazuo Yamagishi and Norihisa Hoshino, “Pro and Cons of the Henoko Relocation: Onaga’s Official Announcement of Running [Henoko isetsude sanpi senmei Onagashi, seishikini shutsuba hyoumei],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 11, 2014.

¹³⁸ Norihisa Hoshino, “Government to Exert Economic Assistance [Seifu wa keizai zenmenni],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 14, 2014.

visited Okinawa later that month, articulating that Futenma would be returned to Okinawan jurisdiction within five years and thus halting operations by February 2019.¹³⁹

Unfortunately, for the central government, few things were against their favor. First, in response to Asahi Shinbun's interview, one of the authorities within the American Ministry of Defense replied that the U.S. government has not agreed with the deadline announced by Suga.¹⁴⁰ Second, it was no secret that regardless of the relocation of fifteen KC-130 Aerial refueling aircrafts to Iwakuni Air Base, practice of these aircrafts still were conducted at Futenma.¹⁴¹ In addition, the U.S. military rejected the relocation of MV22 Ospreys to Suga Prefecture.

Given the background of growing dissatisfaction of the Okinawans, central government's emphasis on economic incentives and apparent contradictions with the American government, in hindsight it was not surprising that Takeshi Onaga defeated Governor Hirokazu Nakaima at the Okinawa gubernatorial elections held on 16 November 2014.¹⁴² As the governor-elect, Onaga announced his will to reexamine the relocation issue and the possibility of rescinding Nakaima's approval if there are any

¹³⁹ Kazuo Yamagishi and Norihisa Hoshino, "Suga to Announce Closure of MCAS Futenma by February 2019 [Futenma hikoujyou no unyou teishi Suga '19 nen 2 gatsu madeni]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 18, 2014.

¹⁴⁰ Takashi Oshima, "America to Deny 2019 Closure of Futenma [Futenma 19 nen teishi bei wa hitei no kamae]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 17, 2014.

¹⁴¹ "Empty Promise of 'Closure' ['Unyou teishi' no karategata]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 22, 2014.

¹⁴² Eric Johnston, "Okinawa election a big win for opponents of Futenma relocation," *The Japan Times*, last modified on November 17, 2014, accessed on March 29, 2017, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/17/national/politics-diplomacy/okinawa-election-big-win-opponents-futenma-relocation/#.WOXkILOGN-U>.

legal problems.¹⁴³ For the Naha City Mayor elections, held on the same day as the governor election, pro-Onaga candidate Mikiko Shiroma won.¹⁴⁴ While Okinawa democratically presented through the gubernatorial election, four days before stepping down from office, on 5 December, Governor Nakaima approved two revision requests regarding the construction of Henoko.¹⁴⁵ Before leaving office, Nakaima articulated his belief that repeating “no” cannot solve the Okinawa base problem and that practical measures must be made one by one.¹⁴⁶

Hirokazu Nakaima has been a mixed blessing for all parties. For Okinawans, he resisted the central government and made the Abe administration succumb to Nakaima’s conditions. For the alliance, Okinawa finally provided legal permission. Nakaima’s betrayal towards the residents of Okinawa Prefecture also led to the rise of Takeshi Onaga. Perhaps the most interesting thing about Nakaima is his supposedly contradictory stance on Henoko. While accepting relocation, he has repeatedly claimed that he still believed that out-of-Prefecture relocation was the best solution. As seen in the following section, Nakaima knew something about the Okinawans that both the U.S. and Japanese government failed to understand: Okinawans are faithful to their win-sets and would against relocation through any available means.

¹⁴³ Yasunobu Shisui, “Election of Anti-Henoko Candidate Onaga [Henoko hantai no Onagashi tousen],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 17, 2014.

¹⁴⁴ “Naha City to Elect Shiroma as Mayor, Promises to Adopt Onaga’s Position [Naha shichou ni Shiromashi ‘Onaga shisei, iji’ uttaeru],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 17, 2014.

¹⁴⁵ “Governor to Accept Two Revisions to the Construction Law [Henoko kouhou henkou, chijiga 2 ken shounin],” *Okinawa Times*, last modified on December 6, 2014, accessed on February 24, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/46848>.

¹⁴⁶ Kazuo Yamagishi. “Futenma: ‘No alone will not resolve problem’ [Futenma ‘No dakejya susumanu’],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 10, 2014.

3.1.2 Onaga: “All-Okinawa” Against Relocation

Takeshi Onaga’s transition to Okinawa governor wasn’t positively accepted by the central government. When visiting Nagatocho, Tokyo for the first time as the governor of Okinawa, he failed to meet Abe and Suga.¹⁴⁷ After few attempts, he met Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Minister Yamaguchi. As for civilian demonstrations held on Okinawa, the guards of Camp Schwab arrested a demonstrator for the first time, raising further commotion among the demonstrators.¹⁴⁸ Regarding the relocation, on 12 March, the government restarted the boring survey in Henoko bay, which was halted for six months due to the weather and the speculated affects to the 2014 Lower House Elections.¹⁴⁹ In face of these events, Onaga only made comments and threats rather than taking direct action. On the same day the government restarted their boring survey, Onaga claimed that he would “use all the means possible to halt construction of Henoko base as promised during elections.”¹⁵⁰ Regarding the demonstration incident, Onaga commented, “Such action was form of extreme police brutality never seen before.”¹⁵¹ Perhaps the greatest move he took after assuming office was the establishment of the Third Party Investigation Team on whether former governor Inamine’s approval was consistent with legal

¹⁴⁷ “Okinawa Governor Fails Visit [Okinawa chiji, menkai karaburi],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 26, 2014.

¹⁴⁸ “First Arrestee at the Henoko Protest [Henoko kougi de hatsu no taihoshu],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 14, 2015.

¹⁴⁹ “Henoko’s Seabed Investigation to restart after six months hiatus: Okinawa Governor ‘Shall not be Forgiven’ [Henoko kaitei chousa wo saikai hantoshi buri Okinawa chiji ‘yurusenu’],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 12, 2015.

¹⁵⁰ Takeshi Onaga quoted in Ibid..

¹⁵¹ Takeshi Onaga quoted in Shisui, Yasunobu, Shounosuke Iwasaki and Kazuo Yamagishi, “Okinawa Retaliates against America’s Arrest [Beigun no kousoku Okinawa hanpatsu],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 24, 2015.

requirements of not.¹⁵² Fortunately for Onaga, he saw an opportunity in halting the procedure of construction.

On 23 March 2015, Onaga demanded that the Ministry of Defense must end all activities by 30 March. Both local and central government knew that the legal permission to conduct investigation would expire by the end of the month. If the government failed to halt investigation, Onaga claimed that he would rescind the government's legal permission to destruct the reef, which Suga replied that such action would probably take the local government to court.¹⁵³ In response to Onaga's threat, The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) claimed that Onaga's demand would hurt both residents around Futenma base and the U.S.-Japan relations in terms of security and trust, thus ignoring Onaga's demand.¹⁵⁴ With MAFF's decision, Minister of Defense Nakatani announced the government's decision to extend the boring survey until the end of June.¹⁵⁵ As friction became apparent, the central government announced interest in holding meetings with Governor Onaga. For the first time since inauguration, in April, Onaga was able to met Minister Yamaguchi, Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan Suga, Minister of Defense Nakatani, and Abe within two

¹⁵² Kazuo Yamagishi and Norihisa Hoshino, "Careful Departure Towards Halting Henoko [Henoko soshihe shinchou funade]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 15, 2015.

¹⁵³ Kazuo Yamagishi, "Governor to Demand the Okinawa Defense Bureau to Halt on Henoko within a Week [Henoko sagyou teishi wo shiji Okinawa boueikyoku ni chiji '1 shukannai']," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 24, 2015.

¹⁵⁴ "Minister of MAFF to Reject the Governor's Demand of Halting Construction: Okinawa Governor to Criticize the Country's Position [Henoko sagyou teishi Nonsuishou mitomezu Okinawa chiji, kuni no shisei hihan]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 31, 2015.

¹⁵⁵ "Boring Survey to be extended: Henoko [Henoko boring chousa enchou]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 31, 2015.

weeks.¹⁵⁶ Meetings between the two parties sporadically continued throughout May and June as well. However, as speculated by analysts, friction remained. In the midst of these meetings, Camp Foster's West Compartment was returned on 4 April.¹⁵⁷ While Suga praised this return as a reminder to physically lessen the burden on Okinawa, Onaga critically responded that the Americans usurped the land from the Okinawans. With the rise of an adamant governor, the situation stalled once again.

If the first six months of Onaga's term was passive or only limited to harangue, the following six months revealed his commitment in fighting against both the United States of America and Japan. In hopes to lobby Okinawan sentiment towards U.S. media and financially support lobbying visits to Washington D.C., regular civilians established the Henoko Fund on 10 April 2015.¹⁵⁸ Whether in response to this civilian action or not, from 27 May to 4 June, Onaga visited both Hawaii and Washington D.C. to express Okinawan discontent and lobby against relocation.¹⁵⁹ Onaga's strong yet fruitless opposition against the boring survey extension back in March escalated in July. While Onaga was unable to stop the government from continuing their investigation,

¹⁵⁶ "Stand-off between Governor Onaga and Suga: the Henoko Relocation 'Impossible' [Henokoisetsu 'zettai dekinai' Onaga chiji, Sugashi to heikousen]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 6, 2015; "Stand-off between Governor Onaga and the Prime Minister [Shushou to Onaga chiji heikousen]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 18, 2015.

¹⁵⁷ Kazuo Yamagishi and Norihisa Hoshino, "Perceived distance due to Henoko [Henoko meguri kyorikan]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 5, 2015.

¹⁵⁸ Kazuo Yamagishi, "Henoko Fund Established [Henoko isetsu hantai kikin wo tachiage]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 10, 2015.

¹⁵⁹ "Meeting with the Governor of Hawaii [Hawaishu chiji to kaidan]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, May 30, 2015.

due to typhoons, at the end of their self-announced extension, the government announced its will to further extend the survey until the end of September.¹⁶⁰

This was immediately challenged by the Third Party Investigation Team's final report. In July, the Investigation Team announced that the former governor's approval was illegal in light of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface due to insufficient environmental assessment.¹⁶¹ After receiving the report, Onaga announced that he would review the findings and announce Okinawa Prefecture's decision in late August. Perhaps in response to this reveal, the central government decided to halt all construction procedure and have an intensive month of discussion with Onaga.¹⁶² However, similar to the April discussions, both parties never came to an agreement and focused on different themes of the issue. Both decided that there was no need to extend the period of dialogue.¹⁶³

With talks failing, the government immediately resumed activities from 12 September 2015.¹⁶⁴ As anticipated back in July, on 14 September, the Prefecture notified the Okinawa Defense Bureau that they started the procedure of rescinding

¹⁶⁰ "Henoko's Boring Survey to be Extended [Henoko boringu enchou]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 30, 2015.

¹⁶¹ "Consideration to Rescind Approval of Henoko [Henoko shounin torikeshi kentou]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 16, 2015.

¹⁶² "Discussion between Okinawa and the Government: First to Occur on the 11th [Okinawa to seifu kyougi shokai wa 11 nichi nimo]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 7, 2015.

¹⁶³ Norihisa Hoshino and Nogo Kamitoo, "Discussions fail to resolve division: Stalemate on Henoko to continue until the end [Shuchu kyougi uzu umarazu Henoko heikousen no mama saishuuban he]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 30, 2015.

¹⁶⁴ Nogo Kamitoo and Takushi Yoshida, "Government to Restart Relocation Process, Governor to Retaliate 'Will Prevent Construction' [Henoko isetsu seifu ga saikai chiji hanpatsu 'tsukurasenai']," *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 12, 2015.

permission of landfill.¹⁶⁵ Onaga followed up the notification by officially revoking permission from the government on 13 October.¹⁶⁶ With the new development in the base problem, both central and local government anticipated the possibility of going into court. The following day, the LDP submitted both an appeal and suspension of the governor's official revocation to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) Keiichi Ishii.¹⁶⁷ While preparation for an appeal required both parties to explain and defend their position, on 26 October, Minister Ishii announced that Onaga's revocation would be suspended under the Administration Appeal Act.¹⁶⁸ Despite the fact that the MLIT was still processing and addressing a possible appeal, the Abe administration decided to restart construction from 29 October.¹⁶⁹ Amidst the government's forcible gesture in October, financial scandals of previous governor Nakaima's environmental assessment team and the central government's direct financial assistance to the three adjacent districts to Henoko Bay received criticism and further angered the Okinawans.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Nogo Kamitoo and Takushi Yoshida, "Okinawa Governor to Challenge the Government: Process of Rescinding Henoko Begins [Henoko torikeshi tetsuduki kaishi Okinawa chiji kuni to zenmen taiketsu he]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 14, 2015.

¹⁶⁶ Nogo Kamitoo and Isamu Nikaido, "Okinawa Governor to Rescind Permission, Government to Appeal for a Review [Henoko shounin wo torikeshi Onaga chiji kuni, fufuku shinsa seikyuu he]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 13, 2015.

¹⁶⁷ "Government to Appeal for Review regarding Okinawa's Recession of Henoko [Henoko, kuniga fufuku shinsa seikyuu Okinawa ken no shounin torikeshi uke]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 14, 2015.

¹⁶⁸ "Minister of MLIT to Override the Governor's Recession: Construction in Henoko Becomes Possible [Henoko sagyou saikai kanouni chiji shounin torikeshi kyou koukateishi kokkoushou houshin]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 27, 2015.

¹⁶⁹ "Construction Restarts in Henoko: Arrestee among Demonstrators, Onaga criticizes 'Iron Rule' [Henoko, umetate chakkou hantaiha kougi, taihoshamo Onaga chiji 'kyouken kiwamareri']," *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 29, 2015.

¹⁷⁰ "Starting this year, Government to Directly Provide Financial Assistance to Three Districts in Henoko [Henoko jimoto ni fukkouhi konnendochuu, kuni kara chokusetsu 3 chiku he]," *The Asahi*

The resumption of construction was followed by an official lawsuit by MLIT Minister Ishii on 17 November 2015 for rescinding permission for construction.¹⁷¹ The MLIT submitted the lawsuit on the basis that Okinawa's decision undermined both national security and foreign relations.¹⁷² Other reasons included the fruitless concentrated period of discussion during August and legitimacy of the proposal's environmental assessment. Reflecting the reasons behind the lawsuit, Suga commented that Okinawa's decision is tantamount to ignoring U.S.-Japan endeavors to decrease burden on Okinawa.¹⁷³ When asked about the speculated results, one of the LDP executive members commented he was "100% sure that [the government] will not lose."¹⁷⁴ In response to the lawsuit, Governor Onaga responded that this was "a direct manifestation of discrimination towards Okinawa."¹⁷⁵

As the first lawsuit led to court hearings in early December, the Okinawa Prefecture submitted a lawsuit in the regional court against the government on 25 December.¹⁷⁶ The second lawsuit questioned whether MLIT's position and analysis of

Shimbun, October 27, 2015; "Government panel members received 11 million yen from contractors to build new US base in Henoko," *Ryukyu Simpo*, last modified on October 20, 2015, accessed on March 20, 2017, <http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2015/10/26/23868/>.

¹⁷¹ "Government to Sue Okinawan Governor: Seeks Cancellation of Henoko Recession [Seiken, Okinawa chiji wo teiso Henoko torikeshi tekkai motomeru]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 17, 2015.

¹⁷² "Summary: Government's Appeal on the Henoko Lawsuit [Henoko 'daishikkou' soshou, kuni no shucchou <youshi>]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 18, 2015.

¹⁷³ Takuya Suzuki and Nago Kamitoo, "Government to Appeal Hazard Removal and Okinawa to Rely on Public Opinion: No signs of Compromise [Henoko, kuni mo ken mo hikazu seifu, kiken jyokyo uttae Okinawa, yoron ni kitai]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 18, 2015.

¹⁷⁴ LDP executive member quoted in Ibid..

¹⁷⁵ Takushi Yoshida, Tsukasa Kimura and Hisatoshi Tanaka, "Government's Lawsuit: Anger and Fear on Henoko, Governor to claim 'Manifestation of Discrimination towards Okinawa' [Henoko tairitsu, ikari to fuan chiji 'Okinawa sabetsu no araware' kuni ga teiso]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 18, 2015.

¹⁷⁶ Kamitoo, Nago and Kazuo Yamagishi, "Okinawa Prefecture to Submit Lawsuit Against Government: Governor 'Commit to Procedure' [Okinawaken, kuni wo teiso chiji 'shuhou tsukusu' Henoko isetsu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 26, 2015.

Okinawa was unbiased, and argued that Minister Ishii, part of Abe's cabinet, submitted the lawsuit in alignment in personal interest. When the Prefecture appealed to the Committee for Settling National-Local Disputes on 24 December, the Committee refused to review their case, claiming that they are not entitled to review a case that the Administration Appeal Act has acted upon.¹⁷⁷ Dissatisfied with the refusal, on 1 February 2016, the prefecture submitted a third lawsuit against the central government, questioning the legality of the Administration Appeal Act used by the MLIT Minister Ishii.¹⁷⁸ The Okinawa Base Problem quickly evolved into a peculiar situation where three legal cases stood between the local and central government.

With the escalation of legal conflict, the court proposed a reconciliation plan between the two parties on 4 February 2016.¹⁷⁹ Despite the government's strong stance at the beginning of November 2015, the Prime Minister announced on 4 March 2016 that both sides would withdraw their lawsuits.¹⁸⁰ While he made it clear that the government's position on Henoko has not changed, Abe announced that in order to appropriately proceed with reconciliation, the government would halt construction.

With all lawsuits withdrawn, it was speculated that the country would submit a revision to the prefecture regarding the base creation. Okinawa would not respond to

¹⁷⁷ "Editorial: Dispute resolution panel abandons duty with Okinawa appeal dismissal," *The Mainichi*, last modified on December 26, 2015, accessed on March 24, 2017, <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20151226/p2a/00m/0na/009000c>.

¹⁷⁸ Takushi Yoshida, "Okinawa to Submit another Lawsuit: Three Lawsuits in Total [Okinawaken, aratani kuni teiso Henoko soshou, 3 ken desorou]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 2, 2016.

¹⁷⁹ Kamitoo, Nago and Kazuo Yamagishi, "Government and Okinawa to question Reconciliation Proposal: Henoko Lawsuit, Stalemate to Continue [Wakaian, kuni ken tomo gimonshi Henoko soshou, tairitsu wa keizoku]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 4, 2016.

¹⁸⁰ "Government and Okinawa to accept reconciliation: Prime Minister Abe to Halt Construction but remains adamant on Relocation [Henoko soshou, kuni to Okinawa wakaihe Abe shushou, kouji chuushi wo shiji isetsu houshin wa kwaranazu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 4, 2016.

the revision and would submit a complaint to the Committee for Settling National-Local Disputes. Whether the Committee rules in favor of the central government or prefecture, the losing party would most likely take the issue to court. Both parties have made it clear that they would abide by ruling. Without much time from withdrawal, as speculated, on 7 March, MLIT Minister Ishii resubmitted a document recanting the Okinawan governor's rescinding as illegal.¹⁸¹ With the new development of events, on 23 March, governor Takeshi Onaga and lieutenant governor Mitsuo Ageta met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani for the first discussion on Futenma post-reconciliation.¹⁸² Regardless of previous conversations that were deemed unfruitful, both parties decided to continue dialogue in the midst of pessimism.

At this moment of time, what mattered more than conversation were legal decisions. This was reflected with the speedy request submitted on 7 March 2016 towards Okinawa to reevaluate their "illegal" revocation. Because Okinawa denied wrongdoing, the Committee for Settling National-Local Disputes held nine hearings for the next two months.¹⁸³ Despite the multiple hearings, on 17 June, the Committee decided that they were not in the position declare whether Onaga's demand to revoke permission was illegal or not. In defense of their decision, the Committee argued,

¹⁸¹ "Government and Okinawa to Proceed with Reconciliation [Henoko wakaide, seifu ga tetsuduki Okinawaken ni shobun tekkai shiji]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 8, 2016.

¹⁸² Takuya Suzuki and Nogo Kamitoo. "Discussions on Futenma continues as stalemate: First Confrence After Reconciliation [Futenma kyougi matamo heikousen kuni to Okinawa, wakaigo hatsu kaigou]." *The Asahi Shimbun*. March 24, 2016.

¹⁸³ Ryo Aihara, "Committee for Settling National-Local Disputes Declines to Pass Judgment [Kuni zesei shiji, tekihi handan sezu Futenma isetsu, kyougi unagasu keisoushori iin]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 18, 2016.

“Whatever decision we make, it would not contribute to the constructing better relations between the prefecture of the central government. Passing a ruling is not the best option.”¹⁸⁴ This was equally surprising for both Okinawa and the central government. In response to the decision, a government-affiliated official revealed the common belief that the Committee would make a clear ruling whether it was illegal or not.¹⁸⁵ In response to the decision, on 18 June, Takeshi Onaga announced that in respect to the indecision by the Committee, the prefecture would not take the issue to court and would instead invest time for dialogue.¹⁸⁶

The government did not view the situation in the same manner. On 22 July 2016, the Abe administration submitted a similar lawsuit against the prefecture as their original one submitted back during November 2015.¹⁸⁷ With hearings held during August, on 16 September, the local court ruled against Okinawa. Arguing that the court was biased in favor of the central government, Onaga appealed to the Supreme Court on 23 September.¹⁸⁸ The legal battle came to an end with the Supreme Court ruling in

¹⁸⁴ Committee for Settling National-Local Disputes quoted in Ibid..

¹⁸⁵ Ryo Aihara and Takushi Yoshida, “No Prospects for Reconciliation: An ‘Unexpected’ Result for both the Government and Prefecture [Futenma tairitsu, kaishou mitousezu ken to kuni ‘souteigai’ keisoushori iin handan nashi],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 18, 2016.

¹⁸⁶ Takushi Yoshida, “Okinawa Prefecture does not submit a lawsuit: Governor ‘Expected Discussions’ [Okinawaken, kuni wo teiso sezu Henoko isetsu, chiji ‘kyougi wo kitai’],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 19, 2016.

¹⁸⁷ Ryuichi Yamashita and Isamu Nikaidou, “Henoko Relocation: Perspective to Restart Construction with Lawsuit Victory and Suga to ‘Confirm Necessity of Following Decision’ [Shouso de isetsu kouji saikai, shiya Sugashi ‘kakutei hanketsu niwa shitagaukoto kakunin’ Henoko isetsu],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 22, 2016.

¹⁸⁸ “Deteriorating Relations between the Government and Okinawa: Onaga Appeals to the Supreme Court [Kuni to Okinawa, kojireru kankei Henoko soshou, ken gajyoukoku beigunki tsuiraku mo kage],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 24, 2016.

favor of the government on 20 December.¹⁸⁹ Clothed with legal authority, the government resumed construction on 27 December. Following events unfolded in favor of the government. Hoping to show their continued commitment to burden reduction, 4000 hectares of the Northern Training Area was returned to the Prefecture on 22 December.¹⁹⁰ By March 2017, the government finished placing half of all concrete blocks necessary on the seabed of Henoko bay.¹⁹¹ In response, Onaga threatened another lawsuit against the central government if the state continues construction post-March, which is the period after the government's permission for reef destruction would expire.¹⁹² These threats have not halted the government's initiatives. With the completion of the concrete block placements, the landfill of Henoko bay started on 25 April with plans to be finished by 2021.¹⁹³ Despite Okinawa's long history of resistance, the long-standing stalemate finally took a major step towards the replacement facility.

¹⁸⁹ "Summary: Explanations for the Henoko Lawsuit Decision [Henoko soshou, hanketsu riyuu youshi]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 21, 2016.

¹⁹⁰ Hisashi Ishimatsu, "Majority of Northern Training Area to be reverted to Okinawa [Okinawa no beigun shisetsu, ichibu henkan kitabu kunrenjyou no kahan nichibei ga saishuu goui]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 22, 2016.

¹⁹¹ "Seawall Created in Henoko, Construction to Start in April: Blocks Inserted [Henoko no gogan, 4 gatsu nimo chakushu he buroku 228 ko no taihan secchi]," *Okinawa Times*, last modified on March 6, 2017, accessed on March 13, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/87175>.

¹⁹² Satoshi Yoshida, "Okinawa Prefecture to Consider New Lawsuit: Resisting Against the Government's Decision [Henoko isetsu, Okinawa ken ga aratana soshou he kuni no handan he taikou]," *The Asahi Shinbun*, last modified on March 16, 2017, accessed on March 16, 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASK3J3C8XK3JTPOB001.html>.

¹⁹³ "Japan begins construction work for controversial new U.S. base in Okinawa," *The Japan Times*, last modified on April 25, 2017, accessed on April 25, 2017, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/04/25/national/japan-begins-construction-work-controversial-new-u-s-base-okinawa/#.WQnBTol95-U>.

3.2 Unwavering Commitment to the Level I Agreement

3.2.1 American Position: From Best to “Only Solution”

For the United States, the FRF itself is a result of long negotiations, thus strengthening the country’s commitment towards relocation and belief of Henoko Bay as the “only solution.” America appreciates the negotiations as a “result of meaningful, sustained work between the United States and Japan.”¹⁹⁴ The Department of State (DOS) reiterated such significance. Even when statistics reveal Okinawan discontent, the DOS continued to reiterate that the “construction of the facility is the meaningful result of years of sustained work between the United States and Japan.”¹⁹⁵ This was further testified when Mark C. Toner, Deputy Spokesperson of the DOS, emphasized that the plans for the FRF are results of constructive negotiations, as bureaucrats at the DOS had “talked about [the American position] for many times – or over many years, rather, from this podium.”¹⁹⁶ Even when American related crimes or accidents escalate local demonstrations, America remained committed, as the DOS Spokesperson John Kirby commented, “[N]othing’s changed about our importance of moving forward on a replacement facility; nothing’s changed about our commitment in working with the

¹⁹⁴ Jen Psaki quoted in U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing: August 25, 2014,” *U.S. Department of State*, August 25, 2014, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/08/230859.htm>.

¹⁹⁵ U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing - March 23, 2015,” *U.S. Department of State*, March 23, 2015, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/03/239705.htm>; John Kirby quoted in U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing - July 15, 2015,” *U.S. Department of State*, July 15, 2015, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/07/244957.htm>.

¹⁹⁶ Mark C. Toner quoted in U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing - August 4, 2015,” *U.S. Department of State*, August 4, 2015, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/08/245680.htm>.

government in Tokyo.... So nothing's changed in our regard in terms of the importance of the replacement facility.”¹⁹⁷ The list continues, with American bureaucrats remaining resilient towards commitment on relocation.¹⁹⁸ For the United States, the current FRF resulted as a joint work between the two governments and thus values the decision. The American government's decision not to modify their win-sets is buttressed by the fruits of negotiation.

Once the Henoko plan was accepted by Nakaima and challenged by Governor Onaga, the DOS furthered commitment by claiming that Henoko was the “only solution.” During Onaga's visit to the United States in 2015, the governor met State Department Office of Japanese Affairs Director Joe Young and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Cara Abercrombie. According to the DOS announcement of the meeting, both officials claimed, “The FRF is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.”¹⁹⁹ The Department of State had repeated the same belief verbatim throughout Obama administration, and this continues under the current Trump administration as well.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ John Kirby quoted in U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing - December 12, 2016,” *U.S. Department of State*, December 12, 2016, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/12/265181.htm>.

¹⁹⁸ “American Official to Emphasize Necessity: ‘Governor Should Accept Henoko’ [‘Chiji wa Henoko shounin wo’ bei toukyokusha, hitsuyousei wo kyouchou],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 23, 2013; U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing - May 15, 2015,” *U.S. Department of State*, May 15, 2015, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/05/242432.htm>.

¹⁹⁹ U.S. Department of State, “Meeting With Okinawa Governor Onaga,” *U.S. Department of State*, last modified on June 3, 2015, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/243121.htm>.

²⁰⁰ John Kirby quoted in U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing - September 21, 2015,” *U.S. Department of State*, last modified on September 21, 2015, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009->

As seen from official comments made by the Department of State, the United States values the current FRF plan as the “only solution” for relocating MCAS Futenma. The negotiations of the blueprint, which took the span of a decade, reveals commitment of both governments in realignment the presence of American forces on Okinawa. Regardless of challenges posed by accidents, demonstrators and the local government, the length of the negotiations cemented American commitment to relocating accordingly to the FRF. America has been resilient on the issue of relocation and continues to abide by their win-sets as determined in 1996.

3.2.2 Japanese Position: Avoiding Koteika and Reducing Burden

The second Abe administration reengaged the stagnant process of relocation. Abe and his cabinet members had repeatedly argued, “Futenma’s *koteika* must not occur.” As hinted by language used by the American government, unless a relocation facility is prepared, Futenma cannot be closed. Once assuming office, the Abe cabinet emphasized their desire to fully commit to burden reduction. When submitting landfill request to the Okinawan government on 22 March 2013, Abe announced, “Futenma’s *koteika* must absolutely not occur. [We will] fully devote in burden reduction.”²⁰¹ Former Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera also explained how the request of landfill is a step towards burden reduction. This same argument still continues to this day.

2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/09/247117.htm; U.S. Department of State, “Meeting With Okinawa Governor Onaga,” *U.S. Department of State*, last modified on February 3, 2017, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/02/267448.htm>.

²⁰¹ Abe Shinzo quoted in ““Okinawa to Oppose.”

3.3 Careful Implementation Amidst Level II Resistance

The Japanese government has been more active, hoping to appease both American and Okinawans. Ranging from negotiations of the original blueprint to the current administration, the Japanese government expressed gestures of consideration towards Okinawans. Through multiple incentives, the second Abe administration endeavored to change Okinawa's win-set.

Abe's greetings at the Battle of Okinawa Ceremonies since his leadership from 2012 portray the current position of the Japanese government. For both 2013 and 2014, Abe reiterated his position that he "will make every effort to lighten to the greatest possible extent the burden of the bases."²⁰² However, in 2014, Abe provided greater emphasis on the role of Okinawa in relation to Japan's future than in 2013. In Abe's 2015 speech, he mentioned for the first time how "the needs of national security have placed a heavy burden on the people of Okinawa, with the concentration of U.S. military bases being a case in point."²⁰³ He further tried to connect with the Okinawans by pointing out to the murder of an Okinawan by a former American military man in his 2016 speech and even promised that the "Japanese government, which bears the

²⁰² Abe Shinzo, "Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Memorial Ceremony to Commemorate the Fallen at the Anniversary of the End of the Battle of Okinawa [Okinawa zen senbotsusha tsuitou shiki souri aisatsu]," *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, last modified on June 23, 2013, accessed on December 10, 2016, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/statement/2013/0623okinawa.html; Abe Shinzo, "Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Memorial Ceremony to Commemorate the Fallen on the 69th Anniversary of the End of the Battle of Okinawa," *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, last modified on June 23, 2014, accessed on December 10, 2016, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201406/0623okinawa.html.

²⁰³ Abe Shinzo, "Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Memorial Ceremony to Commemorate the Fallen on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the Battle of Okinawa," *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, last modified on June 23, 2015, accessed on December 10, 2016, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201506/1211615_9922.html.

responsibility of protecting the lives and property of the Japanese citizens, will promptly set out measures so that such tragic crimes are never repeated.”²⁰⁴

With gradual change in his tone, Abe reemphasized his desire to lighten the burdens of the Okinawans and to develop Okinawa’s local economy. Abe mentioned that Okinawa experiences “heavy impact of U.S. military bases” in both 2015 and 2016, but he has not admitted the voice of struggles in Okinawa. Most of his speech is focused on what the government can provide for Okinawa. He also focused a lot on the future of Okinawa, hinging on the economic future of the government. Regardless of Abe’s efforts, Okinawans believe their voice has been marginalized. Because of Okinawa’s stagnant low win-set, the Japanese government strived to conduct relocation without overtly suppressing Okinawan voice.

This is clear when observing history. The LDP continued with the relocation only under former Okinawa governor Inamine and Nakaima. Although the government conducted construction and inspection over the years and has received criticism by the islanders, they have been more or less careful to be seen as considerate. Abe continuously endeavored to garner support by offering development aid and projects, such as the construction of the Naha second runway.²⁰⁵ The reason why Abe decided to agree with rescinding all three lawsuits in March 2016 is to show a gesture of concern.

²⁰⁴ “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Memorial Ceremony to Commemorate the Fallen on the 71th Anniversary of the End of the Battle of Okinawa,” *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, last modified on June 23, 2016, accessed on December 10, 2016, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201606/1217954_11009.html.

²⁰⁵ “Okinawa Development Budget and Main Policies [Okinawa fukkou yosan to omona shisaku],” *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, last modified in 2016, accessed on December 13, 2016, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/okinawa_shinko/yosan_sesaku.html.

The Japanese government held meetings with Takeshi Onaga in hopes to come to a consensus. Regardless of these gestures, Abe failed to receive support, as seen in the polls and the 2016 Upper House Elections results in Okinawa Prefecture.²⁰⁶ Despite the fact that the LDP has immense power in both houses, the LDP has not forced the issue on Okinawa. Currently, the Abe administration is landfilling Henoko bay amidst continuing opposition. While this may seem like the government is overtly suppressing opposition voices, the government proceeded with construction only after legal authority from the Supreme Court. By defeating the local government in court, the government continues to appeal to the Japanese public that they are a responsible and considerate entity.

3.4 Analysis: Reconfirming the Level II Agreement

Since Hatoyama's voluntary defection and failure of changing the initial win-set, America and Japan continued to reconfirm their commitment in executing the Level I agreement. The second Abe administration endeavored in gaining Okinawan support by providing economic incentives and slowly fulfilling the reversion of facilities other than Futenma base as mentioned in the 1996 SACO Final Report. Implementations of the Final Report such as agreed land returns and relocation of the KC-130 Aerial refueling aircrafts pressured then Governor Nakima. Lost of support from the LDP Okinawa Kenren and Abe's continued gestures towards grand promises pushed Nakaima to accept relocation.

²⁰⁶ "Results on Okinawa Vote: 2016 House of Councilors Election [Okinawa - kaihyou sokuhou - 2016 saninsen]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, last modified on July 10, 2016, accessed on May 4, 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/senkyo/senkyo2016/kaihyo/B47.html>.

Contrary to the governor's belief that the bargain from the government was sufficient, Okinawa Prefecture reconfirmed their Level II commitment through the democratic procedure of gubernatorial elections. With Onaga as the new symbol of Okinawa, the central government became careful with implementation. The Supreme Court ruling in favor of the central government strengthens the alliance to ignore Okinawa's low win-set for relocation. The Level II institution of democracy, which hindered construction post-Nakima's approval, is currently allowing the government to continue construction regardless of opposition. The continuation of relocation may result in a new facility in Henoko, but will not result in expanding Okinawa's win-set. Onaga's victory proved that Okinawa remains steadfast to their commitment of out-of-prefecture relocation.

IV. Comparative Analysis of the Three Periods

1. Changes of Okinawa's Position? Questioning Okinawa's Win-set

Perhaps both American and Japanese government are genuinely confused with what the Okinawans want. While some may argue that the construction itself is illegal due to improper environmental evaluation, others have argued that an “unfair” relation between the United States of America and Japan result as Japanese suffering. Grassroots organizations such as the Okinawa Peace Movement Center (*Okinawa Heiwa Undo Center*), Anti-Helicopter Base Council (*Heri Kichi Hantai Kyougikai*) and SEALDs RYUKYU have emphasized on the necessity of peace.²⁰⁷ On 1 April 2015, a total of 22 individuals, including authors, lawyers and academics, created a petition on Change.org arguing that the current relocation plan is a violation of democracy and destruction of Okinawa's nature.²⁰⁸ The plethora of arguments by Okinawan apologists may confuse observers in what Okinawa argues around and desires for.

When discussing the Okinawan will, the phrase “All Okinawa” commonly appears on media. A term originally used against the deployment of MV-22 Ospreys,

²⁰⁷ “Intention of Erecting the Okinawa Peace Movement Center [Okinawa heiwa undou senta setsuritsu shuishi],” *Okinawa Peace Movement Center*, last modified in 2016, accessed on December 12, 2016, <http://www.peace-okinawa.net/htmlfiles/setsuritsu/setsuritsu.html>; “Our Position of Opposition Regarding the New Henoko Base [Henoko shinkichi kensetsu soshi ni suite no watashitachi no tachiba],” *Anti-Helicopter Base Conference*, last modified in 2016, accessed on December 12, 2016, <http://www.mco.ne.jp/~herikiti/tachiba.html>; “What is SEALDs Ryukyu?” *SEALDs Ryukyu*, last modified in 2016, accessed on December 12, 2016, <http://sealdsryukyu.wixsite.com/sealdsryukyu/whatssealdsryukyu>.

²⁰⁸ “Fear that Henoko Relocation Can Damage Sea [Henoko isetsu umi ni sonshitsu no osore],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 2, 2015.

“All Okinawa” is a phenomenon where Okinawans, regardless of their political background, unite against the increasing presence of military bases. This phrase was popularized by Takeshi Onaga’s platform and victory. Onaga had repeatedly argued for “ideology over identity” and claimed that this triumph resulted in his election.²⁰⁹ This naturally raises the question whether an “All Okinawa” phenomenon really exists and what is Okinawa’s greatest concern.

Out of all the arguments that exist in media and literature, this section focuses on the two main arguments against the FRF plan: protection of environment and marginalization by government. The section will then compare the civilian level interest with the overarching themes through utilizing opinion polls conducted by the central government, NHK, and the prefectural government. Local elections of Ginowan City, Nago City, and Okinawa Prefecture will also be investigated, as democratic elections are a means to analyze Okinawan interest.

1.1. The Environmental Argument: The Beautiful Sea and Dugongs

It is fairly common to read about local individuals’ concerns about the beautiful ocean of Henoko. On an island that exemplifies the beauties of nature, both land and sea, the image of environmental protection seems strong. At his governor inauguration, Takeshi Onaga argued, “[The government] should halt landfill Henoko base in the

²⁰⁹ Kazuo Yamagishi, “ ‘No to Henoko’ Towards Mainland and the Gubernatorial Election that entrusts ‘Okinawa’s Pride’ to Onaga [Hondo he ‘Henoko no’ ‘Okinawa no hokori’ Onagashi ni takusu Okinawachijisen],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 17, 2014.

beautiful sea.”²¹⁰ He also argued that the current FRF is “the destruction of an internationally valued natural environment” and tantamount to creating a base on “Matsushima Bay or Lake Biwa, Lake Towada” in the name of security.²¹¹ The Anti-Helicopter Base Council is the most vocal Okinawan organization that cooperates with other non-Okinawan organizations to protect the sea for environmental reasons.²¹² As written on their website, the organization explains how Henoko bay is home to a variety of coral and seaweed, including the dugong, a symbolic marine mammal usually used in protests against base creation. According to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), dugongs are considered “vulnerable” due to the loss of habitat and water pollution.²¹³ With the acceleration of habitation loss and evidence of dugong visits to Henoko bay, environmentalists argue for environmental protection.

Non-Okinawan organizations are more vocal on the importance on protecting the sea of Henoko. World Wildlife Fund Japan published an open letter addressed to former Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima while he had a team of experts conducting environmental assessments. According to WWF Japan, Henoko, or Oura Bay, is one of the 200 regions that still preserve exceptional biodiversity.²¹⁴ Thirty-six

²¹⁰ Takeshi Onaga quoted in Kazuo Yamagishi, “‘Henoko Not Accepted’: Okinawa Governor Onaga Inauguration [‘Henoko kichi mitomenu’ Onaga Okinawa chiji, shuunin kaiken],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 10, 2014.

²¹¹ Takeshi Onaga, *The Fighting Will of Okinawans* [Tatakau Minni] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 2015), 5 and 225.

²¹² “Henoko’s Beautiful Sea [Henokono utsukushii umi],” *Heri Kichi Hantai Kyougikai*, accessed on April 13, 2017, <http://www.mco.ne.jp/~herikiti/umi.html>.

²¹³ “Dudong,” *WWF*, last modified in 2017, accessed on April 13, 2017, <https://www.worldwildlife.org/species/dugong>.

²¹⁴ “Opinion by Stakeholder on Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface (Nago City Henoko) [Koyuu suimen umetate shounin shinseisho (Nagoshi Henoko) ni kakawaru rigaikankein no

new species of crustaceans were discovered in 2009, leading to biologists wanting to further investigate the region.²¹⁵ In addition to the Dugong, the Oura Bay is home to one of the largest blue corals (*Heliopora coerulea*) with the height of 12 meters, width of 30 meters, and length of 60 meters. While the base will not be directly created on top of this reef, the landfill containing soil from other regions could greatly affect the environment and result in the damage of the reef. The Nature Conservation Society of Japan, a NGO based in Tokyo, upholds the same argument. In a letter addressed to current governor Onaga, while referring to other sources such as the Japanese Coral Reef Society and The Ecological Society of Japan, the Conversation Society argued that the concrete blocks have already affected the ocean.²¹⁶ The NGO revealed that governmental sources such as the “U.S. Marine Corps Recommended Findings 2014” and sources from the Okinawa Defense Bureau have admitted the evidence of dugongs feeding on sea grass found within the area of construction. While Okinawan environmental NGOs such as the Okinawa Environment Network (*Okinawa Kankyo Network*) exist, they are less involved in issues relating to Henoko.²¹⁷ This fact discredits the efforts and calls to protect the beautiful sea of Henoko and suggests that

ikensho],” *WWF Japan*, last modified on July 18, 2013, accessed on April 13, 2017, <http://www.wwf.or.jp/activities/2013/07/1148018.html>.

²¹⁵ “Ooura Bay, Okinawa Island – Thirty-six (36) New Species of Crustaceans Confirmed,” *WWF Japan*, last modified on November 25, 2009, accessed on April 13, 2017, http://www.wwf.or.jp/activities/upfiles/Ourawan_PR091125_eng.pdf.

²¹⁶ “Additional Request to Revoke the Permission to Landfill Publicly-owned Water Surface for The American Military MCAS Futenma’s FRF Construction [Beigun Futenma hikoujou daitai shisetsu kensetsu jigyou no kouyou suimen umetate shounin no tekkai ni tsuite saido no youboushou]” *The Nature Conversation Society of Japan*, last modified on April 17, 2017, accessed on April 22, 2017, <http://www.nacsj.or.jp/archive/2017/04/4841/>.

²¹⁷ “Joint Urgent Statement of NGOs Opposing the Construction of a New Military Base at Henoko Protect Henoko Ocean and its Coral Reefs.” *Ramsar Network Japan*. Last modified on March 25, 2015. Accessed on April 13, 2017. <http://www.ramnet-j.org/2015/03/26/20150325henoko-ngo-en.pdf>.

protests against the FRF may not be heavily revolved around arguments for environmental protection.

The relatively weak effort by locals does not translate into the weak response by Okinawan politicians. On 27 June 2015, the Ministry of Defense announced that they plan to use soil from the Shikoku region.²¹⁸ As WWF warned, this soil contains Argentine Ants, which can affect the Okinawan environment if used. In response to this danger, on 13 July, the Okinawa Prefecture Assembly voted to create principles and rules when using soil and sand.²¹⁹ The prefecture also conducted surveys on coral reefs in the region.²²⁰ This is most likely a response to few corals damaged due to concrete blocks implementation.²²¹ Whether these decisions were politically driven or not, Okinawa has responded to environmental concerns raised by environmental NGOs.

Another development that is worrisome yet received little attention by environmental defenders is the financial scandal of former Okinawa Governor Nakaima's environmental panel. Three out of the thirteen environmental panelists received a total of 11 million yen (roughly 100 thousand USD) from companies with contracts to build the FRF.²²² All of the meetings were closed to public, and the

²¹⁸ "With Hopes to Halt Henoko, Okinawa may 'Regulate Sediment Transfer' [Okinawa 'dosha hannyuu wo kisei' Henoko soshi nentou ni]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 27, 2015.

²¹⁹ "Okinawa Prefecture to Approve Sediment Regulation Ordinance [Okinawaken dosha kisei jyourei ga seiritsu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 13, 2015.

²²⁰ Takushi Yoshida, "Diving Survey on Henoko's Coral Reef to Being [Henoko sangoshou sensui chousa wo kaishi]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 31, 2015.

²²¹ "Henoko Examined by Diving [Henoko mogutte shirabeta]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 27, 2015.

²²² "Government panel members received 11 million yen."

summary of discussions was published nine months after the last meeting.²²³ It was later revealed that companies that provided donations include IDEA Consultants, Penta-Corporations, Environmental Consultants for Ocean and Human (ECOH), and Toyo Construction. In response to scandal that Asahi Shimbun researched and revealed, Yoshihide Suga responded, “The committee debated environmental issues on middle-ground. There is no problem.”²²⁴ Takeshi Onaga commented that it was deeply regrettable that the assessment committee was receiving donations claiming, “Prefectural residents have a hard time consenting [the transactions].”²²⁵ Although Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani also claimed that the donations have not affected the discussions of the panelists, on 28 October, the Ministry of Defense announced to remove the four companies involved in donations.²²⁶ This scandal provided legitimacy to the Third Party Investigation Team’s assessment that insufficient environmental assessment was conducted under the previous governor and to the legal argument against the FRF.

As the evidence above suggests, there are biological reasons for Okinawans to oppose the creation of the new base. The financial scandal of the assessment

²²³ Yasunobu Shisui and Satoshi Otani, “Nine Months of Closed Room Environmental Protection Committee Meetings on Henoko: Committee Member to received Donation and Reward [Henoko, misshitsu no iinkai kankyou kanshiin, giji youshi kouhyou ni 9 ka getsu iin ni kifu houshuu],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 19, 2015.

²²⁴ Yoshihide Suga quoted in “Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga to Announce No Problem with the Donation regarding Henoko [Henoko meguru kifu, mondainai to ninshiki Suga kanbouchoukan],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 19, 2015.

²²⁵ Takeshi Onaga quoted in “Onaga: Donation Problem is ‘Regretful’ [Kifumondai ‘zannen’ Henoko meguri Onagashi],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 21, 2015.

²²⁶ Isamu Nikaidou, “Ministry of Defense: Investigation of the Committee Member Regarding the Donation Problem [Kifu mondai, iinn wo cohusa Henoko kankyou kanshi de boueishou],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 22, 2015; Yuusuke Fukui and Satoshi Otani, “Ministry of Defense: Recipients of the Donations to be Removed from the Environmental Committee [Henoko isetsu jigyou no sujugyousha, kanshiin gyoumu kara jyogai boueishou],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 29, 2015.

committee should provide momentum to environmentalists. Regardless of these revelations, lack of enthusiasm for Okinawan environmentalists is observed. An unstated understanding of environmental damage can be perceived, but opponents have not used the environment argument to their advantage. This reveals that despite disgust against tarnishing the beautiful sea of Henoko, environmental issues may not a top priority of the demonstrators.

1.2 The Marginalization Argument: The “Spiritual Starvation” of Okinawa

The marginalization argument receives the most enthusiasm. Picked up media, academics and politicians, the argument revolves around the rejection of the Okinawan will, which is reflected in both historical and current events. Editorials with titles such as “[Okinawa] should not be treated as a sacrifice” and “Prioritizing America over Okinawa” reveals feelings of rejection by greater authorities.²²⁷ The 1997 Akitagawa Prize Winner Shun Medoruma lamented that his anger transformed into hatred because nothing has changed regardless of Okinawans’ expressing their will through democratic elections over.²²⁸ As seen in the title of Medoruma’s interview, sympathizers use the Ryuku language to create a distinct distinction between the *Uchinanchu* (Okinawan) and *Yamatu* (Okinawan pronunciation of the Yamato ethnic

²²⁷ “Editorial: Should not be treated as a sacrifice [(Shasetsu) Suteishini shitewa naranu],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 1, 2015; “Editorial: Henoko Construction, Prioritizing America over Okinawa [(Shasetsu) Henoko chakkou Okinawa yori Beikoku yuusenka],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 7, 2017.

²²⁸ Shun Medoruma, “The voice of anti-relocation fails to reach the ‘Yamatus’ The Deterioration of Politics Continue [Isetsuhantai no koe yamatu ni todokazu seijino rekkaga susumu],” interview by Kazuki Hagi, *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 13, 2015.

race, the Japanese). This sense of alienation is probably best captured by Tetsuya Takahashi, philosophy professor at The University of Tokyo.

Takahashi described this treatment of Okinawa as a result of a system of sacrifice. This system sacrifices the minorities in a society in order to maintain the benefits of the majority, and such treatment is usually hidden or is justified.²²⁹ While his first book was mainly theoretical, he followed up this concept by further explanation its application to Okinawa: the security of the majority is maintained by sacrificing Okinawa.²³⁰ Takahashi argued that while most Japanese value the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, most of American forces are located in Okinawa, thus creating an unbalance in burden sharing. Rather than merely criticizing the government, Takahashi argued that the Japanese civilian is responsible for perpetuating the sacrifice of Okinawa by seeking an alliance with the United States while not partaking in burden sharing.²³¹ The philosopher followed this line of argument by criticizing the militaristic explanation that Okinawa is geographically strategic; if placing forces on Okinawa is important for emerging threats, this mentality bolsters the justification of a precious or inevitable sacrifice. The philosopher has flaws, as he mainly focused on human rights rather than taking geopolitical implications and the nature of the Marines into serious

²²⁹ Moriyuki Hoshino, review of *System of Sacrifice Fukushima and Okinawa* [Giseino System Fukushima • Okinawa], by Tetsuya Takahashi, *The University of Tokyo, Komaba*, February 2, 2017, College of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, <http://www.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/info/about/booklet-gazette/bulletin/562/open/C-4-2.html>.

²³⁰ Tetsuya Takahashi, *American Bases on Okinawa, Evaluating Out of Prefecture Relocation* [Okinawano beigunkichi Kengaiisetsu o kangaeru] (Tokyo: Shueisha Shinsho, 2015), 119-125.

²³¹ Ibid., 184-187.

consideration. However, Takahashi's argument provides the theoretical framework of the marginalization argument: Okinawan concerns are rejected for a national cause.

Proponents of the marginalization argument also refer back to history to explain how the history of Okinawan marginalization is being repeated. Events such as Imperial Japan's forcible annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, horrors of the Battle of Okinawa, and the rape and murder of five-year-old Yumiko-chan are shared by Okinawans as common knowledge of their unfortunate history.²³² The forcible FRF, in the eyes of anti-base Okinawans, is only part of Okinawa's long history of rejection.

Okinawa Governor Takeshi Onaga also argues along the same line of sentiment. At the first hearing of the first legal court, Onaga argued that Okinawans suffer from "spiritual starvation" (*tamashii no kigakan*), which has resulted from the "usurpation of freedom, equality, rights and autonomy."²³³ Similar language was used at his speeches at the Battle of Okinawa Memorial Day Ceremony in 2015 and 2016. Onaga declared that the 2014 Okinawa gubernatorial election reflected Okinawan's will. In the 2015 speech, Onaga articulated, "The cornerstone of peace cannot be established without respecting and protecting civilian's freedom, equality, human rights and democratic

²³² Eiji Oguma, *The Boundaries of the Japanese* [Nihon No Kyoukai] (Tokyo: Shinyousha, 1998), 23; Chie Mikami, "Shock Caused by the Rape Incident by a Camp Schwab Soldier [Campu Shuwabu no heishi reipu jiken no gekishin]," *Magazine 9*, last modified on March 23, 2016, accessed on April 9, 2017, <http://www.magazine9.jp/article/mikami/26692/>; Jon Mitchell, "Battle Scars: Okinawa and the Vietnam War," *The Japan Times*, last modified on March 7, 2015, accessed on December 31, 2015, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/07/national/history/forgotten-history-okinawa-vietnam-war/#.VpmsWIN95-U>.

²³³ Takeshi Onaga, "Full Text of Onaga's Statement at Court [Daishikkou soshou Onaga chiji chinjyutsusho zenbun]," *Ryukyu Shimpo*, last modified on December 2, 2015, accessed on April 2, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/pages/entry-181721.html>.

rights.”²³⁴ In the following year, Onaga claimed, “In order to establish the cornerstone of peace in a true manner, the basics of the U.S.-Japan [SOFA] should be reexamined, the presence of the Marines and bases should decrease, and base reduction should immediately occur.”²³⁵ In both speeches, it can be observed that the governor of Okinawa believes that the concerns of the country has triumphed and neglected the will of Okinawans.

Onaga’s perspective of the Abe administration is further articulated in his 11 November 2015 press conference regarding the revocation of Henoko construction. When a reporter asked for Onaga’s response towards Abe’s comments that the revocation was illegal and would dismiss public interest, the Okinawan governor responded that the Prime Minister is not taking into consideration of the Okinawan’s will.²³⁶ When Onaga spoke at court in defense of the lawsuits occurring between the local and central government, he claimed that immense presence of the American military bases is the reason Okinawa’s unfortunate history is receiving greater attention.²³⁷ For Onaga, the origins of the FRF problem is not, as Yoshihide Suga has mentioned, the relocation of one of the most dangerously located bases, but in the

²³⁴ Takeshi Onaga, “Full Text: Takeshi Onaga’s Peace Declaration on Okinawa Memorial Day [Okinawa irei no hi Onaga Takeshi no heiwa sengen (zenbun)],” *Okinawa Times*, last modified on June 23, 2015, accessed on December 7, 2016, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/15701>.

²³⁵ Takeshi Onaga, “Full Text of Governor Onaga’s Peace Declaration at the Memorial Ceremony to Commemorate the Fallen at the Anniversary of the End of the Battle of Okinawa [Onaga chiji no heiwa sengen zenbun Okinawa zen senbotsusha tsuitou shiki],” *Asahi Shinbun*, last modified on June 23, 2016, accessed on December 7, 2016, <http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASJ6Q3TQYJ6QTIPE01D.html>.

²³⁶ Takeshi Onaga, “Full Text of Governor Onaga’s Press Conference: Rejection of Correction on Henoko Recession [Henoko shounin torikeshi, zesei shiji wo kyohi Onaga chiji kaiken zenbun],” *Okinawa Times*, last modified on November 11, 2015, accessed on December 13, 2016, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/20751>.

²³⁷ Onaga, “Full Text of Onaga’s Statement at Court.”

forcible usurpation of land from the Okinawans post-WWII.²³⁸ The Okinawan governor also questioned the establishment of Restoration of Sovereignty Day, a national holiday institutionalized from 28 April 2013. While this holiday was supposed to celebrate Japan's return as a sovereign country in 1952 with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Onaga argued that Okinawa did not return to Japan until 1972.²³⁹ In Okinawa, this holiday is treated as the day of embarrassment, as Okinawa was officially placed under American jurisdiction.²⁴⁰ Actions only suggest discrimination.

In his book, Onaga further illustrates the marginalization experienced by the Okinawans. Onaga criticized the Abe administration for contradictions in promises and actions. The governor argued, "The forcible concentration of bases ignores the democratic will of Okinawans."²⁴¹ When discussing alternatives to the FRF, Onaga criticized the Japanese government's default answer of "Henoko is the only solution to Futenma" ignores the fact that Futenma base was originally forced on Okinawans without their consent.²⁴² Furthermore, the verbatim argument of "abandoning the Henoko relocation plan will translate into the *koteika* of Futenma" can be interpreted as a threat by the central government.²⁴³ The usual usage of carrot and sticks policy towards Okinawa frustrates the governor as well. This was seen with Abe's promise to

²³⁸ Takeshi Onaga, "Look at Okinawa as it is [Okinawano aruga mamao mitemoraitai]," in *Mainland and Okinawa* [Hondo and Okinawa], ed. by Asahi Shimbun Publication (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Publication, 2015), 17.

²³⁹ Stanley White, "Japan's Abe says 'restoration of sovereignty day' signals hope," *The Reuters*, last modified on April 28, 2013, accessed on April 23, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-politics-abe-idUSBRE93R01G20130428>; Onaga, *The Fighting Will*, 21.

²⁴⁰ "Widening Gap between the Government and Okinawa."

²⁴¹ Onaga, *Tatakau*, 5.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 32.

²⁴³ Yoshihide Suga quoted in *Ibid.*, 44.

increase financial aid towards Okinawa at the end of 2014 and the LDP rescinding their 50 billion yen in assistance to Nago City after Onaga's victory.²⁴⁴ Finally, in his concluding chapter, Onaga decried that politicians, bureaucrats and regular Japanese citizens argue that the amount of aid Okinawa Prefecture receives is significantly larger than other prefectures and hence suggest that Okinawa should be stop complaining: "[After hearing the argument that Okinawa receives aid and should stop complaining] I respond, 'How is Okinawa being spoiled by Japan. Or is Japan being spoiled by Okinawa.'"²⁴⁵ The governor argued that economic aid should not be seen as a compensation for base burden. Such mentality represents subtle discrimination against Okinawa, which results in marginalization.

This line of argument receives the most attention by media, academics and politicians. The historical treatment of Okinawa continues to gain more attention as the tensions between the island and two governments persist. For some, the current problem is repeated history of the previous grievances of Okinawa. Takahashi addressed this issue by proposing the system of sacrifice theory, which results in marginalizing one party for the benefit of the majority. This theory is supported by how Onaga perceives the gestures by the Abe administration amidst the relocation debate. Those who have taken the marginalization argument to an extreme argue for independence, which Onaga has denied as the majority voice.²⁴⁶ However, as long as

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 68.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 204.

²⁴⁶ The "Okinawan Independence Theory" is an argument that it is better for Okinawa to become one, independent country rather than being a prefecture of Japan. This argument is picked up in works such as Yasukatsu Matsushima, "Okinawa is a Japanese Colony [Okinawa wa nihon no

the central government continues the construction of the current FRF amidst of Okinawan discontent revealed through the democratic procedure, the island's "spiritual starvation" may continue to persist.

Multitudes of arguments against the proposed FRF exist in Okinawan dialogue. Out of all arguments, the environmental and marginalization explanations receive the most attention. As concerned, the proposed FRF will affect the surrounding environment. However, the lack of Okinawan NGOs leading the environmental debate questions whether environmental concerns are of top priority. The marginalization argument received the most concern by locals, media, academics and politicians. This argument ranges from historical to continued treatment, which results in the rejection and curtailment of Okinawan opposition. Onaga Takeshi picked up on these two arguments throughout his career as governor. As the democratically elected governor, he believes his victory against Nakaima revealed the Okinawan will. To further understand what the Okinawan will is, it is important to compare previous elections and statistical data on Okinawan concerns with the three main arguments.

1.3 Statistical Data on Okinawan Concern

When observing at public opinion polls in Okinawa, statistics provided by the Okinawan Times or Ryukyu Times reveal a strong anti-base sentiment. In order to be as objective as possible, opinion polls conducted by the central government, NHK and the prefectural government will be taken into consideration. Interestingly, the Cabinet

shokuminchidearu],” in *What is the Okinawa Problem* [Okinawamondai towa nanika] (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2011), 45; Onaga, *Tatakau*, 87.

office only conducted three public opinion polls on Okinawan sentiment in 1989, 1994 and 2001. According to the Cabinet Offices' numbers, in 2001, 9.8 percent of Okinawans believed in the necessity of American military bases, while 35.9 percent believed that the bases are an unavoidable necessity for security.²⁴⁷ When comparing these numbers with the 1994 survey, both numbers have increased. Simultaneously, opinion that American military bases were not necessary decreased from 24.9 percent in 1994 to 20.6 percent in 2001. The 2012 NHK public opinion polls reveal the continued increasing trend in both Okinawan perception on the necessity of bases (11 percent) and unavoidable necessity (45 percent).²⁴⁸ Regardless of the increase in individuals that believe in the necessity of American bases, the percentage of individuals who believe that American bases are unnecessary remains around 20 percent. Therefore, the myth that Okinawans are against American bases can be debunked to a certain degree. If anything, most Okinawans believe there are no alternatives to the necessity of these American bases.

However, a general recognition of the bases' role in security does not translate in accepting the heavy base presence on Okinawa. Unlike the government polls, NHK questioned about the base presence on Okinawa. Regardless of the increases in numbers of Okinawans who believe in the importance of the bases, the desire to

²⁴⁷ Japanese Cabinet Office, "Public Opinion Investigation on Residents of Okinawa Prefecture [Okinawakenmin no ishiki ni kansuru yoron chousa]," *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, last modified on February 2001, accessed on December 10, 2016, <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h12/h13-okinawa/index.html>.

²⁴⁸ Kei Kouno, "Conscious of Residents of Okinawa Prefecture 40 Years After Reversion [Hondo fukki 40 nenkan no Okinawa kenmin ishiki]," *NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation*, last modified in 2013, accessed on November 27, 2016, <https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/title/year/2013/pdf/003.pdf>, 96.

decreases base presence just like mainland Japan increased by 8 percent from 1992, which resulted in 55 percent in favor.²⁴⁹ The desire to get rid of all bases decreased by 13 percent when compared to 1992, resulting in 21 percent of Okinawans approving removing all bases. Those who argued that the status quo could remain amounts to 19 percent, which is a 8 percent increase from the previous report. Although the number of Okinawans desiring all bases to leave remains relatively significant, these supporters have decreased. It is important to note that the majority of Okinawans desire the concentration of bases to ease even before the Futenma helicopter crash in 2004 and the Hatoyama-shock.

Things get interesting when observing the responses towards the question of whether base concentration on Okinawa is unusual. According to the poll, 57 percent of Okinawans believe that base concentration is unusual, while 29 percent agree that it is unusual if they had to decide.²⁵⁰ While 4 percent of Okinawans believe that base concentration on Okinawa is not unusual, only 8 percent of the Japanese population agreed in the absolute necessity. Interestingly, while numbers reveal a common agreement on the necessity of American bases, this agreement failed to translate into the justification of heavy base concentration.

The 2012 NHK poll also compared Okinawan and the Japanese view on the Futenma Relocation Facility with Henoko, Nago City as an alternative. The report

²⁴⁹ Kei Kouno, "Conscious of Residents of Okinawa Prefecture 30 Years After Reversion [Hondo fukki 30 nenkan no Okinawa kenmin ishiki]," *NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation*, last modified in June 2002, accessed on November 27, 2016, <https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/020601.pdf>, 2.

²⁵⁰ Kouno, "Conscious of Residents of Okinawa Prefecture 40 Years," 98.

reveals that 72 percent of Okinawan respondents (oppose if they had to decide 32% and oppose 40%) disprove the current relocation plan, while 20 percent (support 6% and support if they had to decide 14%) support the current plan.²⁵¹ When compared with the entire Japanese population, those who are unfavorable of the current plan amount to 45 percent, while 36 percent believe that Henoko is the solution. As alternatives to the current plan, 18 percent agreed that the bases should be relocated within the country but out of the prefecture, 30 percent agree that the bases should go abroad, and another 18 percent believed that Funtoma should be returned without creating an alternative base for the American military. It is important to note that only 2 percent of Okinawans and 3 percent of the Japanese population believe that relocation should occur within their prefecture.

These numbers do not mean that Okinawans are ignorant in terms of security problems. Seventeen percent of Okinawans believe that Japan is extremely prone to invasion. The vast majority of Okinawans (64 percent) believe that the threat of invasion is possible.²⁵² These numbers show a different face of the Okinawan sentiment. While the majority of Okinawans would argue that bases should decrease and Henoko is not a suitable alternative, up to a total of 81 percent of the prefecture believes in a palpable security threat. This also reveals that the myth that Okinawans are risk-free is false; Okinawans are aware and believe in the threat posed towards

²⁵¹ Ibid., 98-99.

²⁵² Ibid., 100.

Japan by possibly China. Interestingly, this threat perception is not translated into embracing neither American presence nor the relocation of Futenma to Henoko.

The most recent opinion poll conducted by the Okinawa Prefectural Government provides greater insight in what Okinawans desire. In response to the question, “Do you think that the fact that 74 percent of American military bases located on Okinawa is discrimination?” 43.7 percent answered that they believed it was discrimination and 25.4 percent agreed that it was discrimination if they had to choose, amounting to 69.1 percent.²⁵³

Another question the 2016 report analyzed was the top three top priorities Okinawans desired both the prefectural and central government to conduct regarding the U.S. military bases.²⁵⁴ Out of all the options, the desire to return land was up at 33.2 percent, the highest top priority of the respondents. It can be assumed that most deemed this as most important as land return as second and third priority experiences a significant drop, 4.3 and 4.7 percent respectively. The other top choices are to revise the U.S.-Japan SOFA (17.3 percent placed this as their first priority and 18.1 percent as their second priority), to decrease the number of crimes (14.8 percent placed this as their first priority and 17.1 percent as their second priority), to appropriately address criminals/victims with justice (4.4 percent placed this as their first priority while 11.5 percent as their second priority) and to reduce noise pollution and low-flight practices

²⁵³ Okinawa Prefectural Government, “Simple Summary of the Results on the 9th Consciousness of Prefecture Residents [Dai 9 kai kenmin ishiki chousa hyou oyobi tanjun shuukei kekka],” *Okinawa Prefecture*, last modified on September 29, 2016, accessed on December 13, 2016, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/kikaku/chosei/kikaku/documents/siryou_9th.pdf, 7.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 28.

(11.2 percent placed this as their first priority and 14.5 percent as their second priority). Environmental-related questions such as establishing proper environmental plans (2.7, 3.8 and 3.4 in that order of priority) and addressing military wastes (0.7, 1.7, and 1.6 in that order of priority) are significantly low when compared to the statistics above. Although some of the questions may have been asked to attain a certain answer, by observing the prefectural government's recent analysis, it is clear that Okinawans are most concerned with base return as promised and individual safety from crimes committed by American military soldiers.

The numbers retrieved by the central government, NHK and the prefectural government reveal that the marginalization argument is shared among Okinawans. As seen, it is interesting to observe the desire of diminishing base concentration before the infamous 2004 Futenma Helicopter crash and DPJ Hatoyama's attempted failure. The statistics provided by the three sources reveal that Okinawans understand the dynamic security environment. Despite their appreciation for security provided by the United States and understanding of the growing threat from China, they still believe that base burden can be reduced. Just as the lack of Okinawan NGOs advocating environmental protection suggested, the statistics provided by the Prefectural government proved that environmental concerns were roughly around three percent. It can be concluded that the numbers provided by relatively interest-free parties provide quantitative support to the marginalization argument. Another important observation is the concern over individual security. Continuing opposition against the proposed FRF may not be the facility per se but the perception that burden is not being relieved at all. This possibility

would naturally connect high numbers revealing concerns over personal safety with belief in discrimination manifested in concentration and within prefecture base relocation.

The relocation of Futenma base to another location within Okinawa fails to address Okinawa's desire of decreased presence of American military bases. The FRF continues to be a symbol of discrimination, especially as the central government continues with construction regardless of opposition. From a simple observation of these numbers, it can be concluded that Okinawa's Level II win-sets were never compatible with America's three conditions for base relocation.

1.4 Okinawan Gubernatorial, Nago City and Ginowan Elections

Before making conclusion on the Okinawan perspective, it is necessary to review the results of the Okinawan Gubernatorial, Nago City Mayor and Ginowan City Mayor elections. The major points of debate for the three different elections will be discussed, including the voter turnout and number of votes. While observation for both Okinawan Gubernatorial and Nago City Mayor elections will start from 1998, numbers for the Ginowan City Mayor Election will be under scrutiny from 2007. The election held in 2007 was the first mayor election after the 2004 Helicopter Crash incident, and the development in the city's attitude afterwards deserves attention. Given that the 1995 rape occurred in Ginowan and that the anti-base mayor was reelected in the 2007 elections, it can be assumed that the city has always been against the presence of

American bases. Observation of numbers should reveal whether opinions differ depending on region.

1.4.1 Okinawan Gubernatorial Elections

The 1998 gubernatorial election was the first governor election held after the announcement of relocating the MCAS Futenma within the prefecture. Beginning with the 1995 Rape, Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota continued his position against relocation within the prefecture. Keiichi Inamine, candidate running against the sitting governor, agreed in rejecting the proposed sea-based facility but was willing to compromise. Taking a unique position, Inamine suggested creating a new joint military-civilian airport that would be on a fifteen-year lease for the American military.²⁵⁵ Therefore, the two candidates had different views of the FRF. Interestingly, this was not the theme for the elections. Asahi Shimbun's opinion poll conducted a week before the elections revealed that 51 percent of respondents viewed the prefecture's economy to be the most contested topic in the gubernatorial elections.²⁵⁶ Only 25 percent viewed the base problem as an important factor of voting. Inamine, who advocated for economic revitalization and proposing a base usable by civilians, won the elections. A similar atmosphere was observed in the 2002 gubernatorial elections. While two candidates other than Inamine opposed relocation within the

²⁵⁵ "Candidate for the Okinawa Gubernatorial Elections Keiichi Inamine Against MOB: Futenma Reversion [Okinawa chiji sen rikkouho no Inamine Keiichi shi, kaijyou kichi ni hantai Futenma henkan]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 22, 1998.

²⁵⁶ "Keiichi Inamine to Defeat Masahide Ota, Asahi Shimbun's Okinawa Gubernatorial Elections Investigation on State of Affairs [Inamine Keiichi Ota Masahideshi seru Okinawa chijisen de asahi shinbunsha jousei chousa]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 10, 1998.

prefecture, most of the debate focused on Okinawa's high unemployment debate.²⁵⁷ Similar to the previous election, fifty-nine percent of respondents to Asahi Shimbun and Okinawa Times' opinion poll saw economic strategy as most important, while only ten percent viewed the American base problem as top priority.

With Inamine announcing that he had no interest in returning to office, the 2006 gubernatorial election consisted of new candidates. Similar to Inamine, Hirozaku Nakaima opposed the V-way roadmap yet agreed on relocating the base within the prefecture.²⁵⁸ Nakaima's main opponent, Keiko Itohazu, advocated relocating the base out of the country. With a difference of roughly 38,000 votes, Nakaima won the elections against the anti-base candidate. The Asahi Shimbun's poll revealed that 26 percent viewed policies on base relocation as a priority for elections.²⁵⁹ Just like Inamine, Nakaima emphasized on economic development more than the base problem during the campaign period. One can assume that immediate concerns triumphed prefectural issues with the government.

With the rise and fall of DPJ Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Nakaima officially changed his position and rallied against relocation within Okinawa. Nago City Mayor Youichi Iha, Nakaima's main opponent in the 2010 gubernatorial elections, advocated against relocation within Okinawa and advocated relocating the

²⁵⁷ Tetsuya Kumagai, Norio Yatsu and Akira Uchida. "Enthusiasm Disappears after Gubernatorial Election: Employment takes a precedence over Bases [Okinawa chijisen, nekki kie kichi mondai yori koyousaku]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 12, 2002.

²⁵⁸ Taku Sato, "Inamine elected as Governor, Defeats 'Out of Country' candidate Itokazu: Futenma Discussions to Continue [Okinawa chiji ni Inamine shi Futenma kyōgi keizoku he 'kokugai isetsu' Itokazu shi yaburu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 20, 2006.

²⁵⁹ "Concern on the 'Base Problem' to Increase to 45% ['Kichi mondai' jyuushi 45% ni zou]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 9, 2014.

base to Guam.²⁶⁰ While both candidates argued against the FRF plan, Nakaima avoided direct conflict with the government yet emphasized, “There is no relocation destination within the prefecture.”²⁶¹ The third candidate, Tatsuro Kinjyou, supported the Henoko plan on basis on security.²⁶² Even though both positions were available in the elections, the opposition candidate dominated voter share. In terms of voter interest, 49 percent of voters believed that economic issues were a priority while 36 percent viewed the base problem as important.²⁶³ When compared with the 2006 elections, there is a 10 percent interest increase with the base problem as most important. Economic priority only decreased by three percent, revealing that it was still an important issue. The 2010 election was unique because voters had to decide between candidates with a similar platform.

Unlike the previous four elections, the 2014 gubernatorial election clearly revolved around the base issue. In response to the Asahi opinion poll, 45 percent of respondents believed that the base relocation issue was a top priority in the gubernatorial election, an increase of 9 percent from 2010.²⁶⁴ In comparison, economic concerns decreased to 38 percent, allowing the base problem to gain more attention for the first time. Despite campaigning against Henoko in 2010, Inamine openly supported the relocation in 2014. Takeshi Onaga, mayor of Naha City, adamantly opposed the

²⁶⁰ Fukuko Takahashi and Akigo Sakajiri, “Inamine to be Reelected as Okinawa Governor: Futenma Relocation to Extend [Okinawa chiji ni Nakaima shi ga saisen Futenma isetsu, choukika he],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 29, 2010.

²⁶¹ Hirokazu Nakaima quoted in *Ibid.*

²⁶² “Tatsuro Kinjyou to Run for Gubernatorial Elections ‘to Protect the Senkakus’ [Kinjyou Tatsuro shi ga chiji sen shutsuba hyoumei ‘Senkaku shotou wo mamoru’],” *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on October 6, 2010, accessed on April 22, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-168458.html>.

²⁶³ “Concern on the ‘Base Problem’ to Increase to 45%.”

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

base relocation. The other two runners, Miko Shimoji and Soukichi Kina, argued for a prefectural referendum and revocation of Inamine's permission of relocation respectively, leaving less of an impression on voters.²⁶⁵ For the first time in a gubernatorial election, an anti-base candidate won victoriously against a base lenient candidate.

As seen in the gubernatorial elections, while base issues were definitely on the mind of voters, immediate needs took a greater priority up until 2010. This fact alone cannot support the conclusion that the base issue wasn't important. As seen in Table 1, all elections between pro- and anti-base elections with a 40,000-vote difference, with 2002 and 2014 as an exception. For 2002, voters probably were satisfied of the conclusion of the initial FRF blueprint decided between the central government and Okinawa. While opposed against Inamine's promises of a fifteen-year lease and joint civilian military usage, the government never overrode Inamine's demands. The 10,000-vote difference between Onaga and Nakaima is significant. The fact that elections were close between pro- and anti-base candidates in 1998 and 2006 suggest that despite voter's priority in economic issues, anti-base sentiment was equally strong to make the decisions closer than the 2002 and 2014 results. While Hatoyama's influence on anti-base sentiment cannot be denied, the numbers as seen on Table 1 suggest that the anti-base preference was already prevalent in Okinawan society.

²⁶⁵ "Debate between the four candidates: Differences on Henoko relocation are clear with 'implementation' and 'prevention' [Henoko isetsu 'suishin' 'soshi' 4 shi ronsen]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 31, 2014.

Table 1. Okinawa Gubernatorial Elections

Year and Voter Turnout	Candidate	Number of Votes	Position
1998 (76.54%)	Keiichi Inamine	374,833	Support
	Masahide Ota	337,369	Oppose
2002 (57.22%)	Keiichi Inamine	359,604	Support
	Masanori Yoshimoto	148,401	Oppose
	Shigenobu Aragaki	46,230	Oppose
2006 (64.54%)	Hirokazu Nakaima	347,303	Support
	Keiko Itokazu	309,985	Oppose
	Chousuke Yara	6,220	Oppose
2010 (60.88%)	Hirokazu Nakaima	335,708	Oppose
	Youichi Iha	297,082	Oppose
	Tatsuro Kinjyou	13,116	Support
2014 (60.13%)	Takeshi Onaga	360,820	Oppose
	Hirokazu Nakaima	261,076	Support
	Miko Shimoji	69,447	Referendum
	Shoukichi Kina	7,821	Oppose

Source: Created based on “Okinawa Prefecture Gubernatorial Elections: Comparison of Past Number of Votes and Voter Turnout [Okinawaken chiji sen kako no tokuhyouosu to touhyouritsu no suii,” *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on November 7, 2010, accessed on April 22, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-170144.html>; “Results of Elections, Okinawa Prefecture [Senkyo kekka (Okinawaken)],” *Senkyo Dot Com*, accessed on April 22, 2017, <http://go2senkyo.com/local/jichitai/3962>.

1.4.2 Nago City Mayor Elections

Nago City Mayor elections followed a similar pattern as the gubernatorial elections. In the 1998 elections, Tateo Kishimoto, who took a lenient position and declared that the ultimate decision was based on the governor not the mayor, defeated the anti-base candidate Yoshikazu Tamaki.²⁶⁶ Kishimoto was reelected in the 2002 elections, defeating anti-base candidate Yasuhiro Miyagi.²⁶⁷ Unlike the previous election, Kishimoto ran on the basis of supporting the relocation if it occurs on conditions raised by the city. In addition, this election saw a greater gap between

²⁶⁶ “Tateo Kishimoto Elected as Nago City Mayor: Defeats Anti-MOB Tamaki [Nago shichou ni Kishimoto Tateo shi tousen kaijyou kichi hantaiha no Tamakishi wo yaburu],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 9, 1998.

²⁶⁷ “Tateo Kishimoto re-elected as Nago City Mayor: American Military Futenma Relocation ‘Understood as Concluded’ [Kishimoto Tateoshi, Nago shichou ni saisen beigun Futenma isetsu ‘ketsuron detato rikai’],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 4, 2002.

candidates with roughly 9,000 votes. The gap decreases once more in the 2006 election, with lenient pro-base candidate Yoshikazu Shimabukuro defeating both anti-base candidates Munehito Gakiya and Yoshitami Oshiro.²⁶⁸ As the agreed 2002 plan was being reevaluated, Shimabukuro argued that relocation could occur if it is done in response to the Nago resident's will. The mayor's approved V-way roadmap proved to be his downfall, as Susumu Inamine, who vocally ran against relocation, barely won the 2010 elections with 1,000-vote lead.²⁶⁹ Despite Governor Nakaima's reverse on relocation, Inamine still defeated pro-base candidate Bunshin Suematsu in the 2014 elections. As seen, Nago City shifted from a lenient position that allowed relocation with benefits to Nago City. Once the blueprint changed from the 2002 to the 2006 plan, voters punished Shimabukuro and supported anti-base candidate Inamine.

As host of the new FRF, Nago voters are most keen on the base issue rather than economic benefits or policy. In the 2010 elections, former mayor Shimabukuro lost on a platform to helping revitalizing Nago's local economy.²⁷⁰ This same trend is seen in the 2014 elections and provides greater insight into Nago residents' voting preference. With the LDP heavily supporting candidate Suematsu, Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba mentioned about establishing a "Nago Revitalization Fund of 500 million yen"

²⁶⁸ "Three Candidates for the Nago City Mayor Election: Futenma Relocation as Main Issue [Futenma isetsu ga souten ni Nago shichousen, 3 shi todokede]." *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 16, 2006; "Yoshikazu Shimabukuro Elected as Nago City Mayor: 'Discussions likely if revisions' for the Futenma Relocation [Nago shichou ni Shimabukuro Yoshikazu shi Futenma isetsu 'shuusei nara kyoudgi mo' Okinawa]." *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 23, 2006.

²⁶⁹ "Nago City Elections Today: Inamine 'No Base' and Shimabukuro Emphasis on Local Revitalization [Inamineshi, 'Kichi no' Shimabukuro shi, chiiki kasseika wo shucchou Nago shichousen, kyou toukaihyou]." *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 24, 2010.

²⁷⁰ Ibid..

in hopes to encourage residents to cast their votes for the pro-base candidate.²⁷¹ As seen in Table 2, the difference of votes between Inamine and his opponents in 2010 and 2014 increased, suggesting that the base issue remains the fuel of Nago residents' voting preference. While this trend of divergence may suggest that Hatoyama's promises affected elections post-2010, the close elections in 1998, 2006, and 2010 prove that the base issue has always been important and a key topic of division among voters. Despite the decreasing trend, the relatively high voter turnout also proves interest in shaping the future of the city.

In conclusion, host city has never been clearly for or against accepting the FRF into their district; if anything, voters were willing to accept a base with benefits up to Shimabukuro's election. However, Shimabukuro compliance to the 2006 blueprint plan probably decreased base lenient voters for an anti-base candidate. The growing support of Inamine seen from the transition of 2010 to 2014 reveals that rather than clear economic assistance, the citizens prefer being respected and heard by the government, revealing the spirit of the 1997 Nago City referendum as mentioned in the previous chapter.

²⁷¹ Shigeru Ishiba quoted in "Re-examining the 50 Billion Yen Fund [500 okuen kikin minaoshi genkyuu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 20, 2014.

Table 2. Nago City Mayor Elections

Year and Voter Turnout	Candidate	Number of Votes	Position
1998 (82.35%)	Tateo Kishimoto	16,253	Lenient
	Yoshikazu Tamaki	15,103	Oppose
2002 (78.72%)	Tateo Kishimoto	20,356	Support
	Yasuhiro Miyagi	11,148	Oppose
2006 (74.98%)	Yoshikazu Shimabukuro	16,764	Support
	Munehito Gakiya	11,029	Oppose
	Yoshitami Oshiro	4,354	Oppose
2010 (72.07%)	Susumu Inamine	17,950	Oppose
	Yoshikazu Shimabukuro	16,362	Support
2014 (70.4%)	Susumu Inamine	19,839	Oppose
	Bunshin Suematsu	15,684	Support

Source: Created based on “Results of Elections, Nago City [Senkyo kekka (Nago shi)],” *Senkyo Dot Com*, accessed on April 22, 2017, <http://go2senkyo.com/local/jichitai/3970>.

1.4.3 Ginowan City Mayor Elections

Ginowan, the district with the MCAS Futenma, has maintained its position against relocation within the prefecture. In the 2007 elections, Youichi Iha, sitting mayor of Ginowan city, argued that the air base had to be relocated to the United States of America.²⁷² Opponent Shingi Hokama argued that relocation to Henoko must be admitted in order to reduce burden from Ginowan. Regardless of his argument, the out of prefecture candidate won the elections.²⁷³ This trend continues in both 2010 and

²⁷² “Ginowan City Elections: Stalemate on the Inner-Prefecture Relocation of American Military MCAS Futenma with Sitting Mayor’s Opposition and Candidates’ Acceptance [Beigun Futenma hikoujyou no kennai isetsu de tairitsu genshoku hantai, shingao wa younin Okinawa Ginowan shichousen,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 16, 2007.

²⁷³ Ginowan-City Hall, “House of Councilor Election of Okinawa Prefecture And Ginowan City Mayor Voting Day [Sangiin Okinawaken senshutsu giin hoketsu senkyo oyobi GInowan shichou senkyo touhyoubi],” *Ginowan City*, April 22, 2007, accessed on April 24, 2017, http://www.city.ginowan.okinawa.jp/sisei/election/02/kaisokuH190422_752.html.

2012.²⁷⁴ Ginowan's position was challenged in the 2016 elections, with mayor Atsushi Sakima alternating his position from his 2012 platform and voiced out that Futenma had to be relocated as soon as possible, implying that Henoko was a viable alternative.²⁷⁵ Keiichiro Shimura, candidate supported by Governor Onaga, advocated for both Futenma's unconditional reversion and against the Henoko relocation. Despite his argument that echoed previous platform promises in Ginowan City, Shimura lost by a large margin.

The most important observation in the Ginowan City is the sudden change in voter preference in the 2016 elections. Just like the 2007 elections, mayor Sakima subtly implied that Henoko was a viable alternative while running on a platform of relocating Futenma as soon as possible. The main source of debate revolved around whether the Futenma Air Base was to be relocated to Henoko or another alternative. Despite having candidates opposing Henoko up to 2012, voters allowed a candidate who is lenient with the Henoko to win by an unprecedented margin, as seen in Table 3. This change may be interpreted that Ginowan voters became worried of possible *koteika* of the air base.

²⁷⁴ "Iha to Continue as Ginowan City Mayor [Ginowan shichou ni Iha shi no koukei]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 29, 2010; "Ginowan elects a conservative candidate: Atsushi Sakima as Mayor and his 'out of prefecture' platform [Ginowan, hoshukei ga tousen shichou ni Sakima Atsushi shi 'kengai isetsu' kouyaku]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 13, 2012.

²⁷⁵ "Government Preferred Candidate Atsushi Sakima Defeats Pro-Governor Candidate at Ginowan City Elections [Ginowan shichou ni seikenha saisen Sakima Atsushi, chijiha shingao yaburu]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 25, 2016.

Table 3. Ginowan City Mayor Election

Year and Voter Turnout	Candidate	Number of Votes	Position
2007 (60.39%)	Youichi Iha	21,643	Oppose
	Shingi Hokama	17,801	Support
2010 (67.13%)	Takeshi Asato	23,598	Oppose
	Osamu Ashitomi	21,742	Oppose
2012 (63.90%)	Atsushi Sakima	22,612	Oppose
	Youichi Iha	21,712	Oppose
2016 (68.72%)	Atsushi Sakima	27,668	Support
	Keiichiro Shimura	21,811	Oppose

Source: Created based on Ginowan-City Hall, “Past Election Results [Kakono senkyo kekka],” *Ginowan City*, last modified in 2016, accessed on April 25, 2017, <http://www.city.ginowan.okinawa.jp/sisei/election/02/h28sityoukakosennkyo.html>.

1.5 Marginalization, Opinion Polls and Election Results

From both opinion polls and election results, it can be concluded that out of the two popular arguments, marginalization takes precedence. Opinion polls conducted by the central government, NHK, and the prefectural government proves that Okinawans desire decreased presence of bases from an early stage of the Futenma base reversion dialogue. This trend is challenged to a certain extent when observing the crucial points of debate for the gubernatorial elections. As seen in both gubernatorial and Nago elections, economic incentives were equally important to voters.

On the prefectural level, emphasis and concerns the future of the Futenma base gradually garnered interest, eventually surpassing economic concerns in the 2014 elections. This does not mean that Okinawans lack interest in the base issue. Regardless of the evidence that Okinawans viewed the economy with greater value than the base issue, the elections were competitive with roughly a 40,000-vote

difference. The only anomalies are the 2002 election of Keiichi Inamine and the 2014 election of Takeshi Onaga. The same can be applied to Nago City. It can be observed that Nago residents will not accept a base that lacks conditions voters desire, as seen in Shimabukuro's eventual acceptance of the Henoko Bay plan rather than Inamine and former Nago Mayor Kishimoto's on-sea facility. Ginowan City, host of the air base, remained anti-Henoko until the most recent election in 2016. While reelected mayor Sakima had not explicitly mentioned Henoko as an alternative, he had not denied the location as well. It can be assumed that the lawsuits between the central and local government affected elections. The possibility of the central government's victory may have concerned and jolted voters to choose a candidate that can avoid Futenma base's stabilization.

Table 4. Comparison of Elections

Voting Patterns	Okinawa Gubernatorial	Nago	Ginowan
Initial Concern	Economy > Bases	Allow base if conditions are satisfying	No Henoko
Changes	Bases > Economy 25% (98), 10% (02), 26% (06), 36% (10), 45% (14)	No Henoko	Henoko may be viable
Difference of Votes	Consistent 40,000 vote difference besides 2002 and 2014. Greatest shift in 2014	Consistent 1,000 vote difference besides 2002 and 2014	Consistent opposition besides 2016

Source: Created based on information as provided in Chapter IV 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3.

Provided statistics prove that while opinions within Okinawa are diverse, there is a common trend in the desire of decreasing base presence. The high interest in revitalizing the local economy explains the central government's attempt to persuade the prefecture to accept relocation by providing economic stimulus packages via

synergistic linkage with the FRF. However, polls from the early twenty-first century prove that regardless of economic incentives, the majority of Okinawans will not accept the FRF in Henoko. While Onaga's "All Okinawa" argument cannot be justified in explaining Okinawan sentiment as a whole, information provided in this section proves Okinawa's low win-set has been consistent. Factors such as Hatoyama's failure and Nakaima's surprising acceptance did not change Okinawa's position.

2. Negative Reverberation? External Factors and Low Win-sets

Statistics seen above prove that the majority of Okinawans are against the proposed FRF. The central government, especially with Nakaima, pursued a synergistic linkage between the FRF and economic incentives in order to make the prefecture submit to the alliance's demands. Regardless of increased benefits, Okinawa remained resilient.

While win-sets are determined by the conflict or consensus among the diverse preferences of local constituents, other factors such as Level I strategy and international pressure can positively or negatively affect Level II win-sets. In the case of Okinawa, immature SACO Final Report implementation, American military crimes and accidents, Japanese politicians self-tarnishing comments and ambiguity all negatively affect Okinawa's position on the FRF.

2.1 Actions Falling Short: Implementation of the SACO Final Report

Since Okinawa's reversion to Japan, the American military endeavored in base reduction. With the 1996 document, it was agreed that the United States would return

the following eleven facilities to Okinawa: Futenma, 4000 hectares of Camp Gonsalves (Northern Training Area), Aha Training Area, Gimbaru Training Area, Sobe Communications Site, Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Senaha Communications Station, Camp Kuwae (also known as Camp Lester), Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and housing consolidations on Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran (also known as Camp Foster).²⁷⁶ Most of the land had a decided reversion date. In addition to land reversion, the report included other agreements that included adjusting training and operational procedures, noise reduction, and improving the SOFA procedures in general. This section reviews land reversion that occurred in the order listed above.

The Northern Training Area was originally planned to be returned “by the end of March 2003” under the condition of providing land and water area “in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.”²⁷⁷ Just like the delay for most facilities, reversion did not occur until 22 December 2016. When the reversion was actualized, at the reversion ceremony, the Prime Minister of Japan commented, “The reversion of 4000 hectares of the Northern Training Area has been a task took twenty years. [The government] desires to continue accomplishing results by maintaining deterrence while steadily reducing burden on Okinawa.”²⁷⁸ U.S. Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy commended the reversion as “an important step towards the realignment [of U.S. forces].”²⁷⁹ As a condition of returning the Northern Training Area, Japan was required to create six helipads in the southern part

²⁷⁶ “The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996.”

²⁷⁷ Ibid..

²⁷⁸ Shinzo Abe quoted in Ishimatsu, “Majority of Northern Training”

²⁷⁹ Caroline Kennedy quoted in Ibid..

of the remaining area, resulting in negatively affecting communities living near the facility.²⁸⁰ While it is true that base presence would decrease from 74.5 percent to 70.6 percent, critics argue that the alliance failed to decrease overall burden with this deal.

Perhaps the most damaging report to both America and Japan's effort is the United States Marine Corps' "Marine Corps Installations Pacific 2025 Strategic Vision." In this particular report that explained the direction of the Marines in the coming decade, the military wrote that "approximately 51% of the unusable Northern Training Area (NTA) will be returned to GOJ [Government of Japan], additional available training acreage will be developed where possible, making full use of MCIPAC's [Marine Corps Installations Pacific] finite land acreage."²⁸¹ With the report claiming that the returned land to Okinawa was "unusable" for the Marines, it delegitimizes the efforts of burden reduction and implies that unnecessary land was returned to the Okinawans. Whether this was the perspective when the Final Report was negotiated, the Marines' independent document questions the intentions behind the largest reversion to Okinawa.

Both Aha Training Area, approximately 480 hectares, and Gimbaru Training Area, approximately 60 hectares, was originally planned with reversion by the end of

²⁸⁰ Hisashi Ishimatsu, "Reversion of the Northern Training Area, Largest Return Since Okinawa's Reversion [Okinawa no kitabu kunrenba henkan, nichibei seishiki goui hondo fukkigo de saidai]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, last modified on December 12, 2016, accessed on May 1, 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASJDP4QTXJDPUTFK008.html>; "Five-Hundred Riot Police sent to Higashimura Takae: Five Times more than Henoko [Higashimura Takae ni kidoutai 500 nin Henoko no 5 bai tounyuu he]," *Okinawa Times*, last modified on July 13, 2016, accessed on May 1, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/54284>.

²⁸¹ Marine Corps Installations Pacific, "Marine Corps Installations Pacific 2025 Strategic Vision," last modified n.a., accessed on May 1, 2017, http://www.mcipac.marines.mil/portals/28/Documents/CGsGuidance/MCIPAC_CG_STRAT_2025.PDF, 25.

March 1998.²⁸² The former training area was delayed by nine months due to the conditions of accepting the land and water area access for the Northern Training area, resulting in reversion on 22 December 1998.²⁸³ The conditions for latter training area required a helicopter landing zone relocation to the Kin Blue Beach Training Area and facility relocations to Camp Hansen. This was significantly delayed due to the Kin Town mayor's late acceptance of the return conditions in 2007.²⁸⁴ With relocation that occurred in afterwards, the land was returned on 31 July 2011.²⁸⁵ The Sobe Communication Site, approximately 53 hectares, with a planned reversion by the end of March 2001, was eventually returned in December 2006.²⁸⁶ Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, approximately 191 hectares, had the same reversion date as the communication site and returned in December 2006. Another facility, the Senaha Communication Station with approximately 61 hectares, which had a reversion date of March 2001, was mostly returned in October 2006 as planned.

²⁸² Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The SACO Final Report."

²⁸³ Morimoto, 199.

²⁸⁴ Japanese Ministry of Defense, "Part III: Measures for Defense of Japan, Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Section 3 Measures Relating to the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan," in DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2012, last modified in 2012, accessed on May 1, 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2012/33_Part3_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf, 249.

²⁸⁵ "Half of Gimbaru Training Area Returned Today [Ginbaru kunrenjyo henkan sokujitsu watashi ha hanbun jyaku]," *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on August 1, 2011, accessed on May 1, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-179939.html>.

²⁸⁶ Japanese Ministry of Defense, DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2012, 294.

Table 5. Facilities returned to Okinawan jurisdiction

Facilities returned	Expected Reversion	Actual Reversion
Camp Gonsalves/Northern Training Area	March, 2003	December, 2016
Aha Training Area	March, 1998	December, 1998
Gimbaru Training Area	March, 1998	July, 2011
Sobe Communications Site	March, 2001	December, 2006
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield	March, 2001	December, 2006
Senaha Communications Station	March, 2001	October, 2006

Source: Created based on Japan Ministry of Defense, “Part III: Measures for Defense of Japan, Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Section 3 Measures Relating to the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan,” in DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2011, last modified in 2011, accessed on May 1, 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/34Part3_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf.

The remaining facilities – Camp Kuwae, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port Facility, and housing consolidation for Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran – all had reversion dates by March 2008, were revised in the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.²⁸⁷ It was now promised that Camp Kuwae would be a total reversion rather than partial. Rough dates were clarified with the April 2013 announcement made by the second Abe administration. Most of the remaining facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, will only be returned to Okinawan jurisdiction after the proper implementation of the FRF.²⁸⁸ Despite the alliance’s recent agreement to delink land reversion with the FRF, the linkage between the FRF and most remaining facilities seems contradictory. With Futenma air base’s reversion to be Japanese financial year 2022 or later, the other facilities range from Japanese financial year 2022 to 2028 or later. However, the government announced their intention to

²⁸⁷ “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.”

²⁸⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa April 2013,” last modified in April 2013, accessed on May 1, 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/saihen/pdf/20130405_okicon_plan_e.pdf, 27.

finish the landfill within five years and it was reported that the whole facility might take at least nine and a half years, resulting as anticipated completion by financial year 2026.²⁸⁹

Table 6. Facilities linked with the FRF

Facilities to be returned	Expected Reversion	New Date
Futenma	(1) 2003 (2) 2014	2022 or later
Camp Kuwae/Lester	March, 2008	2025 or later
Makiminato Service Area	March, 2008	2025 or later
Naha Port	March, 2008	2028 or later
Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran/Foster)	March, 2008	2024 or later

Source: Created based on Japan Ministry of Defense, “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa April 2013.”

For promises other than land reversion, both governments have been making changes in a speedy matter. For example, the artillery live-firing training over Highway 104 that is one of the three 1993 Okinawa Prefecture three important factors was relocated by the promised financial year 1997.²⁹⁰ The alliance installed noise reduction baffles at Kadena Base to decrease noise pollution. The promised relocation of the KC-130 Aerial Refuel aircrafts were not given a specific date, and was finally transferred to Iwakuni Air Base in 2014. Promises to improve certain aspects of the U.S.-Japan SOFA procedures such as accident reports and visits to U.S. facilities and areas were changed as well. While burdens such as noise pollution and American

²⁸⁹ “[Extra] Landfill of Henoko to Begin: Prefecture to retaliate, construction of seawall and largest facility since Okinawa’s reversion [‘gougai’ Henoko umetate hajimaru gogan kouji, ken wa hanpatsu fukkigo saidai no kichi kensetsu he],” *Okinawa Times*, last modified on April 25, 2017, accessed on April 25, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/94777>.

²⁹⁰ Morimoto, 203-206.

accidents and crimes may still continue, overall, non-facility related promises stated in the SACO Final Report were implemented in a timely manner.

The implementation of the SACO Final Report has been a mixture of results. Out of the 11 facilities, 6 have been successfully returned. In addition, partial return of two facilities was revised as a full reversion in 2006. However, all successful reversions only occurred after the promised date. Although linkage of reversion and the FRF implementation were eliminated in April 2012, the consolidation plan proposed by the Japanese government in April 2013 linked most of the remaining facilities to the FRF, which will most likely result in reversion by late 2020s if not the 2030s. Both governments have championed the 4000 hectares reversion of the Northern Training Area as an important step towards burden reduction. This too is questionable given the Marines discrediting the usability of the land. In terms of revisions regarding non-land related issues such as practices and noise reduction, implementations were made before entering the twenty-first century. Despite these implementations, it is true that noise pollution and crimes still remain a big concern in Okinawa, thus discrediting these initiatives. Progress in reversion may be occurring, but the immature implementation of the SACO Final Report is likely to be unsatisfactory for the Okinawans.

2.2 American Military Accidents: Reminders of “Colonialism”

The United States of America repeatedly reminds the Japanese government and Okinawans that the FRF is the “only solution” to the relocation problem. As originally stated in the 1996 SACO Final Report, the negotiated facility is “the best option in

terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces.”²⁹¹ Provided statistics prove that Okinawans do not view the proposed FRF as a facility that is beneficial for their own lives. If this facility is truly beneficial for Okinawans, the American government must be able to further prove its liability. However, the American government’s lack of responsibility regarding Okinawan safety is one factor that fosters Okinawan cynicism against the American government.

Statistics introduced in the previous section regarding Okinawan opinion testifies that individual safety is one major concern of the residents. Official numbers provided by the Okinawa Prefecture reveal that there have been approximately 4,790 different crimes committed by American soldiers from 1972 to 1995.²⁹² The number of crimes has definitely seen a decreasing trend, with the amount of offenses against individuals not exceeding ten per year since 1986. The number of theft also decreased to fewer than 50 accounts per year since 1995. Overall, the amount of American related crimes have decreased. However, decreasing incidents fail to translate into the Okinawan perception of safety. This is due to American response towards both American related crimes and military accidents.

The most recent notorious murder occurred in May 2016. Rina Shimabukuro, 20-year-old employee, was raped murdered by retired Marine veteran Kenneth

²⁹¹ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The SACO Final Report.”

²⁹² Okinawa Prefectural Government, “IV Situation of Exercise, Training and Crimes/Accidents [IV enshuu kunren oyobi jiken jiko no jyoukyou],” *Okinawa Prefecture*, last modified in 2013, accessed on May 2, 2017, <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/04ennsyuukunnrennoyobijikennjikonojyoukyou.pdf>, 107.

Franklin Shinzato.²⁹³ When asked by press about the United States' opinion on the relation of this incident to the base relocation, the Department of State reminded the audience that the incident "angers us."²⁹⁴ In response to the incident, former President Barack Obama reassured Japan and Okinawa that "[the United States is] committed to doing everything we can to prevent any crimes from taking place of this sort."²⁹⁵ Interestingly, Prime Minister Abe, for the first time, publically reprimanded Obama for the crime committed by the retired veteran, claiming that he "firmly lodged a protest against President Obama" and "urged the United States to make sure to take effective and thorough means to prevent a recurrence, and vigorously and strictly address the situation."²⁹⁶

With the Japanese government criticizing their ally, both governments came to an agreement to limit legal immunity of American soldiers when committed crimes. The new agreement, which was signed before former President Obama left office in January 2017, now allows Japan to prosecute both military and civilian personnel

²⁹³ "Ex-U.S. Marine Charged With Rape and Murder of Woman on Okinawa," *The Wall Street Journal*, last modified on June 30, 2016, accessed on May 3, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ex-u-s-marine-charged-with-rape-and-murder-of-woman-on-okinawa-1467290233>.

²⁹⁴ John Kirby quoted in U.S. Department of State, "Daily Press Briefing - May 19, 2016," *U.S. Department of State*, May 19, 2016, accessed on April 28, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/05/257402.htm>.

²⁹⁵ Barack Obama quoted in David Nakamura and Anna Fifield, "Okinawa murder dominates talks between Obama and Abe," *The Washington Post*, last modified on May 25, 2016, accessed on March 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/okinawa-murder-dominates-talks-between-obama-and-abe/2016/05/25/14ca6488-227a-11e6-b944-52f7b1793dae_story.html?utm_term=.a9f581b2debc.

²⁹⁶ Shinzo Abe quoted in Pamela Engel, "Japan's prime minister publicly scolded Obama to his face over 'despicable' Okinawa murder," *The Business Insider*, last modified on May 25, 2016, accessed on March 2, 2017, <http://www.businessinsider.com/shinzo-abe-obama-okinawa-murder-2016-5>.

when accused of crime.²⁹⁷ While this agreement is a significant step towards legal equality, it also questionable how and why military and civilian personnel enjoyed immunity for the previous decades.

Crime rates have decreased over time and American personnel have been active in deepening relations with the local community. Unfortunately, American response to serious crimes tends to be lacking. On 13 March 2016, U.S. Navy sailor Justin Castellanos, 24, found a Japanese female tourist from Fukuoka sleeping in a hotel hallway, and took her to his room and sexually assaulted her.²⁹⁸ He was sentenced with 30 months of hard labor as punishment.²⁹⁹ With Castellanos admitting the crime, United States Marine Corps lieutenant general Lawrence D. Nicholson visited Onaga and claimed the incident as regrettable.³⁰⁰ Okinawan media reported that Nicholson claimed, “There has been no large incidents since [my] arrival half a year ago.... [This incident] is extremely embarrassing for us,” without directly making an apology

²⁹⁷ “Bilateral pact limiting U.S. base workers’ immunity to be inked next week,” *The Japan Times*, last modified on January 13, 2017, accessed on May 3, 2017, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/13/national/politics-diplomacy/bilateral-pact-limiting-u-s-base-workers-immunity-inked-next-week/#.WQ1iB7x95-U>; “US, Japan limit legal immunity for some civilian staff in US base,” *USMC Life*, last modified on January 16, 2017, accessed on May 3, 2017, <http://usmclife.com/2017/01/us-japan-limit-legal-immunity-civilian-staff-us-base/>.

²⁹⁸ “Military Personnel to Admit Crime ‘I did It’: Assault on Women in Okinawa [‘Watashi ga yatta’ beihei ga hankou mitomeru Okinawa no jyosei boukou jiken],” *Okinawa Times*, last modified on March 23, 2016, accessed on March 3, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/25840>; Chiyomi Sumida, “Sailor accused of Okinawa rape pleads guilty,” *Stars and Stripes*, last modified on May 27, 2016, accessed on May 3, 2017, <https://www.stripes.com/news/sailor-accused-of-okinawa-rape-pleads-guilty-1.411695#.WQ1nnLx95-U>.

²⁹⁹ “U.S. Navy Sailor Gets 30-Month Sentence for Okinawa Rape,” *Associated Press*, last modified on July 15, 2016, accessed on May 3, 2017, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/3e69affdeab5476891f19c7377116b31/us-navy-sailor-gets-30-month-sentence-okinawa-rape>.

³⁰⁰ “Governor to Criticize Lieutenant: ‘They claim we’re your good neighbor, but they never act like it’ [‘Yoki tonaribito to iuga, jikkou sareta tameshinai’ chiji, Okinawa beigun toppu ni kougū],” *Okinawa Times*, last modified on March 17, 2016, accessed on March 3, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/25553>.

towards the victim.³⁰¹ Throughout the twenty-minute conference, Nicholson repeatedly emphasized that the United States was a good neighbor. In response to Nicholson's speech, Onaga replied, "The practice of being a good neighbor has not been attempted in my honest opinion."³⁰² The military may believe that they are responding in a good manner, but from an Okinawan perspective, Americans fails to exert responsibility.

Although serious crimes may taint American responsibility, one piece of evidence that actually bolsters American responsibility is their response to alcohol abuse. Alcohol restrictions were placed on all military personnel based in Japan from 25 November 2012 to 16 November 2012 in response to military personnel who intruded on private property at night.³⁰³ In response to a gang rape that occurred on Okinawa in October 2012, the military restricted base leave at night and imposed a new curfew that relates to military rank in February 2013.³⁰⁴ From 20 May 2013, alcohol consumption out of base was eased to two cans of beer out of base.³⁰⁵ Restrictions were further eased from 9 December 2014, allowing personnel to drink freely out of base with the same curfew in place. Interestingly, these changes were in response to the local business owners' request that have been financially affected with the ban. Numbers of crimes and driving under the influence of alcohol have decreased

³⁰¹ Lawrence D. Nicholson quoted in Ibid..

³⁰² Takeshi Onaga quoted in Ibid..

³⁰³ "Alcohol Consumption at Night Ban Lifted, American Navy [Zainichibei kaigun, yakan kinshurei wo kaijyo]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 19, 2013.

³⁰⁴ "Night Leave Ban Lifted, Restrictions based on Rank: American Military in Japan [Yakan gaishutsu kinshi wo kaijyo kaikyubetsu no seigen ni tenkan zai nichibei gun]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 14, 2013.

³⁰⁵ "Off-base drinking ban for U.S. soldiers in Okinawa to be eased," *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on November 27, 2014, accessed on May 3, 2017, <http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2014/12/08/16160/>.

during the original ban. Similar restrictions were placed again in response to Shimabukuro's murder. Nicholson placed specific restrictions on leave out of bases from 27 May 2016 to 24 June 2016.³⁰⁶ The restrictions placed a curfew for military personnel at 00:00 A.M. and banned alcohol consumption out of the base facilities. In terms of irresponsible drinking, the military responded appropriately by placing restrictions on consumption. However, similar to the revisions of legal immunity, significant changes have been imposed in recent years. Initiatives of keeping American soldiers should continue to be seriously observed.

Another realm that is equally important to the crimes committed in Okinawa is military accidents. From Okinawa Reversion in 1972 to 2013, there have been 45 accidents of American military aircraft crashes in Okinawa.³⁰⁷ While the number of accident has significantly decreased over the years, the nature of aviation resumption has been questioned. For example, on 5 August 2013, HH-60 Helicopter, which conducts aviation practices above both bases and civilian neighborhoods, crashed within Camp Hansen.³⁰⁸ Without releasing reasons for the helicopter's failure, the same helicopter's operations resumed eleven days after the accident.³⁰⁹ In defense of resuming practices before releasing information, Camp Hansen officials responded that they had to resume before the skills of the pilots weaken. A similar accident occurred

³⁰⁶ Gen Okada, "Military Discipline: Night Leave Ban until June 24th [Yakan gaishutsu kinshi, 6 gatsu 24 nichi made Okinawa, beigun kouki shukusei]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, May 28, 2016.

³⁰⁷ "American Military Aircraft's Crash as the 45th Incident: Out of 45, 17 Helicopter Incidents [Beigunki tsuiraku fukkigo 45 ken me heri wa 17 ken]," *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on August 6, 2013, accessed on May 3, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-210624.html>.

³⁰⁸ "American Military Helicopter to Crash in Okinawa [Okinawa de beigun heri tsuiraku]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 6, 2013.

³⁰⁹ Norio Yatsu, "Same Type of Helicopter in Sky after Crash [Tsuraku dougata heri ga hikou]," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 16, 2013.

on 12 August 2015 when a MH-60 Helicopter crashed in the coast of Okinawa.³¹⁰ Out of the seventeen individuals on the aircraft, seven were injured and sent to the navy hospital. Similar to the previous incident, the American military resumed operations from 18 August prior to releasing information regarding failure.³¹¹ While it is understandable that practice of military aircraft is important for maintaining the skills of pilots, it is also worrisome for citizens to witness aircrafts to resume operation without proper explanation.

The most recent accident is the Osprey accident that occurred on 13 December 2016. At 21:50 at Nago bay, MV-22 Osprey crashed 300 meters away from civilian neighborhood, resulting in two out of five personnel injured.³¹² At midnight 14 December, Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada announced that the United States told Japan that the pilot deliberately crashed the aircraft into the bay. While this comment received severe backlash from the Okinawans, her statement may be justifiable given that the accident avoided the neighborhood. When meeting the lieutenant governor of Okinawa, Lawrence D. Nicholson argued, “The pilot did not harm the neighbor and its residents. This deserves appreciation.”³¹³ After the meeting, the lieutenant governor

³¹⁰ “Seven injured as US military helicopter crashes off Okinawa,” *The Guardian*, last modified on August 12, 2015, accessed on May 3, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/12/us-military-helicopter-crash-okinawa-japan>.

³¹¹ “Training Restarts, Same Type of Crashed Helicopter in the Uruma Incident [Uruma shi oki tsuiraku dougata heri, kunren saikai,” *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on August 19, 2015, accessed on May 3, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-247485.html>.

³¹² “Few Meters Away from Nago’s Coast: Wrecked Osprey Fails Landing [Osupurei kitai taiha fujichakusui, Nago no kaigan suu jyu meteru],” *The Asahi Shinbun*, last modified on December 14, 2016, accessed on March 2, 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASJDG3554JDGTIPE006.html>.

³¹³ Lawrence D. Nicholson quoted in Takushi Yoshida, “American Senior Official to claim ‘We should be thanked for no damage’ Towards Lieutenant Governor of Okinawa [Beigun koukan ‘higai

revealed that there was no form of apology from Nicholson and commented, “I really felt [his] unsuppressed colonial mentality.”³¹⁴ This incident was one of the reasons why Governor Takeshi Onaga decided not to attend the reversion ceremony of the Northern Training Area. Regardless of this serious incident, Osprey operations were resumed from 19 December, six days since the accident.³¹⁵ Unlike the helicopter accidents, the American Marine released that the blade of the Osprey struck the hose of an aerial tanker, resulting in the accident. Even if the aircraft itself did not experience malfunctions, the fact that several aircraft failures have occurred on an annual basis since 2013 is unnerving.

Other than direct crashes, incidents of unauthorized landings by American aircrafts on private property in Okinawa bolsters the perception of American colonialism. For example, on 15 September 2016, one UH-60 Helicopter suddenly landed on a civilian factory’s parking lot due to bad weather.³¹⁶ Another unauthorized landing occurred on 21 January 2017, drawing further protest by civilians.³¹⁷ Both landings have been conducted due to the pilot’s judgment regarding safety. However,

ataezu, kansha sarerubeki’ Okinawa fukuchijini],” *The Asahi Shinbun*, last modified on December 14, 2016, accessed on March 4, 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASJDG547JDGTPOB008.html>.

³¹⁴ Mitsuo Ageta quoted in *Ibid.*.

³¹⁵ Taichiro Yoshino, “Okinawa to Retaliate against Restart of Osprey Training: Governor Onaga ‘Not a Constitutional State’ [Osupurei, zenmen hikou saikai he Okinawa ken wa hanpatsu, Onaga chiji ‘houji kokka dewanai’],” *The Huffington Post*, last modified on December 19, 2016, accessed on March 2, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.jp/2016/12/18/osprey-to-fly-again_n_13714876.html.

³¹⁶ “Landing out of Notice: American Helicopter [Beigun heri renraku nashi ni chakuriku],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 15, 2016.

³¹⁷ “Emergency landing by U.S. chopper draws Okinawa protest,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, last modified on January 21, 2017, accessed on May 3, 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701210030.html>.

such unauthorized landings on civilian property exacerbate skepticism towards the American military and fosters the feelings that perhaps Okinawa is America's colony.

American caused crimes and accidents are a headache for the American military and the central governments, especially as talks of the FRF has been stalled over the previous years. Overall, when looking at statistics, military related crimes continue to decrease and are at its lowest point in history. Alcohol consumption and base leaves are monitored by the military, and military accidents continue to decrease as well. In this sense, it may seem like the United States of America is exerting responsibility in relation to their commitment of protecting the Okinawan's quality of life.

Unfortunately, most responses to resolve issues are merely reactions to accidents that have occurred. While important, decreasing crime rates itself cannot create a responsible imagery of the American military with rapes and murders that still occur on an annual basis. In addition, despite its decreasing trend, military accidents have started to occur on an annual basis since 2013. It is understandable that military practices must be continued in order to maintain deterrence in the region. To do that in exchange with Okinawan trust, however, will only tamper the American image on the island. American action has suggested that maintaining the military's projection and power takes precedence over Okinawa safety.

2.3 Japanese Language and Ambiguity: Shooting oneself in the foot

If the United States negatively affect Okinawa's win-set with military crimes and accidents, the LDP alienate the residents by tarnished their reputation through

occasional events that reflect their ally's irresponsibility. For example, in June 2015, novelist Naoki Hyakuta, close friend of the Shinzo Abe, participated in a LDP gathering as a special lecturer and commented, "Two newspapers in Okinawa should be put out of business for their criticism of the central government's policy on the U.S. base issue."³¹⁸ In response to Hyakuta's comment at a LDP sponsored gathering, Abe mentioned that it was regretful and did not reflect the LDP's stance. While Hyakuta himself is not a politician, the fact that a guest lecturer at a LDP gathering spoke against Okinawa proved problematic. Head editors at both Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo published a joint statement against Hyakuta, labeling his comment promoting suppression of speech.³¹⁹ Regardless of criticism from Abe and other LDP ministers, Hyakuta's comment is one example of smearing the LDP's image.

Other comments made by LDP ministers themselves have also tampered LDP's reputation. When questioned by President Obama about the rescinding of lawsuits in March 2016, Abe responded that the government chose reconciliation with the Japanese proverbs of "taking things slowly" (*isogaba maware*).³²⁰ In response to Abe's comment towards Obama, Onaga criticized, "The consultations are based on striving

³¹⁸ "LDP comes under fire over anti-newspaper comments," *Japan Today*, last modified on June 27, 2015, accessed on May 3, 2017, <https://japantoday.com/category/politics/ldp-comes-under-fire-over-anti-newspaper-comments>.

³¹⁹ Kazuhiko Taketomi and Yoshikazu Shiohira, "Joint Protest Statement against Hyakuta's Comment on the Two Okinawan Newspapers [Hyakutashi hatsugen wo meguru Okinawa 2 shinbunsha no kyoudou kougi seimei]," *Okinawa Times*, last modified on June 26, 2015, accessed on May 6, 2017, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/15827>.

³²⁰ Kazuo Ikejiri and Taketsugu Sato, "Responding to Obama's Concern on Futenma, Prime Minister Abe 'Taking things slowly' as best [Bei daitouryou, Futenma isetsu meguri kenen Abe shushou 'isogaba maware'],," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 1, 2016.

for an amicable settlement is the gist of the reconciliation agreement, [and such comment] undermines the spirit of reconciliation.”³²¹

Perhaps the most recent incident that ruined the reputation of the LDP in Okinawa was Yosuke Tsuruho’s ambiguous stance of racial slurs used against Okinawans. In October 2016, when facing demonstrators near the sites of helipad construction in the southern areas of the Northern Training Area, two guards from Osaka Prefecture yelled against the demonstrators calling them *dojin* and *shinajin*.³²² While Suga commented that the usage of such language is extremely disappointing, Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Minister Yosuke Tsuruho claimed that he was not in the position to claim that such action was wrong.³²³ He further escalated the situation by claiming, “Whether this is a human rights problem or not, a third party member [like myself] making a decision is extremely dangerous. Everyone has the right to freedom of speech.”³²⁴ When asked whether this “*dojin* problem” failed to understand Okinawan sentiment, the minister replied, “I am not in the position to decide whether [that comment] undermines Okinawan sentiment or

³²¹ Takeshi Onaga quoted in “Governor to Criticize Prime Minister’s ‘Taking things slowly’ Comment [Souri no isogaba maware hatsugen wo chiji hihan],” *QAB Ryukyu Asahi Broadcasting*, last modified on April 1, 2016, accessed on May 6, 2017. <http://www.qab.co.jp/news/2016040178819.html>.

³²² *Dojin* (土人) and *Shinajin* (シナ人) are derogatory labels used against aboriginals and Chinese. “Police to use Racial Slurs against Demonstrators [Kougi no shiminra ni keikan ga sabetsu hatsugen],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 19, 2016.

³²³ Nogo Kamitoo and Takushi Yoshida, “Okinawa Governor’s ‘Indignation’ Against *Dojin* and *Shinajin* Slurs by Two Osaka-based Policeman [Shimin ni ‘dojin’ ‘shinajin’ Okinawa chiji ‘ikidoori’ Osakafukei no 2 tari hatsugen],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 20, 2016; “Tsuruho Okinawa Minister ‘Not in the Position to Declare Wrong’ Regarding *Dojin* Incident [‘Dojin’ hatsugen, Tsuruho Okinawa shou ‘machigai to iu tachiba ni nai’],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, last modified on October 21, accessed on March 2, 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASJBP3VC4JBPUTFK00C.html>.

³²⁴ “Tsuruho Minister ‘Cannot Determine whether *Dojin* Comment was discriminatory or not’ Opposition Party to Criticize [Tsuruho daijin ‘dojin hatsugen, sabetsu to dantei dekinai’ yatou hihan],” *The Asahi Shimbun*, last modified on November 8, 2016, accessed on May 6, 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASJC85Q7RJC8UTFK00Y.html>.

not.”³²⁵ On 18 November, the government decided that the minister did not need to apologize.³²⁶ The government failed to properly address a blatantly racial comment, thus allowing anger to fuel against them.

While the comment by a guest lecturer to a LDP gathering is still problematic, comments made by LDP ministers themselves invigorate an irresponsible image of the government. The government may act responsible by only pushing the relocation under consent or legal authority. The government may also use language that is pleasing to the ear. However, small comments such as the ones previously mentioned ruins any initiative taken by the government and thus perpetuate Okinawan resentment. The ambiguity in the Japanese government towards Okinawan sentiment, as reflected in the blueprint decisions and in the current Abe administration, has contributed to the stagnation to relocation.

The lack of sufficient explanation also exacerbates the relocation problem. Both governments continue to rearticulate the necessity of reducing the burdens on Okinawa and maintain deterrence. In particular, as previously mentioned, the Japanese government continuously articulates three reasons for justifying the relocation: 1) Deterrence, 2) Strengthening of the US-Japan Alliance, and 3) Reducing the burden on Okinawa. However, these arguments have remained vague and irresponsible, as the public opinion polls revealed that Okinawans do not agree with the governmental reasons. While Abe had admitted “the needs of national security have placed a heavy

³²⁵ Ibid..

³²⁶ “Government answers that there is no need for an apology for the *Dojin* Problem [‘Dojin’ mondai no shazai fuyou seifu ga toubenshou],” *Mainichi Shinbun*, last modified on November 18, 2016, accessed on May 6, 2017, <https://mainichi.jp/articles/20161119/k00/00m/010/017000c>.

burden on the people of Okinawa,” he has not stopped to explain in what manner it is necessary.³²⁷ By insinuating that the construction of Henoko reveals commitment to the US-Japan alliance, Abe tried to relate the necessity of the base to the alliance.³²⁸ As seen in the Joint Statements, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) also focused more on what the American and Japanese government have accomplished rather than addressing on the problem and issue that remain.³²⁹

The Okinawan public opinion polls might explain why the government has been hesitant on providing sufficient explanation. Given that the Okinawans have resisted for the past twenty years and current polls reveal this continuing trend, the government may be hesitant in rearticulating the necessity of Henoko. Rather than debating and convincing the majority of Okinawans that Henoko is the only solution, the current government has avoided direct conversation of the relocation by emphasizing on the bright future of the prefecture. The LDP has more or less given up on winning over the Okinawans by convincing them of the necessity of Henoko; rather, they prefer to win over Okinawan consent by providing economic incentives. When looking at the numbers, economic assistance increased the year after Nakaima accepted the

³²⁷ Abe Shinzo, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Memorial Ceremony to Commemorate the Fallen on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the Battle of Okinawa.”

³²⁸ “U.S.-Japan Summit Conference Confirming on Henoko: Agree on Strengthening Alliance [Nichibei shunou kaidan ‘Henoko’ suishin wo kakunin doumei kyouka de icchi,” *Ryukyu Shinpo*, last modified on April 29, 2015, accessed on December 12, 2016, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-242370.html>.

³²⁹ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “JOINT STATEMENT OF THE SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Security Environment,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan*, last modified on April 27, 2015, accessed on December 8, 2016, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078186.pdf>, 7.

relocation.³³⁰ The amount of financial aid decrease during the years of Onaga's appointment, suggesting that gestures against the government could lead to less assistance.³³¹ It may be natural to avoid addressing the Okinawans about the necessity of the base, especially given the high number of disapproval. However, the government's lack of addressing and engaging in dialogue with Okinawans and usage of vague arguments has worked in further exacerbate the already isolated Okinawan perspective.

3. Returning to Win-sets

The relocation of Futenma base received greater disapproval than acceptance. While the alliance proposed reversion of the base in hopes to decrease burden, the proposal of creating a FRF within Okinawa resulted in resistance. A comprehensive perspective on the base relocation issue is necessary in understanding whether relocation was possible or not.

3.1 Moments of Cooperation? Illusions of Overlapping Win-sets

A comparative observation of relocation discussions at different points throughout the twenty years prove that American and Okinawan win-sets never

³³⁰ Japanese Cabinet Office, "Regarding the 2014 Okinawa Development Fund [Heisei 26 nendo Okinawa fukkou yosan ni tsuite]," *Cabinet Office Government of Japan*, last modified on March 2014, accessed on December 12, 2016, http://www8.cao.go.jp/okinawa/3/2014/h26_gaisankettei.pdf.

³³¹ Japanese Cabinet Office, "Regarding the 2015 Okinawa Development Fund [Heisei 27 nendo Okinawa fukkou yosan ni tsuite]," *Cabinet Office Government of Japan*, last modified on March 2015, accessed on December 12, 2016, http://www8.cao.go.jp/okinawa/3/2015/h27_gaisankettei.pdf; "Regarding the 2016 Okinawa Development Fund [Heisei 28 nendo Okinawa fukkou yosan ni tsuite]," *Cabinet Office Government of Japan*, last modified on March 2016, accessed on December 12, 2016, http://www8.cao.go.jp/okinawa/3/2016/h28_yosanan.pdf.

overlapped. The Okinawan government considered accepting the FRF in 2002 and 2006 with certain conditions. In response, the alliance did not accept those conditions. Perceived cooperation of relocation under Inamine and Nakaima can be concluded as illusions of overlapping win-sets. Even when Nakaima accepted the FRF in 2013, it should be noted that he was against the FRF in its current form for seven years. If he remained loyal to his position, the current relocation landfill and construction would have not occurred. As seen below in Table 7, both constituents never reached a realistic compromise.

Table 7. Comparison of FRF Positions

	1996	2002	2006	2010	2013	2014 to current
Okinawa	No FRF	FRF if: (1) 15 Year Lease (2) Joint Civilin-Military Facility	FRF if placed out in sea	No FRF	Acceptance	No FRF
Japan	Henoko	Compromise with Okinawa yet vague	V-way roadmap and no more compromise	Out of Prefecture	Henoko	Henko
America	Henoko	No to Okinawa's Conditions	V-way roadmap and no more compromise	Henoko	Henoko	Henoko

3.2 Stagnant Win-sets

It can be concluded that the win-sets of the alliance and Okinawa hardly shifted. As mentioned in chapter 3, the three American conditions to relocate Futenma within Okinawa, to not consolidate the FRF to an existing facility, and to maintain the equal level of security remains significant for their relocation plans. On the other hand, opinion polls and evolving trends in local elections reveal that decreasing base presence is in the interest of Okinawans. Inamine's compromise in 2002 reveals this sentiment of reduced burden by imposing limited usage as one of the conditions. Nakaima's proposal of relocating the base out into the sea reflects Inamine's

achievement of the original blueprint, which placed the FRF 2.2 kilometers from Henoko.³³² The location of the FRF is important, as the December 2016 Osprey incident proved to threaten Okinawans. Nakaima's new conditions in 2013 and eventual acceptance should be considered an anomaly, as his defeat in the 2014 gubernatorial election resulted in the largest win margin in recent history.³³³

Putnam's three factors that affect win-sets explain Okinawa's rigid position. Diversity in Okinawa did not result in heterogeneous preferences, but rather homogeneity. Economic incentives, while inducing, failed to divide the prefecture. The democratic procedure of executing construction hindered the central government from forcing landfill until Nakaima's approval. The government's explanation of base relocation and alliance strength failed to convince the Okinawans to accept the proposed FRF. Not only has Okinawa's win-set been limited from 1996, but also the alliance failed to induce expansion or modification of conditions.

On the contrary of expansion, the central governments succeeded in continued alienation of the Okinawan public. While the military endeavors to connect with the local community in a good manner, crimes and accidents easily nullify efforts. Continued crimes and accidents remind Okinawans that bases in any form and any location would eventually turn into a threat if located within the prefecture. Enticing speeches on burden reduction are vain in light of Japanese politicians tarnishing their image of responsibility. Avoiding direct conversation results in frustration as well.

³³² Japanese Cabinet Office, "Consideration documents based on 'Main Points of the Direction in Handling the Relocation Facility Plan'."

³³³ "Results of Elections, Okinawa Prefecture [Senkyo kekka (Okinawaken)]."

Initiatives such as economic development packages, while welcomed, failed to change Okinawa's opinion on American bases. The alliance has successfully created skepticism, resulting in negative reverberation.

In the same manner, the United States and Japan failed to expand their conditions as well. While Japan knew that Okinawa would resist, the country believed in America's sacrosanct conditions. The United States never showed intention to compromise within prefecture relocation. The Hatoyama administration's challenge of America's limited conditions resulted in reaffirming the conditions importance. From an American perspective, Henoko proved to be the "only solution" for Futenma base. Rather than fighting on behalf of Okinawa, the Japanese government believed in the absolute necessity of Henoko and thus determined to create the FRF in Henoko bay. The American bureaucrat's continued defense of the FRF and the Japanese government's continued emphasis on relocation reaffirms the alliance's commitment to fulfilling their Level 1 agreement.

As seen throughout the whole thesis, the range of consent between Okinawa and the alliance is significantly minuscule. Both parties failed to convince the other to readjust the conditions of negotiations, which resulted as a stalemate. The alliance decided to continue with relocation hoping that Okinawa would eventually concede to the Henoko proposal. The alliance's belief in the superiority and necessity of security took precedence over compromising and reliving burden for Okinawans. The obdurate characteristic of both the alliance and prefecture resulted in a lengthy, tedious period of

negotiation. It is unfortunate to witness the proposal that engendered from altruism to foster frustration, skepticism, and convulsion.

4. The Future of Relocation

The relocation of Futenma will occur, albeit the completion date remains undecided. A determined relocation should not prevent observers from reevaluating the conditions of both the alliance and Okinawa. Resentment will continue to be prevalent in Okinawa with the forcible relocation contrary to the resident's will. In order to question whether strict conditions are necessary in order to achieve each party's agenda, this section will end with questioning America's three conditions and Okinawa's out-of-prefecture position.

4.1. Changes in Security? Questioning the FRF's Conditions

For the past twenty years, both American and Japanese government justified the FRF in terms of security. As already mentioned throughout the thesis, both governments articulate the importance of the FRF as an alternative to the deterrence provided by the MCAS Futenma. However, intellectuals have questioned whether the proposed FRF will provide necessary deterrence. At the first hearing of the first legal suit between the prefecture and central government, Onaga referred to Joseph Nye, former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Mike Mochizuki, associate professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs of The George Washington University, when making an argument against the FRF's

promised deterrence.³³⁴ Therefore, it is worthy to investigate the security argument against the FRF relocation stimulated by academics.

In his defense at the first hearing, Onaga primarily referred to Nye's contribution to the security debate by questioning whether the current FRF could deter threat from Chinese missiles.³³⁵ Onaga argued that the nature of Ospreys being aircraft of transportation would not contribute to deterrence. The governor also referred to a conversation with Minister of Defense Gen Natakani questioning how Japan would respond to a missile attack. Nakatani responded that Japan would respond to a missile attack with missiles, which, in the realm of international security studies, is the equivalent of hitting a bullet with another bullet. Nye previously argued that the physical presence of the American troops on Okinawa is an assurance of the nuclear umbrella.³³⁶ Whether implying that deterrence itself might be decaying or not, he argued that American presence on Okinawa might not be effective with a growing Chinese military: "As China invests in advanced ballistic missiles, the fixed bases on Okinawa become increasingly vulnerable."³³⁷ Mochizuki also made the same analysis that expanding Chinese might in align with their Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy will threaten American presence on Okinawa.³³⁸ The rising threat of China may nullify the

³³⁴ Onaga, "Full Text of Onaga's Statement at Court."

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, *Nichibeiedoumei vs. Chuugoku and Kitachousen [U.S.-Japan Alliance vs. China and North Korea]* (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2010), 198-199.

³³⁷ Joseph S. Nye, "Japan's Robust Self-Defense Is Good for Asia," last modified on August 7, 2014, accessed on April 25, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/japan-self-defense_b_5658883.html.

³³⁸ Yanagizawa et al., 150.

detering potential of the FRF, if not challenge the projection of American forces in the Pacific.

Others questioned whether the nature of the facility itself is well adequate. Kazuhisa Ogawa, Specially appointed professor at the Global Center for Asian and Regional Research of University of Shizuoka, argued that the FRF is unrealistic and economically devastating.³³⁹ He explained that the 1800-meter runway planned for the current FRF at Henoko is too short for aircrafts utilized at Futenma Air Base, such as the Antonov An-124 Ruslan, which requires at least 2500 meters.³⁴⁰ Ogawa proposed creating a facility within Camp Hansen and modifying and utilizing Camp Hansen's runway as an adequate alternative. In addition to the short runway, the location of the new facility would also put aircrafts at risk of tsunamis.

Conservative historian Eldridge also argued along the similar line.³⁴¹ With the experience of serving as the deputy director for government and external affairs for Marine Corps Installations Command-Pacific located in Okinawa from 2009 to 2015, Eldridge argued that the current plan would not reduce burden on Okinawan residents due to geographic proximity. He also explained that usually 305 meters of a runway is designed for a safety zone, thus resulting as an actual usage of less than 1500 meters of the planned runaway. As an alternative, he believed that creating a base near Katsuren,

³³⁹ Kazuhiro Ogawa, "Nichibei Futenma hengkangoui no toujisha ga kataru 'Okinawa mondai no honshitsu' ['Nature of the Okinawa Problem' explained by a Participant]," interview by Yasurou Matsumoto, in *Okinawa Youron Daremo Kikanakatta Beigunkichimondai [Two Arguments on Okinawa: The American Base Problem that isn't heard]* (Fukuoka, Japan: Gekkan For Net, 2016), 320.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 321-322.

³⁴¹ Eldridge, *Who Kills Okinawa*, 253-255.

Uruma would be most suitable.³⁴² A plan originally proposed by Norio Ota, honorary president of the Okinawa Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Katsuren Construction is a proposal to create an artificial base near the Katsuren region. Eldridge argued that the shore near Katsuren consists of dead corals and is relatively shallow, thus provides advantages for base creation.³⁴³ However, as the historian himself mentioned, the proposal lacks support because it advocates for a creation of an entirely new base, whereas the current Henoko plan is within the geographical jurisdiction of Camp Schwab.³⁴⁴ Whether conservative or not, these two academics argued that the facility itself has fundamental flaws and might not provide full support the American military would need for operation.

Perhaps the most recent work on the presence of American bases on Okinawa and its relation to deterrence is the Tokyo-based think tank New Diplomacy Initiative's publication. Kyouji Yanagizawa, former researcher and bureaucrat at the Ministry of Defense, argued that the Marines do not contribute to deterrence.³⁴⁵ According to Yanagizawa, Americans have previously shown an attitude that they would not dispatch Marines if the Senkaku Islands come under Chinese attack. This attitude itself defeats the purpose of deterrence. In addition, he critiqued that Abe's explanation of bolstering the strength of the Self Defense Force for the purpose of anti-submarine

³⁴² Ibid., 246.

³⁴³ Eldridge, *Okinawa Theory*, 57-58.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 66.

³⁴⁵ Kyouji Yanagizawa, "How to deal with the Futenma Base Problem [Futenmakichimondai ni dou mukiauka]," in Yanagizawa et al., 27-29.

strategy and defense of the American bases reveals distrust in American provided deterrence.

Referring Yukio Okamoto, former Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, Mike Mochizuki agreed that it is highly unlikely that the United States and China would go into war for an uninhabited island.³⁴⁶ However, Mochizuki criticized Okamoto's analysis due to the lack of explanation on how diminishing the presence of Marines would contribute to reducing deterrence. In addition, China continues to physically threatening the Senkaku Islands through boats and aviation, which undermines the deterrence argument. After analyzing three other Japanese military annalists, Mochizuki concluded that all authors focus on commitment and trust rather than practical assessment. Given the likelihood that marines will have a minimal role in situations of actual combat outbreak and that recent provocations have not been deterred by the marine's presence (e.g. North Korean Nuclear tests, scrambles with Chinese jets over the Senkakus, etc.), Mochizuki questioned whether the proposed FRF can really provide deterrence to Japan.³⁴⁷ For Mochizuki, the current pacific plan of the American military with rotating Marines already provides deterrence, and thus the FRF would only end as a financial and political burden for all three parties. In conclusion, Mochizuki proposed an alternative: the creation of a helipad within Camp Schwab and the usage of the currently constructed Naha Airport's second runway in times of emergency.

³⁴⁶ Mike Mochizuki, "Deterrence and Marines on Okinawa [Yokushiryoku to Zaiokibei Kaiheita]," in Yanagizawa et al., 106-107.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 117-127.

The other authors of the same publication also reminded readers of the decreasing number of Marines and the U.S.-Japan effort to further decrease their presence on Okinawa. While there were roughly 21,000 Marines on Okinawa at the end of the Cold War, the current official number is at 18,000 individuals and is planned to decrease to 9000.³⁴⁸ The decreasing trend alone does not question the role of Marines on Okinawa. While the 4th and 12th Marine Regiment and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are based in Okinawa, the 4th Marine Regiment will be relocated to Guam by 2020.³⁴⁹ The authors note that the 31st MEU is out of Okinawa for roughly nine months on an annual basis due to joint trainings. The same applies for the 12th Marine Regiment, which spends more than six months per year to train on mainland Japan. At a 2 plus 2 meeting in 2013, Minister of Defense Chuck Hagel claimed, “More than half of Osprey trainings do not occur in Okinawa,” which suggests that the Marines are also training out of the island.³⁵⁰ The reality of decreasing Marines and frequent absence questions whether the physical presence of Marines can be considered as deterrence. More than the Marines themselves, the authors’ revelation suggests that the U.S.-Japan alliance itself acts as deterrence.

Both Japanese and American, liberal and conservative, academics contributed to the debate against the militaristic necessity of the FRF. The threat of China, fundamental shortcomings of the proposed facilities and questionable contributions to

³⁴⁸ Yanagizawa et al., 129.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 130; Gina Harkins, “Marines identify units that will move from Japan to Guam,” *Marine Corps Times*, last modified on October 1, 2015, accessed on April 22, 2017, <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/10/01/marines-identify-units-move-japan-guam/73046768/>.

³⁵⁰ Chuck Hagel quoted in Yanagizawa et al., 130.

deterrence provides logistical arguments against the security concerns revolving around the Henoko plan. While these scholars have rejected the FRF, not all argued for relocating the base out of the prefecture; in fact, many believe in the necessity of relocating the base within is necessary for maintaining the functional role of the Marines.³⁵¹ None of them also believe that relocating any of the bases out of Okinawa is plausible. However, the Center for Strategic & International Studies have conducted their own assessments and concluded, “No ‘Plan B’ would surpass the current FRF plan in terms of operational and political sustainability.”³⁵² It is important, then, to observe government documents in order to question the FRF feasibility.

For America and Japan, the FRF is “only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.”³⁵³ However, it is questionable whether the FRF really is the only solution that solves the “operational, political, financial, and strategic” concerns of both governments. It is no secret that the Okinawa problem exists due to political differences. This tension has only worsened. Financially, landfill construction for the new FRF plan is estimated to cost around 231 billion and the overall cost to be over 350 billion yen.³⁵⁴ While the landfill construction fee for the current FRF is 100 billion yen cheaper than the 2002 plan, additional years of demonstration and deliberation and

³⁵¹ Ogawa, 329-330; Eldridge, *Who Kills Okinawa*, 275-278; Mochizuki, “Deterrence and Marines on Okinawa,” in Yanagizawa et al., 125-127.

³⁵² Green et al., 56.

³⁵³ U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing - September 21, 2015.”

³⁵⁴ “Defense Minister estimates total cost of Henoko relocation at more than 350 billion yen [Henokosougouhi 3500 oku goe Boueisho ga keisan kouhyou],” *Ryukyu Shimpō*, last modified on March 14, 2014, accessed on May 1, 2017, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/preentry-221327.html>.

costs for environmental evaluation will diminish the difference between the two plans.³⁵⁵

If these two characteristics lack plausibility, observers may conclude that the operational and strategic explanations allow the FRF to be the best solution. The Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report argued that the FRF fulfills the necessities of the American military. Reported on 31 August 2010, the report concluded, “The V-way shaped configuration would support both peacetime and contingency operational capacity requirements.”³⁵⁶ With representatives from the American Office of the Secretary of Defense and Department of State, American Military, Japanese Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cabinet Secretariat, both parties came to an agreement that the FRF would be a suitable substitute to the current air base.

However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recently criticized both governments’ conclusion on the FRF’s operational capability. According to the GAO, the MCAS Futenma “support operations involving a variety of fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tilt-rotor aircraft... [and] also supports the use of a runway if needed for a United Nations contingency, such as disaster responses.”³⁵⁷

³⁵⁵ Japanese Cabinet Office. “Documents related with the ‘Main Direction with dealing with the FRF Construction’ [‘Daitai shisetsu kihon keikaku shuyou jikou ni kakaru toriatsukai houshin’ ni motodoku kentou shiryō],” *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, last modified in 2002, accessed on April 17, 2017, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hutenma/dai9/9siryou1.pdf>, 5.

³⁵⁶ Japan Ministry of Defense, “FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY BILATERAL EXPERTS STUDY GROUP REPORT,” last modified on August 31, 2010, accessed on May 1, 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/sankou/report/20100831_e.html.

³⁵⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, “MARINE CORPS ASIA PACIFIC REALIGNMENT DOD Should Resolve Capability Deficiencies and Infrastructure Risks and Revise Cost

Although both governments have not criticized the shorter runway of the FRF in comparison to MCAS Futenma, the GAO criticized the agreed blueprint as problematic:

Instead [of a 9,000-foot runway], there will be two 5,900-foot V-shaped runways that, according to Marine Corps officials, will be too short for certain aircraft. As we reported in March 1998 and is still the case based on our discussions with Marine Corps officials, the loss of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma's runway equates to the loss of an emergency landing strip for fixed-wing aircraft in the area and the loss of the United Nations use of a runway. According to an official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the office has not yet developed a plan for other alternate runways in Okinawa because it is not a priority.³⁵⁸

As the congressional watchdog recorded, the FRF's shorter runway cannot fully provide runways necessary for certain aircrafts, and there is no alternative announced yet. Another problem is the GAO's revelation that a "Marine Corps and Pacific Command officials said the government of Japan is ultimately responsible for replacing the lost requirements by providing a longer runway elsewhere."³⁵⁹ Currently, there is no evidence that the Japanese government plans to provide additional facilities out of the decided FRF framework. It is also highly unlikely that the governments would create an additional facility after claiming that the current framework is the "only solution." However, if true, this would delegitimize the necessity of the FRF.

If several problems question the FRF's operational, political, financial, and strategic purposes, what justifies both governments to advocate for the FRF? Given that the past twenty years were devoted to negotiation and assessment, it is probably

Estimates," last modified in April 2017, accessed on May 1, 2017, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683967.pdf>, 21.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., 21-22.

³⁵⁹ Ibid..

politically preferable to remain with the current plan rather than negotiating a new location and causing turmoil elsewhere. Reanalysis would also be a political defeat of both governments and thus would make relocation elsewhere more difficult. Change in blueprints would also discard previous financial investment. Despite having a shorter runway as critiqued by the GAO, the FRF will still be able to operate as a facility for other aircrafts and the Ospreys. Most importantly, the relocation of the air base out of the crowded Futenma would be a palpable gesture of base reduction.

Recent comments by the Japanese Minister of Defense reiterate concerns on the short runway. On 15 June 2017, Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada claimed that unless all eight conditions for return of Futenma base are not satisfied, the alliance could not return Futenma back to Okinawan jurisdiction.³⁶⁰ Her statement is problematic due to the fourth condition of Futenma base's reversion: "Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF."³⁶¹ As of July 2017, discussions on the civilian facilities have not occurred. Therefore, as long as discussions do not occur, the stabilization of Futenma is possible. Given the likelihood of Okinawan demonstration against the usage of civilian facilities, it is possible for Futenma base to remain active beyond its intended reversion date. It is most likely that this civilian facility would be Naha Airport's second runway, currently constructed under the second Abe administration as

³⁶⁰ Ryota Nakamura, "Inada's Rippling Comment: If conditions not met Futenma will 'not be returned' [Inada shi hatsugen ga hamon Futenma henkan jyouken mitassei nara 'henkan nashi']," *Ryukyu Shinpo*, last modified on July 4, 2017, accessed on July 9, 2017, <https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-527148.html>.

³⁶¹ Japan Ministry of Defense, "Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa April 2013."

one of his economic incentives. However, if the alliance eventually utilizes a civilian runway, the FRF cannot be justified to be a suitable replacement of MCAS Futenma. Therefore, the alliances' argument of the FRF as the "only solution" in terms of operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns remains highly questionable.

Criticism against the militaristic necessity of the FRF is abundant. The FRF's insufficient runway length receives the greatest attention. In order to address this shortcoming, the government will most likely utilize a civilian facility, which will further increase burden on Okinawa. The worst-case scenario is the continued usage of Futenma base as their runway. Critics agree that within the prefecture cannot be compromised due to security necessities. However, base consolidation should be seriously considered. Difference of culture between marines and air force or aviation concerns may hinder the feasibility of merging MCAS Futenma's facilities with another facility. Regardless, in order to complete relocation with Okinawan support, America will need to modify their conditions. American deliberation and obstinacy resulted as the 2006 FRF blueprint with a shorter runway than the original 2002 proposal, which results in the inevitable usage of a civilian facility. The original spirit of lessening burden is lost in America's current position on relocation.

4.2. "Nokinawa"? Questioning Okinawa's Low Win-set

Reconsideration of conditions is also required from Okinawa. Security experts on both sides of the political spectrum argued that relocation out of the prefecture is implausible. If the alliance, especially the United States, should reconsider base

consolidation as an alternative, the Okinawans should also view this alternative as the solution.

The current governor upholds the belief that Futenma should be unconditionally returned back to Okinawa.³⁶² Statistics introduced in the thesis reconfirm Okinawa's position against increasing base burden. This desire should not translate into a simple "no" to any alternative. Eldridge labels this phenomenon of perpetual resistance without constructive proposal as "Nokinawa", an Okinawa that can only say "no."³⁶³ This label alone obscures the complexity of the issue, but raises an important point of consideration.

The polls introduced in the thesis affirmed the fact that Okinawan's understand the evolving security environment.³⁶⁴ The governor himself criticized the FRF as insufficient due to the lack of deterrence provided by the Henoko facility alone. If Okinawa believes in the necessity of bolstering security, it is important for Okinawa to find alternatives on the same line of argument. The alliance may reject Okinawan proposals, given that the new facility has already been approved. True resistance can be achieved by challenging the feasibility of the alliance's limited conditions. With both conservatives and liberal academics arguing against the FRF's militaristic feasibility, Okinawa could have diverted construction by proposing a militaristic alternative.

³⁶² "Government Preferred Candidate Atsushi Sakima Defeats Pro-Governor Candidate at Ginowan City Elections."

³⁶³ Eldridge, *Okinawa Theory*, 165.

³⁶⁴ Kouno, "Conscious of Residents of Okinawa Prefecture 40 Years," 100.

4.3 The Impossible Compromise

The information above suggests that the parties could have established changed their position. The rigid conditions of both parties, especially the United States of America, remain questionable. As shown in the thesis, the lack of agreeable conditions determined compromise to fail. Failure of achieving agreement should have resulted in a reevaluation of fundamental concerns. Rather than questioning and developing alternatives that guarantees one party's conditions, stalemate should have resulted in internal evaluation. Lack of introspective criticism suggests that both parties had no intention to fasten the process of relocation. This resulted in the alliance's threatening position of acceptance of Henoko or stabilization of Futenma, providing Okinawa a dilemma that would only limit its win-sets.

V. Conclusion

The alliance between the United States and Japan is important for security in East Asia, which has been referred by Prime Minister Abe as the alliance of hope. Unfortunately, the alliance of hope is challenged by the unsolved the MCAS Futenma relocation problem. The alliance extended the promised relocation by fifteen years beyond the initial agreement. The American and Japanese government continue to articulate the necessity of the bases in terms of security and burden reduction. However, Okinawan polls and the current governor's speeches reveal that the residents do not share the same perspective as the government. The schism between the local and central governments reveal that both have not budged towards a compromise.

Existing literature on the Okinawa problem fails to address the root of stalemate. Debate revolves around tangent issues. This thesis contributes to the debate by readdressing the fundamental reason behind the twenty-year delay. When observed through Putnam's Two-Level Game Analysis, the Okinawa base problem can be seen as a fundamentally erroneous methodology of negotiation. Any form of agreement cannot be achieved when the two parties at negotiation have no interest of compromise.

Would it have been better for the alliance to not propose MCAS Futenma's relocation regardless of growing domestic and international attention on the atrocities of the American soldiers? The reality of military-caused crimes and accidents would inevitably coax the alliance to consider relocation. History reveals that the alliance had good intentions for Okinawa and desired to provide a facility that would genuinely

replace the air station. The problem is not the alliance's proposal of relocating Futenma. The fundamental problem is the alliance's misunderstanding of Okinawa's burden and stance on relocation. The alliance must admit that their initial intention to "reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance" had failed. Continuing resistance for twenty years proves that Okinawa did not view the FRF in the same manner as the alliance.

The Futenma relocation problem may come to an end sooner or later, given that the Supreme Court will strengthen the LDP's justification for constructing Henoko base regardless of discontent or not. This does not mean that Okinawan resistance would end. The Okinawa base problem will continue to be a problem as long as alienation continues. The forcible construction of Henoko will not amend the deteriorated relations between the prefecture and the alliance. Even if the current delay is solved, it may be hard to provide a real solution to appease Okinawa's "spiritual starvation."

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Abstract (Korean)

불가피한 교착상태: 오키나와현 후텐마 기지 이전에 대한 투 레벨 게임 분석

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1995 년 오키나와 성폭행 사건 이후, 일미 양 정부와 오키나와의 관계는 견잡을 수 없이 악화하였다. 1996 년 일미 정부는 오키나와의 불만 조정하기 위해 후텐마 비행장을 헤노코에 있는 슈워브 캠프 (Camp Schwab) 가까이 7 년 이내에 이전시키기로 합의했다. 하지만 20 년이 지나도록 이 합의는 이루어지지 않고 있다. 오키나와 기지 이전 문제에 대한 기존 연구는 사회·환경·안보 관점 중심으로 이 문제를 다루지만, 왜 이전합의가 지연되고 있는지 실증적 분석을 하고 있지 않다.

이 논문은 후텐마 기지 이전합의가 왜 20 년 동안 교착상태에 빠졌는지 퍼트넘(Putnam)의 투 레벨 게임 이론을 적용하여 분석한다. 처음부터 오키나와의 저항이 명확했음에도 불구하고 오키나와의 요구보다 안보를 중시한 일미 양 정부는 오키나와와 협상을 시작하였다. 협의 이전의 오키나와 저항은 처음부터 합의 가능성이 낮았다는 것을 시사한다. 그러므로 협상은 오래 걸릴 수 밖에 없었고 합의하기 어려웠다.

키워드: 오키나와, 일미 동맹, 후텐마, 헤노코, 투 레벨 게임 분석